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vForeword
Foreword
In Australia, legislation was introduced in 2006 that 
requires specified businesses (such as banks and 
other financial institutions, insurance companies, 
securities and investment companies, gambling 
service providers, bullion dealers and providers of 
alternative remittance services) to forward reports of 
certain financial transactions to a federal government 
agency, the Australian Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC). This legislation, the 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism 
Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth)), 
is part of a suite of measures to ensure that Australia 
complies with the international anti-money laundering 
and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) standards 
developed by the Financial Action Task Force.
The AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) establishes a risk-based 
regulatory framework in which certain businesses 
that offer ‘designated services’ are required to identify 
their customers and their customers’ financial 
activities that might pose a high risk of involvement 
in money laundering or financing of terrorism and 
report these to AUSTRAC. Reporting entities need to 
be diligent in their reporting activities and in maintaining 
information about their customers and transactions  
for the system to work effectively. In order to deter 
businesses from failing to comply with the legislation, 
the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) also establishes 
penalties for non-compliance.
Some of the regulated businesses had comparable 
regulatory responsibilities under Australia’s earlier 
anti-money laundering legislation (Financial 
Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth)), as entities  
that provided certain regulated services, while others 
were exposed to regulatory requirements for the first 
time with the enactment of the 2006 Act. Businesses 
whose services fall under the definition in the AML/
CTF Act 2006 (Cth) of what constitutes a designated 
service are now obliged to implement AML/CTF 
programs to address the level of money laundering 
and terrorism financing (ML/TF) risk that they believe 
affects their business operations. In addition, they 
are required to adhere to customer identification and 
due diligence procedures and to submit suspicious 
matter, threshold transaction and international funds 
transfer instruction reports to AUSTRAC.
As part of the Australian Institute of Criminology’s 
research into Australia’s AML/CTF regime, a survey 
was conducted in mid-2009 of all businesses with 
reporting obligations under the AML/CTF Act 2006 
(Cth) at that time. The survey, which was undertaken 
during the early phase of implementation of the 
legislative reforms, provides a point-in-time review  
of the perceptions of affected businesses, many of 
who were still in the process of adapting to the new 
regulatory regime and consequently, in streamlining 
their processes. Most participants held neutral views 
about the regime, although there was general support 
for the regime in meeting its aims of deterring 
offenders, minimising risk and promoting good 
governance practices within the business 
community. Those who responded were also of the 
view that the costs that had, thus far, been incurred 
were not prohibitive at the time, with respondents 
spending an average of $1,000 during the previous 
12 months in complying with the legislation.
Some of the findings from the survey however, 
reflected difficulties that a number of businesses  
had experienced, particularly those without previous 
regulatory obligations. In particular, some saw the 
regulatory regime as being too onerous for the 
perceived level of risk that they faced at the time. 
Many participants also felt that they would gain a 
better understanding of the risks and respond better 
to regulatory obligations, if a greater array of sector-
specific education and training opportunities were 
made available. Almost all survey participants  
(the majority of whom were from micro or small 
businesses and irrespective of the sector that they 
represented), considered in mid-2009 that the ML/
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TF risks to their businesses were low. It is possible 
that this assessment was, in part, based on limited 
exposure to the educative material describing inherent 
risks to their businesses that has since been made 
available by AUSTRAC and other industry 
organisations.
Changes to the AML/CTF environment in the  
period since the survey was conducted may have 
ameliorated these concerns to some extent. On a 
national level, the Commonwealth Organised Crime 
Strategic Framework, introduced in 2009, includes 
among its purposes the aim of enhancing 
relationships between the Commonwealth and 
regulated industries in both understanding and 
responding to organised crime matters. Money 
Laundering Working Groups were formed under  
the Framework and have produced a Response  
Plan for Heads of Commonwealth Law Enforcement 
Agencies (HOCOLEA). In addition, the national 
regulator, AUSTRAC, has produced a range of 
guides, typology reports and other tools to assist 
entities, particularly those who have experienced 
difficulty in adapting to Australia’s risk-based AML/CTF 
approach, to evaluate risks and to apply appropriate 
compliance programs more effectively. Similarly, 
there has been an increase and improvement in 
industry-specific engagement through targeted 
education campaigns and the development of 
sector-specific guidance and supervision plans, 
which refer to individual exposure and risk levels.
The combination of regulator response, alongside 
increased familiarity with the regime, has arguably 
produced enhanced understanding of the benefits  
of the regime, as well as improved capability among 
businesses in achieving compliance with regulatory 
requirements. The findings presented in this report 
provide a useful gauge at a specific point in time of 
how over 4,000 Australian businesses and parts of 
some sectors regulated under the AML/CTF Act 
perceived the ML/TF risks they believed they faced. 
This is an important contribution to understanding 
the Australian risk environment and operation  
of AML/CTF regulation. However, the findings in  
this survey on business perceptions of ML/TF risk 
need to be viewed in a wider context. Business 
perceptions represent only one piece of the broader 
ML/TF picture. Due to the complexity and clandestine 
nature of ML/TF, most if not all businesses will only 
see a part of the environment. A significant amount 
of ML/TF and illicit financial activity can only be 
detected when government agencies examine  
larger holdings of transaction reporting and other 
information. Access to criminal and other intelligence 
may be needed to draw links across information sets 
to identify unusual or suspicious activity. Investigations 
are often required to confirm money laundering and 
criminal behaviour. Except in instances where law 
enforcement and other authorities approach 
businesses to gain their assistance on operational 
matters, business will not be privy to this wider array 
of information, much of which is highly classified.
AUSTRAC and other government agencies provide 
guidance and information on ML/TF risks, including 
summaries of real life cases and methods that have 
been detected. But this information is, by necessity, 
limited. Intelligence and operational sensitivities 
restrict the amount of information and detail 
authorities can provide to business on actual cases 
or the full extent of known ML/TF risk. Government 
authorities also acknowledge that they do not possess 
comprehensive visibility of the entire ML/TF risk 
environment. For these reasons, business 
perceptions of ML/TF risk presented in this report 
need to be seen as only one view of the ML/TF 
environment in Australia. Interpretation of those 
findings needs to take this limitation into account.
The results of the present study will be of use in 
providing a context of business perceptions as 
AUSTRAC conducts its own surveys of businesses 
to determine how well certain sectors understand 
risk and how well they have performed in 
implementing their AML/CTF obligations.  
The present results, taken in conjunction with 
AUSTRAC’s ongoing survey results in the future, 
should provide a comprehensive body of information 
on how Australian businesses have approached 
AML/CTF and their views concerning the benefits 
and difficulties that have arisen in practice. This 
information will also provide a basis for developing 
future outreach activities to assist businesses with 
compliance in this important area of financial crime 
control.
Adam Tomison
Director
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In 2009, the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) 
conducted a survey of 4,346 Australian businesses 
with anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism 
financing (AML/CTF) obligations under Australian 
legislation. The aims of the survey were to determine:
•	 perceptions of the risks of money laundering and 
financing of terrorism faced by these businesses;
•	 processes used by businesses in the compliance 
areas of customer identification and transaction 
monitoring;
•	 estimated costs for businesses to comply with the 
regime; and
•	 businesses’ perceptions of the necessity and 
effectiveness of the regime and of the 
effectiveness of their compliance with it.
Methodology
Businesses were contacted by letter and telephone 
by staff from a social research company, the Social 
Research Centre, engaged by the AIC to carry out 
the survey. Contact details were provided by the 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
(AUSTRAC) after permission in writing was obtained 
from AUSTRAC’s Chief Executive Officer, subject  
to the AIC and the survey consultant agreeing to 
comply with strict protocols regarding security of 
information and confidentiality. The research was 
also approved by the AIC’s Human Research Ethics 
Committee and the Statistical Clearing House of the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Data were collected over a period of approximately 
10 weeks between 31 July 2009 and 11 October 
2009. Of the 10,670 addresses originally provided 
by AUSTRAC, 8,976 were included in the initial 
questionnaire mailing (a number were removed 
because they fell outside the sampling criteria),  
with 8,690 being confirmed as usable selections. A 
total of 4,346 survey responses were received, which 
was 50 percent of those selected (see Challice & 
Eliseo 2012 for further details). This provided a large 
sample of businesses from all sectors that were 
subject to AML/CTF regulation in Australia in 2009. 
The majority of respondents were small or micro 
businesses, as was the case with their level of 
representation in the regulated sector as a whole. 
The participating businesses were from the gambling, 
banking, managed funds and superannuation, 
securities and derivatives, foreign exchange, 
alternative remittance, financial services and cash 
delivery sectors, and other businesses providing 
regulated services such as bullion dealers. Almost 
half of respondents came from the gambling industry 
(55.3%), while businesses from the financial services 
sector (23.5%) formed the second largest group. 
Only eight percent of respondents came from the 
banking sector. This may have influenced the results 
where analyses were conducted across the entire 
sample. Small and micro businesses comprised  
the majority of the sample, which may also have 
influenced the results in the study.
In addition to conducting the business survey,  
10 individuals from businesses who completed the 
questionnaire agreed to participate in face-to-face 
interviews. These individuals worked in pubs and 
clubs, a credit union, a cash delivery business, a 
mortgage lender, a private equity firm and a currency 
exchange service. In addition, a representative from 
an Australian Government agency was interviewed. 
These interviews were conducted anonymously  
and no individuals or businesses were named  
or identifiable. The aim of the interviews was to 
ascertain additional information on some issues that 
the questionnaire was unable to canvass in detail. 
Interviews with such a small number of individuals 
cannot be considered to be representative of the 
entire regulated sector but nonetheless, the 
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qualitative data that were obtained provided some 
important, albeit subjective, insights into the operation 
of the AML/CTF regime in Australia.
The information presented in this report was 
collected during a period that coincided with the 
early implementation stages of Australia’s AML/CTF 
regime. This period represented a phase during 
which the regulated sector was still adapting to the 
requirements and the effects of the legislation and  
as a result, some respondents might not have had a 
comprehensive understanding of how the legislative 
requirements affected their business operations.  
In addition, AUSTRAC has undertaken significant 
outreach activities with the regulated population 
since the data were collected.
Survey limitations
Although the current study was the first of its kind  
in Australia, the research was subject to a number  
of limitations. These are explained more fully in the 
separately published methodology report (Challice  
& Eliseo 2012). Some of the principal limitations are 
as follows.
It was apparent that some inconsistencies were 
present in how businesses from the same industry 
sector identified their primary sources of revenue  
in the self-reported demographic information.
In addition, and despite intensive pre-testing of  
the survey instrument and review by AUSTRAC  
and other stakeholders, as well as the use of a 
comprehensive glossary, the language used in the 
questionnaire to describe some aspects of the AML/
CTF regime in Australia proved inaccessible to some 
survey respondents. This may have been more of  
an issue for some of the newly included business 
sectors. Some interviewees reported being motivated 
to participate in a follow-up interview in order to 
obtain feedback on difficulties they experienced in 
trying to respond to the survey. Depending on the 
extent of participants’ difficulty in understanding 
some of the key terms employed, the results may 
not have captured the views of businesses recently 
included in the regime to an appropriate extent. 
Analysis of responses from participants who elected 
not to complete the survey suggested that non-
corporate businesses, such as pubs and clubs, 
Australia Post outlets and retailers were over-
represented in this group. More than 70 percent  
of those who elected to not complete the survey 
agreed that the regime was too onerous (Challice  
& Eliseo 2012).
Almost half of respondents consisted of businesses 
in the gambling industry. Businesses from the financial 
services sectors, such as banks, were under-
represented. This might have influenced the results 
in situations where analysis was conducted across 
the entire sample. Small and micro businesses 
comprised the majority of the sample, which may 
also have influenced the results obtained in the 
study. At the time of writing, there was no publicly 
available information on the distribution of business 
size within the regulated sector, to determine 
whether the number of smaller businesses that 
responded were representative of the entire 
regulated sector.
Perceptions of the risks  
of money laundering  
and terrorism financing
Although there have been estimates that ‘up to  
$10b a year in the proceeds of crime are available 
for laundering in and through Australia’ (ACC 2011: 
46), more than 97 percent of respondents 
considered that their business had a low risk of 
involvement in money laundering in the 2008–09 
financial year. More than 95 percent of respondents 
across all business sectors believed that the level of 
risk of money laundering faced by their businesses 
in 2008–09 would remain the same or decrease in  
the ensuing two year period to 30 June 2011. Only 
nine businesses from the sample of more than 4,000 
considered that money laundering posed a high risk 
to their business at the time.
Almost all of the businesses surveyed also considered 
that risk of terrorism financing was low in 2008–09. 
Again, more than 95 percent of respondents 
anticipated that the risk of their business becoming 
implicated in terrorism financing would remain the 
same or decrease in the two year period to 30 June 
2011. Only two businesses considered that the risk 
of terrorism financing to their business was high.
The money laundering and terrorism financing  
(ML/TF) risks that participants speculated may affect 
their business in the two year period to 30 June 
2011 were more likely to relate to the core internal 
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activities of the business than to some external 
threat. Businesses in certain sectors also believed 
that some of their customers were more likely than 
others to pose a risk of money laundering and 
financing of terrorism. For example, those in the 
financial services sector were more likely than those 
in other business sectors to consider that politically 
exposed persons (PEPs) and foreign companies 
posed greater money laundering risks than other 
types of customers. Individuals (both Australian and 
overseas residents) were the customer type most 
frequently nominated as posing higher risks of both 
money laundering and financing of terrorism than 
corporate customers.
Compliance
Survey participants were asked about three aspects 
of their AML/CTF activities—the procedures used to 
identify customers (so-called ‘know-your-customer’ 
(KYC) procedures), the extent to which they 
undertook ongoing customer due diligence and the 
extent to which they undertook pre-employment 
screening processes. It was found that 85 percent  
of businesses conducted ongoing customer due 
diligence procedures, with 80 percent complying 
with KYC requirements and 75 percent conducting 
pre-employment screening.
There was no significant difference in terms of  
rates of compliance with customer due diligence 
requirements between businesses that took the view 
that they faced few risks of money laundering or 
financing of terrorism and those who believed that 
they were at higher levels of risk. Similarly, there was 
no significant relationship between compliance with 
the three anti-money laundering measures outlined 
above and the perceived effectiveness of the regime 
generally.
A significant relationship was found between the 
business sector of participants and their likelihood  
of complying with KYC, ongoing due diligence and 
pre-employment screening processes. Businesses 
from the financial services sector were significantly 
more likely than other businesses to perform ongoing 
due diligence and KYC procedures. Businesses  
from these sectors, such as banks, as well as those 
offering cash delivery services were more likely than 
other sectors to conduct pre-employment screening.
Anti-money laundering/
counter-terrorism  
financing software
A number of software applications have been 
developed to assist businesses to comply with  
AML/CTF obligations. Some of these facilitate 
customer identification by enabling names to be 
matched with lists of internationally proscribed 
persons and organisations, while others enable 
transactions to be tracked and monitored for 
reporting purposes. The present survey asked 
respondents to indicate which types of software  
they used, if any, and to state whether or not  
the software they used was effective in meeting 
legislative obligations. Since 2009, a number of 
businesses may have begun using software for 
compliance purposes.
Less than one-quarter of businesses indicated  
that they used software for AML/CTF compliance 
purposes. Those in the gambling sector were the 
least likely to use AML/CTF software. The majority of 
businesses considered that procedures undertaken 
by staff and internal audit were effective in monitoring 
transactions, while only a few businesses agreed 
that software was an effective means of monitoring 
transactions for AML/CTF purposes.
Reporting suspicious 
matters
Australian reporting entities are required to submit 
various financial transaction reports to AUSTRAC. 
Reporting entities are required to lodge suspicious 
matter reports (SMRs) upon forming a suspicion  
that a customer may be dealing with the proceeds  
of crime or involved an offence or tax evasion. SMRs 
are discretionary reports and in Australia, may be 
triggered at any stage of a transaction.
Survey respondents were asked to indicate the 
circumstances in which the non-reporting of 
suspicious transactions to AUSTRAC may be 
justifiable. The largest proportion of businesses 
considered under-reporting of suspicious matters to 
be unjustifiable, while most businesses considered 
that over-reporting of suspicious matters could be 
justifiable. More than 70 percent of businesses 
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agreed over-reporting was justifiable where they 
were unsure of what a transaction involved. Almost 
60 percent agreed that over-reporting was justifiable 
in order to avoid penalties for non-compliance.
Participants’ views on under-reporting and over-
reporting suspicious matters were associated with 
business sector. Businesses in the banking sector 
were the least likely to consider over-reporting 
justifiable in certain circumstances. Financial services 
sector businesses, such as banks, and securities 
and derivatives firms, were more likely to consider 
under-reporting justifiable in certain circumstances 
than other types of businesses.
The participants’ business sector was also associated 
with the likelihood of identifying a suspicious matter 
in the year to 30 June 2009. Banks, despite holding 
more restrictive views on the justifiability of over-
reporting than other business types, were most likely 
to have identified a transaction suspected of being 
linked to money laundering in the year to 30 June 
2009. Participants outside the banking sector were 
more inclined than not to report a suspicious matter, 
while those in the banking sector were the most 
likely to actually encounter and identify a suspicious 
matter. None of the surveyed businesses reported 
matters involved with the financing of terrorism.
Compliance costs
Participants were also asked to estimate the 
approximate cost of complying with the AML/CTF 
regime over the 12 month period ending 30 June 
2009. Owing to the fact that the period 2008–09 
was one during which some businesses were starting 
to implement their AML/CTF systems, costs incurred 
during this period may have been quite high. The 
median expenditure on AML/CTF compliance was 
$1,000, with 57 percent of businesses reporting an 
AML/CTF expenditure of $1,000 or less for the year. 
The range of compliance expenses across the entire 
sample was from zero costs to $60m for the year  
in question. Managed funds and superannuation 
businesses had the highest median compliance 
costs of $6,000 in the 2008–09 financial year, while 
businesses from the foreign exchange sector and 
those classified as ‘other’ reported median costs  
of below $500.
Two-thirds of businesses believed that their costs 
would remain the same as in the 2008–09 year for 
the two years to 30 June 2011. Staff training and 
professional development, staff salaries, record 
keeping, monitoring and reporting accounted for  
the majority of compliance costs for Australian 
businesses.
The survey also sought to determine if businesses’ 
expenditure on compliance in 2008–09 was 
associated with their views on the extent to which 
they considered compliance with the regime to  
be too onerous. It was found that businesses  
with higher costs were not more likely than other 
businesses to view compliance with the regime  
as being too onerous for the risks involved. The 
likelihood of participants viewing compliance with 
the regime as being too onerous, however, did  
not directly increase with the level of expenditure. 
Businesses that spent $1,000 or less in 2008–09 
were more likely to give neutral responses to the 
question of whether the regime was too onerous  
for the risks involved than those that had higher 
expenditure.
Attitudes towards the  
AML/CTF regime
The largest proportion (45.5%) of respondents 
neither agreed nor disagreed that the system was 
too onerous with respect to money laundering risks. 
The proportion of respondents who agreed with  
the statement (30%) was slightly higher than the 
proportion who did not (25.7%). These findings 
indicate there was no strong feeling either way about 
the onerous nature of the regime. The businesses 
that considered the burden of compliance too 
onerous for the risks involved were the ones that 
also considered the regime to be less than effective 
in minimising the risks of ML/TF.
Some businesses anticipated that compliance with 
the AML/CTF regime would be an onerous process 
when it was introduced in 2006, but later found that 
compliance was relatively simple or found that AML/
CTF enhanced existing compliance programs or 
other risk management processes, therefore not 
requiring fundamental changes to procedures 
already in place.
Overall, two-thirds of Australian businesses 
considered the regime to be effective in deterring 
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offenders, minimising risk of financial crime, 
minimising risks of money laundering, minimising 
risks of terrorism financing, maintaining the integrity 
of the financial system and promoting good 
governance practices. Respondents viewed the 
regime as being neither effective nor ineffective  
in facilitating proceeds of crime recoveries and 
minimising the risk of reputational damage.
Conclusion
Overall, it appeared that the Australian businesses 
regulated under the AML/CTF regime in 2009 who 
responded to the current survey believed that the 
risk of money laundering was low and that the risk  
of financing of terrorism was even lower. Overall,  
the perception of respondents was that the benefits 
of the regime appeared to justify the compliance 
burden that many businesses experienced. 
Respondents felt that there was a continuing need 
to improve the levels of education about the risk  
of money laundering and financing of terrorism in 
order to ensure that all levels of business in Australia 
appreciated the aims of the regime and how their 
compliance activities may assist in preventing and 
deterring serious financial crime.
Businesses without previous exposure to AML/CTF 
compliance were more likely to report difficulties  
with the system and to consider the regime as being 
overly onerous compared with the risks involved. 
Some of those businesses indicated they were 
experiencing difficulty with conducting risk 
assessments, implementing risk-appropriate 
measures and complying fully with the regulatory 
obligations.
Educational materials and training activities tailored 
to businesses without previous exposure to AML/CTF 
or other forms of financial regulation, or without 
other extensive compliance activities, were identified 
as potentially improving compliance and effective 
implementation of legislative requirements. Initiatives 
aimed at these sectors would be likely to improve 
businesses’ capacity to conduct a risk assessment, 
which is the central component of the risk-based 
AML/CTF system. It might be inferred from the 
recommendations of respondents for better 
dissemination of education and training materials 
that the information made available to the regulated 
sector at the time of the survey did not assist some 
reporting entities in understanding and complying 
with the AML/CTF regime. In the period since the 
survey was conducted, AUSTRAC has developed  
a more extensive range of education, training and 
guidance materials, including industry-specific 
guidelines, risk management tools to assist small 
and medium-sized business to identify, assess and 
treat risks and annual typology reports describing 
known methods by which specific sectors have 
been used for ML/TF purposes. In addition, the 
private sector has developed new training courses 
for those involved in AML/CTF compliance work.  
For example, the Diploma of Applied Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Management is  
a new workplace-focused qualification, developed 
jointly by the Australian Financial Markets Association 
and the International Compliance Association. More 
recent surveys being undertaken by AUSTRAC  
as part of its 2010–11 supervision strategy should 
reveal whether longer exposure to the AML/CTF 
regime has delivered greater understanding of  
ML/TF risks and enhanced capacity to comply  
with regulatory obligations.
The findings presented in this report need to be 
viewed as part of a wider context, as business 
perceptions represent only one piece of the  
broader ML/TF picture. Due to the complexity  
and clandestine nature of ML/TF, most if not all 
businesses will only see a part of the environment.  
A significant amount of ML/TF and illicit financial 
activity can only be detected when government 
agencies examine larger holdings of transaction 
reporting and other information to which businesses 
rarely have access.
AUSTRAC and other government agencies provide 
guidance and information on ML/TF risks, including 
real life cases and methods that have been detected. 
But this information is, by necessity, limited. 
Intelligence and operational sensitivities restrict  
the amount of information and detail authorities  
can provide to businesses on actual cases or the  
full extent of the known ML/TF risk. Government 
authorities also acknowledge that they too do not 
possess comprehensive visibility of the entire ML/TF 
risk environment. For these reasons, business 
perceptions of ML/TF risk presented in this report 
need to be seen as only one view of the ML/TF 
environment in Australia.
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In 2009, the AIC undertook a survey of businesses 
that were, at that time, regulated under Australia’s 
AML/CTF legislation. The aims of the survey were  
to determine:
•	 perceptions of the risk of ML/TF faced by these 
businesses;
•	 the processes they use in the compliance areas of 
customer identification and transaction monitoring;
•	 the estimated costs of compliance with the 
regime; and
•	 the perceptions of the necessity and effectiveness 
of the regime and of the effectiveness of compliance.
The survey focused on the experience of businesses 
with the AML/CTF regime in Australia in the 12 months 
prior to 30 June 2009 and also on expectations of 
how these aspects might change during the two 
year period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2011. This 
timeframe refers to the initial period of implementation 
of AML/CTF legislation by the Australian Government 
and the responses described herein refer to that 
period alone.
Specifically, the survey examined the following areas:
•	 information about respondents’ business sector, 
staffing and turnover;
•	 AML/CTF procedures and software used for 
pre-employment screening of staff, due diligence 
and KYC;
•	 extent and effectiveness of customer identification 
and due diligence;
•	 extent and effectiveness of transaction monitoring 
and reporting;
•	 views concerning under- and over-reporting to 
AUSTRAC;
•	 current and future compliance costs;
•	 effectiveness of the AML/CTF regime and opinions 
about the extent to which the regime is onerous;
•	 views about how the regime could be improved; 
and
•	 current and future perceptions of ML/TF risks.
This report describes the results of the survey and 
where appropriate, integrates this information with 
the findings of previous surveys conducted by 
consultancy practices and government agencies.
In addition to conducting the survey, 10 individuals 
from businesses that completed the questionnaire 
agreed to participate in face-to-face interviews. 
These individuals worked in pubs and clubs, a  
credit union, a cash delivery business, a mortgage 
lender, a private equity firm and a currency exchange 
service. In addition, a representative from an 
Australian Government agency was interviewed. 
These interviews were conducted anonymously and 
no individuals or businesses were named or made 
identifiable. The aim of the interviews was to ascertain 
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more detailed information on some issues that  
the questionnaire was unable to canvass in detail. 
Interviews with such a small number of individuals 
cannot be considered to be representative of  
the entire regulated sector but nonetheless, the 
qualitative data that were obtained provided  
some important, albeit subjective, insights into  
the operation of the regime in Australia.
The anti-money  
laundering/counter-
terrorism financing regime
The primary aims of those who commit economic 
crimes are to secure a financial advantage and to be 
able to make use of the stolen funds without being 
detected by police and regulatory agencies. Many 
offenders, but by no means all, seek to disguise the 
origins of their criminally derived funds by engaging 
in the process of money laundering. Others, 
however, simply disburse money with little attempt  
at concealment, which often leads to detection by 
police, followed by prosecution and punishment.
There are three stages to laundering the proceeds  
of crime. In the initial or placement stage, the money 
launderer introduces illegal profits into the financial 
system. In some cases, illegally obtained funds may 
already be in the financial system, such as where 
funds have been misappropriated electronically from 
business accounts. Placement can also entail splitting 
large amounts of cash into less conspicuous smaller 
sums that are then deposited directly into a bank 
account, or by purchasing a series of financial 
instruments, such as cheques or money orders,  
that are then collected and deposited into accounts 
at other locations.
After the funds have entered the financial system, 
the launderer may engage in a series of transactions 
to distance the funds from their source. In this 
layering stage, the funds might be channelled 
through the purchase of investment instruments, or 
by transferring money electronically through a series 
of accounts at various banks. The launderer might 
also seek to disguise the transfers as payments for 
goods or services, thereby giving them a legitimate 
appearance. Another device used at the layering 
stage is to use corporate and trust vehicles to disguise 
the true beneficial ownership of the tainted property.
Having successfully processed criminal proceeds 
through the first two phases, the money launderer 
then moves to the third or integration stage in which 
the funds re-enter the legitimate economy. The 
launderer might choose to invest the funds in real 
estate, luxury assets, or business ventures. It is at 
this stage that offenders seek to enjoy the benefits 
of their crimes, without risk of detection.
In response to mounting international concern  
about money laundering, the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) was established in 1989. FATF is an 
inter-governmental body that sets international 
standards and develops and promotes policies  
to combat ML/TF. In 1990, FATF issued a set of  
40 Recommendations to combat money laundering. 
The 40 Recommendations sets out the framework 
for anti-money laundering efforts and provides a set 
of countermeasures covering the criminal justice 
system and law enforcement, the financial system 
and its regulation, and measures to enhance 
international cooperation.
The FATF AML/CTF standards typically recommend 
provisions that criminalise ML/TF, enable freezing 
and recovery of assets linked to proceeds of crime 
and terrorist activities, and create a preventive 
regulatory system that aims to make ML/TF more 
difficult to commit and more likely to result in the 
detection and punishment of offenders. AML/CTF 
preventive measures are not uniform between 
countries but each regime broadly encompasses 
aspects of:
•	 customer identification;
•	 transaction monitoring;
•	 transaction reporting;
•	 record keeping;
•	 staff training; and
•	 compliance reporting.
AML/CTF preventive measures, unlike the criminal 
sanctions and asset recovery systems, are aimed at 
and implemented through private sector businesses 
rather than by law enforcement and prosecutorial 
agencies. The FATF’s Recommendations suggest 
that countries implement preventive AML/CTF 
requirements for financial institutions and selected 
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non-financial businesses and professions that FATF 
believes are at risk of becoming involved in money 
laundering, the financing of terrorism or financing  
the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction 
(FATF 2012).
Following the attacks on the United States on  
11 September 2001, FATF expanded its mandate  
to address the financing of terrorism and created  
an additional eight (and subsequently 1 further) 
recommendations aimed at combating the funding 
of terrorist acts and terrorist organisations (Jensen 
2005). The structure of the 9 Special 
Recommendations reflects the different aims  
of the two crimes and the different typologies  
used to commit each offence. The 9 Special 
Recommendations were intended to work in concert 
with the earlier 40 Recommendations targeted  
at money laundering and not as an independent 
separate system to address the financing of terrorism.
In June 2003, FATF completed a major review of  
its recommendations and on 15 February 2012,  
issued revised standards on combating ML/TF  
and stockpiling weapons of mass destruction.  
The revised FATF Standards strengthen global 
safeguards and further protect the integrity of the 
financial system by providing governments with 
stronger mechanisms to take action against financial 
crime, while also addressing new priority areas  
such as corruption and tax crimes. The revised 
Recommendations have been strengthened to  
deal with areas of increased risk and to deal with 
new threats such as the financing of proliferation  
of weapons of mass destruction. They are also 
emphasise transparency and are tougher on 
corruption. In addition, there is more flexibility for 
compliance in low risk areas, which allows financial 
institutions and other designated sectors to apply 
their resources to higher risk areas. FATF (2012)  
calls upon all countries to effectively implement 
these measures in their national systems. The  
AIC has published a separate study in which the 
response to the FATFs recommendations in a 
number of selected countries was reviewed (Walters, 
Budd, Smith, Choo, McCusker & Rees 2012).
The AML/CTF regime broadly refers to three core 
components adopted universally (to varying degrees) 
by developed nations and by the majority of developing 
countries to address both crimes (Chaikin & Sharman 
2009). The FATF Recommendations form the basis for 
AML/CTF systems internationally (Sharman 2008).
Australian anti-money laundering legislation was 
implemented as a direct response to two Royal 
Commissions in the 1980s exposing the links 
between money laundering, major tax evasion,  
fraud and organised crime. The Costigan and 
Stewart Royal Commissions identified the need for 
legislative strategies to address these issues. While 
initially focusing largely on suspicious transactions 
and large cash transactions, Australia’s anti-money 
laundering legislation was later extended to include 
the reporting and monitoring of certain international 
transactions. Australia’s primary anti-money 
laundering legislation, the Financial Transaction 
Reports Act 1988 (Cth) (FTR Act), was enacted to 
create barriers in Australia’s financial and gambling 
sectors to discourage financially motivated offenders 
and to provide financial intelligence to revenue and 
law enforcement agencies. It applied to a wide range 
of businesses within the financial services industry, 
including banks, building societies, credit unions,  
the insurance industry, the travel industry and the 
gambling industry.
The FTR Act required cash dealers to report 
suspicious transactions to AUSTRAC and to report 
certain domestic currency transactions and currency 
transfers to and from Australia, of $10,000 or  
more. The Act also required cash dealers to report 
international funds transfer instructions and verify  
the identities of account holders or signatories, as 
well as block withdrawals by unverified signatories  
to accounts exceeding certain credit balance or 
deposit limits. The Act also created an offence of 
opening or operating a bank account or similar 
account with a cash dealer in a false name. The  
FTR Act specified penalties for non-compliance  
with its reporting requirements or for provision of 
false or incomplete information. The reporting and 
identification requirements, backed by penalties  
for offences, provided a strong deterrent to money 
launderers and facilitators of money laundering.
The FTR Act was originally developed for a financial 
system in which most transactions were face-to-face 
and took place over the counter at branches of 
financial institutions. However, cashless, non 
face-to-face electronic transactions are increasingly 
replacing traditional cash-based transactions and 
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the range of financial services available to consumers 
outside the traditional banking sector has expanded 
greatly. Money laundering methodologies have 
continued to evolve, as these commercial and 
technological developments have created 
opportunities for criminals to exploit.
In 2005, FATF conducted its third review of Australia’s 
AML/CTF regime and found that Australia did not 
comply with all of the FATFs Recommendations  
that were current at the time (FATF 2005). Partly  
as a consequence of this, Australia introduced the 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism 
Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth)) 
to address the concerns raised by FATF. The primary 
concerns related to customer due diligence and the 
resourcing of AUSTRAC. To some extent, it may be 
said that Australia’s regulatory regime was criticised 
for not addressing a number of areas that had  
never been incorporated into its aims, such as  
the monitoring of PEPs (persons linked to senior 
positions in judicial, political, management or military 
arenas). In this regard, FATF’s concerns about 
Australia’s regulatory arrangements mirror FATFs 
expanded concerns beyond money laundering  
(and its initial emphasis to its links with the narcotics 
trade) to terrorism and terrorism financing. There 
was also a perception that the previous legislative 
regime had been too prescriptive and cumbersome, 
resulting in ‘defensive reporting’, a practice that 
threatened to overload regulators with information  
of dubious relevance and accuracy, and an inflexible 
response to new developments in money laundering 
techniques (Ross & Hannan 2007: 139).
In keeping with most comparable regulatory regimes 
(such as those in the United States and United 
Kingdom), the AML/CTF regime in Australia is risk 
based. The regime requires businesses that supply 
designated services to comply with the legislation, 
but there is discretion in how they meet some of 
these obligations. The focus of the legislation is  
on the nature of the service rather than on the entity 
that supplies it. The reporting entity is largely given 
responsibility—with general guidance and education 
from AUSTRAC—for both determining the level  
of risk represented by any customer and any 
transaction, and the appropriate response. 
Responsibilities such as customer due diligence 
show a change in emphasis from a regulatory ‘tick 
and flick’ based regime to one that emphasises the 
responsibility of reporting entities to maintain ongoing 
knowledge of their customers. The presumption  
is that a risk-based regime allows financial bodies 
(which presumably have more practical experience 
in dealing with actual clients) to be given more 
latitude in determining what level of risk any 
particular client or transaction represents and how 
best to manage that risk (Ross & Hannan 2007).
Under the FTR Act, AUSTRAC’s responsibilities were 
related to specific industries and less than 4,000 cash 
dealers. Under the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth), a larger 
number of entities are regulated. At 30 June 2011, 
AUSTRAC reported that a total of 18,484 entities 
were enrolled with AUSTRAC Online (AUSTRAC 
2011); a much broader family of regulated entities 
than under the FTR Act). Although AUSTRAC is the 
AML/CTF regulator in Australia, it does not have any 
law enforcement or prosecutorial powers. Therefore, 
it is an administrative-style Financial Intelligence Unit 
(FIU) that supplies information to a wide variety  
of government bodies. The financial intelligence  
it provides is used by these partner agencies to 
investigate cases of alleged financial crime, which 
may then be referred for investigation by police and 
prosecution.
The Australian  
legislative framework
Australia’s legislative framework proscribes ML/TF 
and includes asset recovery mechanisms, as well  
as various preventive regulatory measures.
Money laundering offences
Division 400 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 
(the Criminal Code) outlines the federal money 
laundering offences for Australia. The Criminal Code 
defines money laundering broadly and the only  
limit it places on predicate crimes is to restrict these 
to indictable offences—that is, money laundering 
involves dealing in the proceeds of indictable 
offences, as opposed to summary offences dealt 
with in lower courts. Division 400 of the Criminal 
Code specifies 18 separate money laundering 
offences of dealing with the proceeds and 
instruments of crime and an additional offence  
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of possessing the proceeds of crime. Offences  
for dealing with the proceeds and instruments of 
crime are distinguished by the value of the money  
or property involved and the mental element of the 
offence. The decision in R v RK [2008] NSWCCA 
338 indicated that each of the 18 ‘dealing’ offences 
created two separate offences. The first is an offence 
of dealing with the proceeds of crime; the second is 
an offence for dealing with the instruments of crime 
as Chief Justice Spigelman noted (at para 6):
s 400.3(2)(c) creates an offence where a person 
is reckless as to a relevant fact. Furthermore,  
it creates two distinct offences where either:
(A) the money or property is proceeds of crime 
and the person is reckless as to the fact that the 
money is proceeds of crime (s 400.3(2)(b)(i) and (c)).
(B) there is a risk that the money or property will 
become an instrument of crime and the person  
is reckless as to the fact that there is a risk that it 
will become an instrument of crime (s 400.3(2)(b)
(ii) and (c)).
All Australian states and territories, with the 
exception of the Northern Territory, have other 
money laundering offences. Offences relating to 
financing of terrorism, however, are solely at the 
federal level.
Financing of terrorism offences
Offences relating to the financing of terrorism are 
contained in two pieces of federal legislation, each  
of which has a separate definition of terrorist 
organisation that is applicable.
The Criminal Code contains general offences that 
proscribe the financing of terrorism. The Suppression 
of the Financing of Terrorism Act 2002 (Cth) amended 
the Criminal Code by including a range of offences 
relating to the financing of terrorism. The Anti-
Terrorism Act (No. 2) 2005 (Cth) further amended 
the Criminal Code’s financing of terrorism offences  
in 2005. The Criminal Code’s offences currently 
encompass getting funds to, from, or for a terrorist 
organisation intentionally or recklessly, collecting 
funds to finance terrorism and collecting funds to 
finance a terrorist. Division 102 also criminalises  
the provision of resources or support to a terrorist 
organisation.
Terrorist organisations are defined by the Criminal 
Code as organisations:
•	 directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, 
planning, assisting in, or fostering a terrorist 
activity, irrespective of whether one occurs; or
•	 that have been proscribed as terrorist organisations 
by the Attorney-General.
In addition, the Charter of the United Nations Act 
1945 (Cth) (CoTUNA) contains offences tied to  
asset freezing sanctions imposed on individuals  
and entities proscribed by the United Nations 
Security Council’s 1267 list and certain other  
lists of proscribed persons. The individuals and 
organisations tied to offences under CoTUNA are 
identified in the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade’s Consolidated List. Section 20 creates an 
offence of holding a freezable asset and using or 
dealing with that asset, allowing another to use or 
deal with the freezable asset, or facilitating the use 
or dealing with an asset, unless the use or dealing 
has been authorised. Section 21 creates an offence 
for directly or indirectly making a freezable asset 
available to a proscribed entity, unless the dealing  
is an authorised dealing.
Asset recovery mechanisms
All Australian states and territories, in addition to the 
Commonwealth, have asset recovery mechanisms 
that enable the proceeds of crime to be recovered 
from entities. The bulk of the Commonwealth’s asset 
recovery powers are held within the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002 (Cth) (POCA 2002), which repealed 
the previous Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 (Cth) 
(POCA 1987). The key change in the asset  
recovery regime in Australia that was introduced  
by POCA 2002 was the inclusion of a civil recovery 
mechanism. In addition, in 2010, the Crimes 
Legislation Amendment (Serious and Organised 
Crime) Act 2010 (Cth) amended POCA 2002 to 
include unexplained wealth provisions. The asset 
recovery mechanisms in some Australian states  
and territories, such as the Northern Territory and 
Western Australia, also extend the powers to recover 
the suspected proceeds of crime beyond civil 
confiscation and encompass unexplained wealth 
provisions.
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Key preventive legislation
Australia’s key AML/CTF preventive measures are 
contained in the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) which, 
together with supplementary regulations and 
instruments, establishes Australia’s compliance 
framework (see Appendix for definitions). The FTR 
Act, the previous core AML/CTF legislation, contains 
additional requirements and defines cash dealers 
(with reporting obligations) in Australia.
The AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) outlines much of  
the regulatory regime, as well as defining those 
businesses with AML/CTF regulatory obligations. 
The Act takes a service provision approach to 
describing the businesses with obligations (referred 
to as reporting entities). The AML/CTF regime 
currently applies to providers of designated services 
as defined in s 6. The general categories of 
regulated businesses are:
•	 financial services—banks, credit unions, building 
societies, lending, leasing and hire purchase 
companies, stored value card issuers, asset 
management companies, financial planners  
(who arrange for the issue of financial products), 
life insurers, superannuation funds, custodial 
services companies and security dealers;
•	 money service businesses—remittance dealers, 
issuers of traveller’s cheques, foreign exchange 
dealers and cash couriers;
•	 the gambling sector—casinos, bookmakers, 
TAB’s, clubs and pubs, internet and electronic 
gaming service providers; and
•	 bullion dealers.
The requirements of the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth)  
do not, as yet, extend to various non-financial 
service providers (known as Designated Non-
Financial Businesses and Professions or DNFBPs)—
such as legal practitioners and accountants engaging 
in financial or real estate transactions, trust and 
company service providers, dealers of precious 
metals and stones (outside of bullion dealers), and 
businesses in the real estate industry (although the 
government is considering the extension of the 
regime to these sectors; AGD 2009).
Australia requires all reporting entities to meet the 
same AML/CTF obligations, with few exceptions. 
Broadly, these obligations include:
•	 filing transaction reports, including threshold 
reports, to the FIU;
•	 performing risk-based customer identification 
procedures and monitoring customer 
transactions;
•	 establishing and maintaining an AML/CTF program;
•	 maintaining customer and transaction records;
•	 reporting on the level of compliance with the 
regime; and
•	 nominating a compliance officer.
The Australian regime is a risk-based system where 
reporting entities who provide designated services 
have the discretion to assess the risks associated 
with specific customers and transactions and to  
an extent, determine how to mitigate that risk by 
meeting the obligations under the Act. Reporting 
entities adjust the level of due diligence associated 
with each customer and transaction, according to 
their risk level, as well as to consider the level of risk 
posed by their different operations.
Financial intelligence unit
In Australia, AUSTRAC is both the FIU and AML/CTF 
regulator for all business sectors with AML/CTF 
obligations. AUSTRAC is not a law enforcement-style 
FIU and as such, does not have any investigative or 
prosecutorial powers. AUSTRAC’s regulatory powers 
extend to monitoring compliance, issuing remedial 
directions, accepting enforceable undertakings and 
applying for civil penalty orders.
Reporting obligations
The AML/CTF regime currently requires reporting 
entities to provide the following reports about 
transactions to AUSTRAC:
•	 SMRs—reporting entities are required to submit 
SMRs on forming a suspicion that a transaction 
may be connected to a breach of taxation 
legislation or to the proceeds of crime. SMRs  
are discretionary reports that may be triggered  
for transactions of any value.
•	 Threshold transaction reports (TTRs; significant 
cash transaction reports for some entities)—
reporting entities must report any transactions in 
physical currency beyond the threshold amount, 
which is currently $10,000 or more or the foreign 
currency equivalent. TTRs are mandatory, rather 
than discretionary, reports.
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•	 Reports of international electronic transactions—
reporting entities are required to report all 
electronic funds transfer instructions (international 
funds transfer instructions), regardless of value,  
to AUSTRAC. These are also mandatory reports.
Matters triggering TTRs and reports of international 
funds transfers may also be the subject of an SMR.
Anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism 
financing compliance programs
The AML/CTF Act requires all reporting entities  
to assess their own levels of ML/TF risks and  
to develop their own AML/CTF programs. Each 
program has two components. Part A of the 
program includes identifying, managing and 
reducing the risk of money laundering and terrorism 
financing faced by the reporting entity. Part B of  
the program centres on customer identification 
measures and includes the minimum KYC information 
requirements.
All reporting entities must report their compliance 
with the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) annually to 
AUSTRAC.
Methodology
The way the current survey was undertaken, including 
detailed information concerning the design of  
the questionnaire, selection of participants, data 
collection, response analysis and data preparation  
is presented in a companion report published by the 
AIC (Challice & Eliseo 2012). The following is a brief 
summary of the key features of the methodology of 
the study.
The study was undertaken in two parts. The first 
comprised a survey administered to all businesses in 
Australia in July 2009 that had AML/CTF regulatory 
obligations. Respondents were able to complete  
a questionnaire online, by telephone or on paper, 
with responses forwarded to a consultant research 
organisation engaged by the AIC to administer  
the survey. The survey instrument also called for 
volunteers to participate in follow-up face-to-face 
interviews, which were conducted in October 2009 
with 10 individuals from a range of sectors including 
one Australian Government department, pubs and 
clubs, a credit union, a cash delivery business,  
a mortgage lender, a private equity firm and a 
currency exchange service. Eight of the 10 interview 
participants came from the small business sector, 
which was the business sector in which most survey 
participants were employed. Interviews with such a 
small number of individuals cannot be considered to 
be representative of the entire regulated sector but 
nonetheless, the qualitative data that were obtained 
provided some important, albeit subjective, insights 
into the operation of the regime in Australia.
Ethical considerations
The study was approved by the AICs Human 
Research Ethics Committee, as well as the 
Statistical Clearing House of the Australian Bureau  
of Statistics, who monitor large surveys undertaken 
of Australian businesses by government agencies. 
Detailed protocols were also followed in connection 
with the provision of the sampling frame from 
AUSTRAC to ensure that data were held securely 
and that confidential information could not be 
compromised or released publicly. All results were 
reported in aggregate form in order to preserve 
participants’ anonymity.
Survey instrument and interviews
The questionnaire asked respondents to report:
•	 views on, and procedures for, conducting 
customer identification and due diligence;
•	 views on, and procedures for, conducting 
transaction monitoring and reporting;
•	 views on under-reporting and over-reporting 
suspicious transactions;
•	 the extent of AML/CTF compliance costs, 
expectations of cost movements in the future, 
areas of greatest expense and means for reducing 
the expense;
•	 views on the effectiveness of the AML/CTF 
regime, the responsibilities assigned to businesses 
by the regime and means for improving how it 
operates;
•	 perceptions of money laundering risks to their 
business, including high-risk customers and 
changes to those risks; and
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•	 perceptions of terrorism financing risks to their 
business, including high-risk customers and 
changes to those risks.
The follow-up interviews addressed the same 
themes, with a specific focus on the perceptions  
of money laundering and terrorism financing risks  
to business, the risk management practices used  
to mitigate those risks, the costs of complying with 
the AML/CTF requirements and the extent and utility 
of contact with AUSTRAC.
Respondents,  
sector and profile
AUSTRAC provided an initial sampling frame of 
10,670 businesses believed to provide designated 
services under the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) in 2009. 
The final sampling frame consisted of 8,690 
businesses, of which 4,346 (50%) responded.
The confidential release of the mailing list was 
undertaken with the authority in writing of AUSTRAC’s 
Chief Executive Officer at the time and was subject  
to strict conditions as to usage and confidentiality.  
A number of security measures were implemented  
by the Social Research Centre to ensure necessary 
privacy protocols were maintained and these are 
described by Challice and Eliseo (2012).
The difference between the number of businesses  
in the initial sampling frame provided by AUSTRAC 
and the final sampling frame used was explained 
because of duplicate entries in the initial list, which 
were present because many businesses were 
members of a Designated Business Group (DBG) 
who only needed to be contacted once. A DBG 
comprises two or more businesses or persons that 
join together to adopt and maintain joint AML/CTF 
program obligations under the legislation. Finally, over 
1,000 of the records had incomplete or incorrect 
contact information.
Survey respondents fell into nine broad industry 
sectors. Respondents self-identified as working in:
•	 managed funds or superannuation—providing 
services as an investment company, managed 
fund, superannuation company, or unit trust 
manager;
•	 banking—encompassing banks, building 
societies, credit unions, finance corporations, 
friendly societies, housing societies, merchant 
banks and SWIFT;
•	 financial services—such as factorers, forfeiters, 
hire purchase companies, lease companies and 
pastoral houses;
•	 securities/derivatives—including futures brokers, 
investment banks and securities dealers;
•	 gambling—casinos, clubs, gambling houses, 
hotels and pubs, on course bookmakers, sports 
bookmakers and TABS;
•	 foreign exchange—providing services as foreign 
exchange providers, payment service provider/
postal and courier service providers, travel agents 
and issuers of travellers’ cheques;
•	 cash delivery services—such as cash carriers, 
cash custodians and payroll service providers;
•	 alternative remittance dealers—including both 
corporate remitters and remittance providers;
•	 other—Australia Post outlets, news agents and 
other retailers, and bullion dealers.
Respondents were asked to identify the industry 
sector generating the largest proportion of income, 
or funds under management, in the year to 30 June 
2009. The distribution of survey respondents across 
the nine industry sectors is shown in Table 1. 
Businesses generating the largest proportion of their 
income from gambling services (n=2,251) comprised 
more than 50 percent of respondents. The survey 
participants’ businesses ranged in size from zero 
employees (those with casual or contract staff only) 
to more than 200 employees. The distribution of 
businesses provided in Table 2 shows that 79.7 
percent of respondent businesses employed fewer 
than 20 full-time equivalent employees at 30 June 
2009. This reflects the concentration of small 
businesses (76%) that identified their main revenue 
stream as coming from gambling activities.
As shown in Table 2, more than 90 percent of the 
survey sample was represented by small or micro 
businesses. Due to the absence of publicly available 
information, at the time of writing, on the distribution 
of business size within the regulated sector, it was 
unable to be established whether the number of 
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smaller businesses that responded to the survey 
were representative of the regulated sector as a 
whole. For this reason, care must be taken when 
interpreting the findings presented in this report.
Table 3 shows that the annual turnover for 81 percent 
of respondents, outside the managed funds and 
superannuation industries, was less than $5m for  
the year to 30 June 2009. Managed funds and 
superannuation companies, shown in Table 4, were 
asked to estimate their funds under management at  
30 June 2009 with two-thirds (66.2%) reporting that 
they held less than $1m.
Respondents primarily occupied senior management 
roles within their companies. Approximately 65 percent 
(n=2,684) were owners, directors, or senior executives. 
A further 8.8 percent identified themselves as 
managers (n=364). Table 5 shows that few 
respondents were employed as risk or compliance 
officers (10.8%; n=448) or money laundering 
compliance officers (4.7%; n=194). The large 
number of managers, executives, or owners who 
participated in the survey is most likely due to the 
high proportion of small businesses that participated 
in the survey.
Table 1 Respondents, by industry sector
Industry sector n %
Managed funds and superannuation 356 8.8
Banking 313 7.7
Financial services 169 4.2
Securities and derivatives 115 2.8
Gambling 2,251 55.3
Foreign exchange 214 5.3
Cash delivery services 58 1.4
Alternative remittance businesses 195 4.8
Other businesses 397 9.8
Total 4,068
Note: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
Table 2 Full-time equivalent employees at 30 June 2009
FTE employees n %
0 405 11.1
1–4 1,422 38.9
5–19 1,087 29.7
20–49 419 11.5
50–99 160 4.4
100–199 90 2.5
200+ 75 2.1
Total 3,658
Note: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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Table 3 Annual turnover, 2008–09
Turnover 2008–09 n %
<$100,000 125 7.5
$100,001–$500,000 329 19.7
$500,001–$1,000,000 248 14.8
$1,000,001–$5,000,000 651 39.0
$5,000,001–$10,000,000 148 8.9
>$10,000,000 171 10.2
Total 1,672
Note: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
Table 4 Funds under management at 30 June 2009
Funds under management n %
$0 253 36.2
$1–$100,000 93 13.3
$100,000–$500,000 82 11.7
$500,000–$1,000,000 35 5.0
$1,000,000–$5,000,000 59 8.4
$5,000,000–$10,000,000 14 2.0
$10,000,000–$50,000,000 49 7.0
>$50,000,000 114 16.3
Total 699
Note: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
Table 5 Primary role of survey respondents within the regulated business
Respondents’ role n %
Owner/director/Chief Executive Officer/Managing Director 2,684 64.7
Risk/compliance officer 448 10.8
Manager 364 8.8
Accountant/auditor 259 6.3
Money laundering compliance officer 194 4.7
Administration 84 2.0
Other 80 1.9
Legal officer/lawyer 38 0.9
Total 4,151
Note: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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Reference periods
All retrospective survey questions asked respondents 
to consider the 12 month period to 30 June 2009. 
The reported volumes of suspicious transactions, 
AML/CTF implementation costs and cost areas  
all related to this period. Respondents were also 
asked to consider the two year period between  
1 July 2009 and 30 June 2011 when responding  
to the prospective questions about future trends. 
These questions addressed respondents’ views 
concerning expected changes to AML/CTF 
implementation costs and any changes to risks  
of money laundering or terrorism financing that they 
considered were likely to occur within their business 
during the specified two year period.
How this survey differs  
from other similar studies
The AML/CTF Australian businesses survey is  
the first large-scale study of Australian businesses 
regulated with respect to AML/CTF preventive 
measures. More than 4,000 Australian businesses 
responded to the survey from a population of around 
17,700 businesses with AML/CTF regulatory 
obligations (AUSTRAC 2009b). This sample captured 
businesses from all regulated sectors and 
encompassed micro, small, medium and large 
businesses. The AML/CTF Australian businesses 
survey, as noted above, examined:
•	 businesses’ perceptions of ML/TF risks;
•	 application of core components of the AML/CTF 
regulatory requirements, including specific detail 
on their approach, confidence and use of software 
when conducting customer identification and 
transaction monitoring measures;
•	 costs of implementing the measures;
•	 views on the necessity and effectiveness of  
the regime; and
•	 views on improving the regime.
The AML/CTF Australian businesses survey differed 
from AUSTRAC’s survey of compliance officers in 
relation to the topics covered and the sample used. 
AUSTRAC’s (2010a) survey examined the specific 
responsibilities of compliance officers and the  
AML/CTF reporting chain of command and focused 
predominantly on businesses offering financial 
services. In addition, more than half of the sample  
of AUSTRAC’s study came from businesses that 
employed more than 50 staff members, while in  
this study less than 10 percent of businesses had  
50 or more employees.
The present survey also examined in greater detail 
aspects of AML/CTF compliance documented in 
previous surveys undertaken in overseas jurisdictions. 
Gill and Taylor (2004) surveyed financial institutions in 
the United Kingdom in 2001 concerning the utility of 
AML/CTF regulation and the importance of customer 
identification requirements. They analysed 466 
responses from those businesses surveyed. More 
recently, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2007) examined 
the perceptions and implementation by businesses 
of the risk-based approach to AML/CTF by financial 
services entities in the United Kingdom and the 
associated costs of doing so. Their research 
involved 148 interviews with money laundering 
reporting officers (MLROs) and other compliance 
professionals with anti-money laundering 
responsibilities from across the financial services 
sector including retail banks, investment banks, 
insurers and investment managers, and covering a 
range of different sized organisations. KPMG India 
(2009) sent a survey to 100 financial institutions in 
India and considered the application of transaction 
monitoring, the costs associated with AML/CTF 
compliance, risk-based assessments and customer 
identification, by banks and non-bank financial 
services in India. As such, these previous surveys 
have involved quite small samples and have been 
focused on quite specific aspects of the AML/CTF 
regime. The present survey was far more extensive, 
involved a survey of regulated businesses in Australia 
and examined a wide range of issues to do with 
AML/CTF regulation and compliance in Australia.
In view of the differing samples and objectives of 
these and other surveys, it has not been possible  
to draw direct comparisons between the present 
findings and those previously reported. Where some 
limited comparisons are appropriate, however, these 
have been identified and reported in the discussion 
below. The broader question of how Australia’s 
legislative response compares with those in other 
countries has been addressed in a separate AIC 
publication (see Walters et al. (2012)).
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One of the central tenets of the FATF 
Recommendations is a risk-based approach to 
preventing and detecting money laundering and  
the financing of terrorism (FATF 2012). A risk-based 
approach requires regulated businesses to determine 
the risks of ML/TF they face, identify customers and 
transactions posing high levels of risk, and mitigate 
those risks by implementing enhanced due diligence 
procedures (FATF 2007). Effective compliance with  
a risk-based AML/CTF regime requires businesses 
to understand the potential risks posed to their 
businesses and respond to them effectively (Gurung, 
Wijaya & Rao 2010).
Ross and Hannan (2007) have identified three risk 
elements, each of which needs to be considered  
in effective money laundering risk assessments—
probabilistic, consequence and vulnerability risks. 
Probabilistic risk assessment involves the 
establishment of an association between an 
observable action and an activity the observer  
would like to detect. If money laundering and identity 
fraud have a strong association, to use Ross and 
Hannan’s (2007) example, then the presence of 
identity fraud would suggest a high risk of money 
laundering. The assessment of consequence risk  
is tied to the potential impact of an activity. A small 
cash transaction may be illicit but its potential impact 
may be far smaller than a large illicit transaction. 
Monitoring large transactions in this example would 
be a better risk mitigation practice. Vulnerability  
risks are those that impede effective monitoring  
or detection, such as regulatory deficiencies or  
the presence of opaque transactions. Kini (2006) 
argues that the high-profile AML/CTF regulatory 
enforcement activity in the United States around 
2006 illustrates the significance of a considered risk 
assessment program. ABN AMROs correspondent 
banking business with Russian banks constituted  
a high-risk activity in a high-risk location; Bank 
Atlantic’s high net-worth business in Florida also 
entailed a high-risk business in high-risk locations. 
The banks, in both cases, failed to employ adequate 
AML/CTF controls and FinCEN, the AML/CTF 
regulator in the United States, imposed large 
penalties on both banks (Kini 2006). These cases 
illustrate the need for regulated businsses of all  
sizes to have an effective AML/CTF plan in place  
to assess the level of ML/TF risks that face their 
operations and to respond to such risks appropriately.
Perceptions of money 
laundering risks
One of the primary aims of the current study was to 
determine how Australian businesses perceived the 
AML/CTF regime and in particular, their views on the 
Perceptions of money 
laundering and terrorism 
financing risks
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customers that pose highest risks of money 
laundering, the types of money laundering risks 
posed to their businesses and the best ways in 
which they might be reduced. The respondents  
to the survey by industry sector and their primary 
role in the regulated business, are listed in Tables 1 
and 5 respectively. Table 6 provides case studies  
of the types of high-risk customers that regulated 
businesses in Australia may encounter.
The AML/CTF Australian businesses survey asked 
respondents to identify the types of customers they 
viewed as posing the greatest risk of being involved 
in money laundering. Respondents were able to 
nominate multiple types of customers posing greater 
risks, selected from the following list:
•	 domestic companies;
•	 registered foreign companies;
•	 trustees;
•	 partnerships;
•	 incorporated and unincorporated associations;
•	 registered cooperatives;
•	 domestic government bodies;
•	 foreign government bodies;
•	 charities and not-for-profit associations;
•	 PEPs;
•	 Individuals—Australian residents (including sole 
traders); and
•	 Individuals—foreign residents (including sole 
traders).
Approximately 40 percent of all survey respondents 
nominated individual foreign residents as the type  
of customer posing the greatest risk of money 
laundering (see Table 6). A slightly smaller proportion 
(37.2%) selected individual Australian residents  
as those customers posing the greatest risks of 
money laundering. The proportions of respondents 
who nominated each customer type show that 
participants were least likely to nominate domestic 
government bodies as posing high risks of money 
laundering (4%).
While most respondents ascribed the greatest  
risks of money laundering to Australian and foreign 
resident individuals, the data showed some 
differences between how customers are perceived 
by different business sectors surveyed. Participants 
from the gambling sector held different views on 
who constituted a high-risk customer than did those 
from the financial services sectors such as banks.
A high proportion of survey respondents were from 
the gambling sector (n=2,252) and they appeared  
to perceive Australian residents as posing a greater 
risk of money laundering than respondents from  
the banking sector or those from the securities and 
derivatives sector. Approximately 41.2 percent of 
respondents from the gambling sector identified 
individual Australian residents as the customer group 
posing the greatest risk of money laundering, while 
36.8 percent of banking sector respondents and 
25.4 percent of securities and derivatives sector 
respondents considered Australian individuals to  
be high risk. In each case, the mean results for those 
in the gambling sector regarding clients perceived  
to present the greatest risk of money laundering 
were significantly different from those in the banking 
sector (Z=31.5; p≤0.0001) and those in the securities 
and derivatives sectors (Z=35.6; p≤0.0001).
Respondents from the gambling sector were, 
however, much less likely to consider that individual 
foreign residents held increased risks of money 
laundering (34%) than those in either the banking 
sector (54.9%) or in the securities and derivatives 
sector (57%). In each case, the mean results for 
those in the gambling sector concerning money 
laundering risks of foreign sector customers were 
significantly different from those in the banking 
sector (Z=23.9; p≤0.0001) and those in the securities 
and derivatives sector (Z=29.2; p≤0.0001).
Gambling sector respondents were also less likely  
to perceive PEPs as being high-risk customers than 
respondents from the banking sector or from the 
alternative remittance services sector. A relatively 
small percentage of gambling sector respondents 
(15.2%) identified PEPs as those who presented  
the greatest risk of money laundering; more than 
one-third of banks (38.2%) cited PEPs as high-risk 
customers. Comparing the means between these 
groups, significant differences were found between 
the perceptions of gambling and banking sector 
respondents with respect to the money laundering 
risks posed by PEPs (Z=13.9; p≤0.0001) and 
between those from the alternative remittance and 
banking sectors (Z=-6.214; p≤0.0001). This could, 
arguably, be explained on the basis that those in the 
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Box 1 Australian money laundering cases
The recently prosecuted money laundering cases in Australia summarised below offer some insight into the types of high-risk customers 
that the regulated business sectors may encounter.
A Ansari v R H Ansari v R (2007) 70 NSWLR 89; Ansari v The Queen [2010] HCA 18; Regina v Z [2006] NSWCCA 342
The Ansari brothers were convicted of two charges of conspiring to launder money valued at more than $1m through their remittance 
business Exchange Point. The Ansaris took receipt of $2m cash from a man known as ‘Z’ in October 2003. The Ansaris then arranged for 
another person, ‘H’ to collect the money and deposit it on their behalf between October 2003 and May 2004. ‘H’ deposited $1,952,107 
in amounts of less than $10,000 during that period. Via Exchange Point, the Ansari’s moved illicit funds around within their country of 
origin without leaving any transaction records with a remittance service provider in that country.
The Crown alleged that the Ansaris knew that the funds would be deposited in amounts less than $10,000 to avoid triggering reporting 
requirements in Australia. The Crown demonstrated that the brothers were reckless of the risk that the money would become an 
instrument of crime. The money laundering offence the Ansaris were convicted of conspiring to execute was the reckless laundering  
of funds valued at $1m or more (s 400.3(2)).
Defendant ‘Z’ was an Israeli national who pleaded guilty to money laundering and drugs charges in 2004. Z’s role was to deposit the 
proceeds from drug sales with Exchange Point and in 2004, Z advised the Ansaris that a deposit would be for more than $2m and 
would require more steps than the previous laundering activities. Z and a Belgian national, ‘K’ were arrested for possessing commercial 
quantities of MDMA. A statement later made by Z indicated he was employed by a Romanian national, ‘R’, to move money from Australia 
and he delivered more than $2m to Exchange Point on his first trip in 2003. R offered Z $10,000 in 2004 to undertake the same kind  
of laundering activities as those undertaken in 2003.The Ansari’s appealed their sentences to the NSW Court of Appeal, which dismissed 
the appeals and affirmed the terms of imprisonment for the money laundering offences for which they were found guilty.
R v Huang, R v Siu [2007] NSWCCA 259
Huang and Siu each pleaded guilty to offences under the FTR Act (s 31(1)) and of money laundering under the Criminal Code (s 400.3(1)). 
Huang was paid $30,000 by his employer for remitting $3,088,311 to Hong Kong and China in 335 separate transactions in 2003. 
Huang used a branch of one of two major Australian banks to complete the transactions. He believed he was remitting legitimately gained 
funds that were being transferred offshore to evade Australian taxes. Siu believed the money to be the proceeds of an illegal fishing 
operation. Siu conducted 59 transactions, also through the same large Australian banks, between May and July 2003 to remit a total  
of $556,400. Siu was paid around $3,000 for his participation.
Trang Thi Phuong Nguyen 2010
In 2010, Nguyen pleaded guilty to money laundering for transactions she conducted between November 2007 and January 2008. 
Nguyen divided funds totalling $1.9m into accounts with balances of less than $10,000 and remitted the funds to individuals in Vietnam 
using false names (ACC 2010).
Long Thanh Money Transfer Company 2009
Seven people employed by the Long Thanh Money Transfer Company were convicted of money laundering in 2009. The individuals 
involved in the remittance businesses received sentences for laundering up to $68m (ACC 2009a). Three other defendants were 
convicted in October 2009 (ACC 2009b) for laundering sums of $9m, $5.5m and $4m respectively.
Nhon Anh Khuu and Chi Vien Duong 2009
Khuu and Duong defrauded the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) of $1.7m and $2.2m by creating an artificial network of subcontractors 
to disguise the nature of a labour hire business from the ATO, as well as receiving goods as payment for labour that were later sold. The 
defendants pleaded guilty to charges of defrauding the Commonwealth, obtaining property by deception, dishonesty causing a risk of a 
loss to the Commonwealth and dealing funds intended to become the instruments of crime.
Prchal, Raffaut, Rojas and Smetana 2008
Raffaut prepared amended tax returns containing false details for Prchal in 2001 and 2002, resulting in the ATO refunding Prchal 
$35,038.87. Raffaut then obtained the details of other tax payers and he and Prchal recruited Rojas to present those details to tax agents 
in order to obtain refunds from the ATO. Smetana was recruited to supply bank account details to receive the payments from the ATO. 
Smetana received eight percent of the total payment; Rojas received $200–250 per day for his role. The ATO paid $262,580.23 into 
Smetana’s three accounts. The group claimed a further $162,121.89 that the ATO did not pay out. Smetana was convicted of recklessly 
dealing with the proceeds of crime to the value of $100,000 or more (CDPP 2009).
15Perceptions of money laundering and terrorism financing risks
banking and remittance sectors would be more likely 
to encounter and hence form views about foreign 
PEPs than those in the gambling sector. Confirmation 
of this would, however, require further research. It 
should be noted that the majority of respondents 
within the gambling sector were from small business 
clubs and pubs, and that larger gambling sector 
entities such as casinos, may have a different view 
on the risks posed by PEPs.
The different perceptions of the level of risk of 
customers present in different industry sectors could 
also be due, in part, to the nature of the customer 
bases of these businesses. The large proportion of 
respondents from the gambling sector who perceived 
that individuals posed risks of money laundering 
(41.2%), as opposed to domestic companies (8.5%), 
reflects the customers of these businesses—
gambling businesses generally only having 
individuals as customers. The interview data further 
confirmed this finding. Proprietors of pubs that have 
gaming machines considered that high levels of risk 
surround patrons who spend large sums at venues 
with multiple gaming. Domestic companies were, 
obviously, not involved in such activities.
Respondents were also asked to predict what they 
perceived as emerging money laundering risks to 
their businesses for the period from 1 July 2009  
to 30 June 2011 (see Table 7). The unprompted 
response of approximately one-third of respondents 
(32.8%) was that they expected their businesses to 
face no money laundering risks in the two years to 
30 June 2011. A further 18.7 percent of respondents 
expected there to be low risk or for risk of money 
laundering to decrease during that period. A much 
smaller proportion of respondents (1.5%) anticipated 
that risk of money laundering would increase.
Respondents from the cash delivery service sector 
were most likely to believe that there would be no 
money laundering risk for their businesses in the  
two years to 30 June 2011 (43.9%), while a further 
21.1 percent anticipated that such risk would be low 
or would decrease. Respondents from the securities 
and derivatives sector were least likely to believe  
that there would be no money laundering risk to  
their businesses in the two years to 30 June 2011 
(21.1%), although 25.4 percent of these businesses 
also anticipated that risks would be low or decrease 
during the ensuing two year period.
Apart from those who considered that their business 
faced no risks of money laundering or low or 
decreasing risks in the two years to 30 June 2011, 
gambling was the most commonly identified money 
Table 6 Customers perceived to hold the greatest risks of money laundering
Customer type n %a
Individuals—foreign residents 1,670 39.9
Individuals—Australian residents 1,556 37.2
Registered foreign companies 932 22.3
Politically exposed persons 921 22.0
Foreign government bodies 638 15.2
Charities and not-for-profit organisations 545 13.0
Domestic companies 484 11.6
Partnerships 363 8.7
Trustees 360 8.6
Incorporated and unincorporated associations 351 8.4
Registered cooperatives 202 4.8
Domestic government bodies 168 4.0
Don’t know 1,529 36.5
None selected 168 4.0
a: Respondents were able to select more than response; therefore, percentages do not total 100
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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laundering risk, selected by 288 respondents, 
although most of these (n=272) were from the 
gambling sector themselves. Most of the 2.7 percent 
(n=111) of respondents who nominated money 
transfers or foreign exchange as posing money 
laundering risks in the two years to 30 June 2011 
(see Table 7) were also sector specific. The foreign 
exchange sector had the highest proportion of 
respondents who selected foreign exchange or 
money transfers as being a risk (13.8% of that 
sector’s respondents). A statistically significant 
difference was found between the mean results for 
foreign exchange businesses and the next business 
category that identified foreign exchange as a high 
risk (7.9% of the ‘other’ category), in terms of foreign 
exchange being a money laundering risk in the 
ensuing two years to 30 June 2011 (Z=-2.855; 
p≤0.004). In summary, respondents from the foreign 
exchange sector were most likely to nominate 
money transfers or foreign exchange as a money 
laundering risk, as might be expected.
Changes in perceived 
money laundering risks
Survey respondents
Survey respondents were asked to consider the level 
of money laundering risk their business had been 
exposed to in the financial year prior to 30 June 
2009 and how they perceived the level of risk may 
alter in the ensuing two year period to 30 June 
2011. The findings are shown in Table 8.
The majority (97.8%) of survey respondents 
perceived the level of money laundering risk to their 
businesses in the year to 30 June 2009 to be low.  
A similarly high proportion of respondents (93.6%) 
expected the risk of money laundering faced by their 
businesses to remain the same in the two year period 
to 30 June 2011. These findings were obtained in 
2009 from surveyed businesses and may not accord 
with the understanding of risk levels held by law 
enforcement agencies and regulators such as 
AUSTRAC (2011c) and the Australian Crime 
Commission (2011).
Table 7 Areas of perceived money laundering risk to 30 June 2011
Potential money laundering risk n %a
No perceived risks 1,375 32.8
Low risks/decreasing risks 785 18.7
Risks perceived to increase 62 1.5
Money transfer/foreign exchange 111 2.7
Gambling 288 6.9
New/unknown clients 88 2.1
Generic money laundering/proceeds of crime risks 45 1.1
Fraud 52 1.2
Drugs 45 1.1
Identity-related issues 45 1.1
Use of cash 33 0.8
Financial services 34 0.8
Superannuation 20 0.5
Internal fraud/staff issues 22 0.5
Tax evasion 19 0.5
Other 118 2.8
Don’t know 190 4.5
No response 1,061 25.3
a: Respondents were able to select more than response; therefore, percentages do not total 100
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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Interviews
Interviewed participants explained in more detail why 
they perceived that their businesses currently faced 
few risks of ML/TF and why they thought these  
low levels of risk were unlikely to change in the 
foreseeable future. The customer profile of their 
business, stringent practices for acquiring new 
customers and KYC procedures, having few new 
customers, business size and the nature of their 
industries were the key reasons cited by the 
interview participants for the perception that they 
had very low or non-existent risks of ML/TF to their 
businesses (eg see Box 2).
Some interviewees took the view that money 
laundering and terrorism financing did not pose any 
risk to their businesses because of the nature of the 
industry in which they operated. For example, one 
interviewee from the funds management industry 
was unaware of any instances of funds managers 
who had been involved in ML/TF, although it is 
theoretically possible that funds managers could  
be involved in assisting money laundering activities 
unwittingly. Those from the gambling sector, 
predominantly owners of pubs and clubs that 
operated gaming machines, viewed the legislation 
as being necessary for financial institutions but 
considered it to be superfluous for a pub or club.
The small business owners who were interviewed 
each referred to the size of their businesses as the 
main reason why risks of money laundering and 
financing of terrorism were low. These individuals 
stressed that the size of their customer base allowed 
them to know their existing customers personally, 
effectively minimising risks to their businesses.  
The interview participants from the gambling sector 
provided a common example of how the size of  
their businesses might insulate them against risks  
of ML/TF. Gaming machines allow the possibility  
of placing large sums of money into each machine 
and having that money paid back out. A customer’s 
capacity to do so in a venue with few machines, while 
remaining unnoticed by staff, would be exceedingly 
low. A larger venue with many more machines could 
offer, in the opinion of the interviewee, a more genuine 
opportunity for this to take place as the staff would 
be less likely to be able to monitor all of the gaming 
machines effectively. One interviewee observed that 
previously unknown customers in a small pub were 
immediately noticed by staff and some customers 
were inclined to monitor the behaviour of each other 
carefully—often in order to see which machines were 
likely to pay dividends more than others. The 
interviewee felt that this kind of environment almost 
completely removed the ability for anyone in the 
establishment to do anything untoward without 
attracting attention.
One interviewee noted that the cash-based nature of 
the hotel industry afforded a far greater opportunity 
to launder illicitly-gained funds than did the use of 
gaming machines. It was thought that hotels offered 
opportunities to co-mingle the proceeds of crime 
with legitimate turnover by discounting stock to 
increase the turnover of the business; or by adding 
false levels of stock into the stock monitoring 
system. One interviewee noted that the ability to 
co-mingle funds in a cash business was not tied 
singularly to the hotel industry—it had little to do  
with gaming facilities and more to do with the 
cash-intensive nature of businesses in general.
The risks identified by interviewees were very 
industry specific; or tied to the specific services 
offered by some businesses. For example, some  
of the risks posed to commercial banks were 
thought to arise from the remittance services and 
trade financing products they do business with.  
One interviewee explained that a bank’s inability to 
verify the presence, absence, quantity, or price of 
commodities exposed it to risk that it may have 
provided finance for something entirely different  
than that represented and the money may have 
been paid back to the bank to develop a financial 
trail for it. The goods financed by a bank arrive  
at their destination port, money is exchanged and 
the transaction documents arrive weeks after a 
transaction has taken place. The transactions take 
place long before the bank’s documentation arrives; 
it is not possible to examine the actual delivery even 
if the bank wanted to, or had the expertise to do so. 
The process becomes even more complex where 
the bank has provided financing for trade between 
two countries other than Australia.
Risks identified by an interviewee based on the Gold 
Coast concerned the location of the business. The 
director of this firm considered that the Gold Coast 
was a target for criminals testing out various scams. 
This director highlighted that the risks of doing 
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business in this location were increased by the  
highly transitory population and the absence of any 
industry apart from tourism.
The interviewee from the money-changing and 
remittance service business held a different view  
of the tourist-orientated location of his business.  
He viewed the customer base of tourists, cruise  
ship employees and migrant workers as posing a 
lower risk of becoming involved in ML/TF than a 
more diverse customer base that the same kind  
of business in a metropolitan location might attract. 
He did note that the only potential risk areas within 
the business stemmed from the remittance services 
he provided to migrant workers, but stressed that 
the identification requirements and transaction 
information needed to complete the transfer through 
the network he utilised eliminated those risks. 
Alternative remittance providers may, however, be 
subject to enhanced risks owing to close kinship or 
cultural ties with their customers, which may lead to 
subtle pressures to comply with high-risk requests. 
Smaller businesses, regardless of sector, also face 
capacity constraints in putting risk identification and 
mitigation programs in place. A regional pub owner 
agreed with the utility of the AML/CTF regime in 
metropolitan areas but did not see any risks of  
ML/TF to her business due to its location in a 
country town with a population of less than 10,000 
people; she had never seen any evidence of either 
taking place and did not expect this to change in  
the next two years.
Interviewees highlighted the fact that opaque 
transactions within their businesses created a 
potential risk area for exposure to ML/TF. One 
interviewee expressed concern about the role of 
other financial institutions as intermediaries in the 
transactions made with his business. Borrower 
clients, for example, are able to make cash deposits 
in a branch of a major bank to service a loan. The 
mortgage company, in these instances, remained 
unaware if those payments were made as large cash 
payments. The mortgage company has had to rely 
on the bank to perform the appropriate due diligence 
in these situations. The opaque transactions 
identified by an interviewee in the mutual banking 
industry encompassed internet banking services, 
where the business has a decreasing amount of 
contact with customers, and in the capacity for 
account holders to nominate third-party signatories 
or power of attorney access to accounts. This left 
the business unsure about who was transacting 
through the account.
Perceptions of terrorism 
financing risks
Survey respondents were asked to consider the 
potential risks to their business of becoming involved 
in a transaction tied to the financing of terrorism in 
some way. All survey participants were asked to 
identify the customer types that they considered 
would pose the highest risk of becoming involved in 
the financing of terrorism and the types of terrorism 
financing risks that their businesses might face in the 
two year period to 30 June 2011. The survey sought 
to document the level of terrorism financing risks 
perceived by regulated businesses in the 2008–09 
financial year and to document how regulated 
businesses expected those risks to alter in the 
forthcoming two year period. The study also 
documented the views of regulated businesses on 
the best strategies for reducing risks of terrorism 
financing. It should be noted that accurate 
intelligence on terrorism financing risks is not widely 
known among the community generally and few 
people in Australia could be expected to have the 
same level of understanding of risk levels as law 
enforcement and security agencies.
Table 8 Changing perceptions of money laundering risks
Risks to 30 June 2009 Risks from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2011
Current risk level n % Expected change to risks n %
Low 3,785 97.8 Increase 128 4.0
Medium 76 2.0 Remain the same 2,991 93.6
High 9 0.2 Decrease 78 2.4
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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Table 9 shows the views of survey respondents as  
to the types of customers they perceived to hold the 
greatest risks of being involved in the financing of 
terrorism during the financial year 2008–09, selected 
from a predetermined list of customer types. It was 
found that more than 36.1 percent (n=1,511) of 
respondents believed that individuals posed the 
greatest risk, followed by PEPs (24.7%).
These results were significantly different according  
to the business sector the respondents occupied 
(χ2=35.8, df=8, p≤0.0001). Comparing mean results 
for the highest perceived risk customer types, it  
was found that there was a statistically significant 
difference between the proportion of respondents 
who considered that individuals presented the 
highest risk of financing of terrorism and those  
who considered that PEPs presented the highest 
risk, with respondents across the entire sample 
perceiving risks from individuals to be the greatest 
(Z=11.31, p≤0.0001).
Changes in perceived 
financing of terrorism risks
Table 10 shows the views of respondents on the 
types of terrorism financing risks they considered 
would affect their businesses over the two year 
period to 30 June 2011, selected from a 
predetermined list of risk categories (see Box 3 for 
known Australian terrorism financing cases). The 
majority of respondents (57.9%) were of the view 
that their business would face no risks, or low risks, 
of terrorism financing in the two years to 30 June 
2011. Approximately six percent of respondents did 
not know whether such risks existed or they were 
unable to predict the level of risk. Comparing mean 
results for response categories of no risk/low risk 
and don’t know/can’t predict the risk, it was found 
that there was a statistically significant difference 
between the proportion of respondents who 
considered that there were no/low risk of financing 
of terrorism and those who did not know or could 
not predict the risks for the two years to 30 June 
2011 (Z=51.21, p≤0.0001).
The results were significantly different according to 
the business sector respondents occupied (χ2=98.1, 
df=8, p≤0.0001). A Cramér’s V of 0.16 indicated that 
there was a weak level of association between 
respondents’ perceptions of risk and the business 
sector they occupied. The proportion of respondents 
from different business sectors who perceived no  
or low risk of terrorism financing ranged between 
65.9 percent for financial services businesses to 
40.4 percent of foreign exchange businesses.
Table 11 shows the views of respondents on the 
level of terrorism financing risks they considered 
have affected their business in the year 2008–09 and 
how the level of risk would change over the two year 
period to 30 June 2011. Almost all respondents 
(99.5%) considered there to be a low level of 
terrorism financing risk to their business in the year 
to 30 June 2009 and almost all (95.3%) anticipated 
that the level of risk would not change during the 
two years to 30 June 2011. The 17 respondents 
who considered that terrorism financing risks were 
Box 2 Business perceptions of money laundering risks
The customer profile of a cash delivery business
All of the cash delivery business customers were well-known companies and entities that the public are familiar with; their customers did 
not include any individuals. A NSW Government department, with 900 sites that were serviced by the cash delivery business where all of 
the cash collected was in the form of coins, was a typical example of a client. All of the cash delivery business customers were based in 
Australia and no customer had ever requested that their funds be sent offshore.
Screening new customers in a private mortgage company
The private mortgage company held views on specific kinds of borrower clients that might pose higher risks of illicit dealings. These 
views were formed on the basis of the location that the business operates from. The company would not lend funds for some property 
development ventures or to other borrowers that they assumed may be likely to be involved in organised crime. The company had, 
unwittingly, loaned funds to borrowers to pay proceeds of crime warrants in the past. The company ameliorated the risks associated with 
these customers by clarifying the nature of the offence with the prospective borrower’s lawyer and witnessing proof of the nature of the 
matter. Banks, faced with the same kind of loan application, have the capacity to request details of the debt, whereas a private mortgage 
lender does not have the same powers.
Source: Cash delivery business and private mortgage company representative, personal communication, November 2009
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medium in 2008–09 were spread across the gambling 
(n=6), banking (n=4), alternative remittance (n=2), 
foreign exchange (n=2), managed funds and 
superannuation (n=1), and other (n=1) business 
sectors. The two respondents who considered risks 
to be high were both from the gambling sector.
Perceived effectiveness  
of anti-money laundering/
counter-terrorism financing 
measures
Respondents were also asked to identify the 
countermeasures that they considered would be 
most effective in minimising ML/TF risks to their 
businesses.
Anti-money laundering measures
Table 12 presents the results for anti-money 
laundering measures grouped into 17 categories. 
The most commonly identified measures that 
respondents considered to be effective in minimising 
money laundering related to customer identification 
and due diligence (14.6%). Considerably fewer 
respondents viewed transaction monitoring (6.4%) 
or reporting (2.9%) as effective countermeasures.
The large ‘no response’ rate, compared with the 
limited positive response rates given for each of the 
suggested risk mitigation measures listed in Table 
12, maybe due to a lack of understanding of the 
utility of the risk mitigation measures proposed,  
a lack of understanding regarding the differential 
functions of the risk mitigation measures and/or  
a level of indifference to the effectiveness of any or 
all of these measures. In turn, this may be because 
respondents came largely from small or micro 
businesses that do not always have extensive AML/
CTF compliance measures in place. However, the 
majority of respondents, irrespective of the sector 
they represented, did use basic compliance 
measures and most believed these were effective  
in minimising ML/TF risks faced by their business 
(see next section). Alternatively, views may have 
been influenced by the educative resources available 
to entities at the early stages of implementation of 
AML/CTF regulatory obligations, which have been 
described as possibly being limited in both sector 
specificity and accessibility (eg see Bricknell et al. 
2011 and Choo et al. forthcoming).
The extent to which respondents nominated 
customer due diligence as the most effective 
strategy against money laundering varied 
significantly according to the respondent’s business 
sector (χ2=124.2, df=8, p≤0.0001), although a 
Cramér’s V of 0.18 indicated that there was only  
Table 9 Customers perceived to hold the greatest risk of terrorism financing
Type of customer n %
Individuals 1,511 36.1
Domestic and foreign companies 837 20.0
Charities and not-for-profit organisations 500 11.9
Partnerships 303 7.2
Registered cooperatives 200 4.8
Politically exposed persons 1,035 24.7
Foreign government bodies 815 19.5
Incorporated and unincorporated associations 366 8.7
Trustees 289 6.9
Domestic government bodies 174 4.2
Don’t know 1,898 45.3
No response 138 3.3
Note: Respondents were able to select more than response; therefore, percentages do not total 100
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
21Perceptions of money laundering and terrorism financing risks
a weak level of association between respondents’ 
identification of effective anti-money laundering 
measures and the business sector they occupied. 
Fewer gambling sector respondents (10.9%) 
nominated customer due diligence as the most 
effective countermeasure to money laundering than 
respondents from the banking (19.4%) or managed 
funds/superannuation (24%) sectors. Comparing 
mean results for responses from gambling sector 
respondents with those from the banking sector, it 
was found that there was a statistically significant 
difference between the proportion of respondents 
who identified customer due diligence as an effective 
anti-money laundering measure (Z=14.18, p≤0.0001). 
Similarly, there was a statistically significant difference 
between the proportion of respondents from the 
gambling sector who identified customer due 
diligence as an effective anti-money laundering 
measure and those in the managed funds and 
superannuation sectors (Z=12.35, p≤0.0001).
Approximately 11 percent of respondents stated  
that there were low risks, or no risks associated with 
money laundering and that, accordingly, they did not 
see the need for any countermeasures. The extent 
to which respondents stated that there were no  
risks of money laundering to their businesses and 
accordingly, no anti-money laundering measures 
were needed, varied significantly according to the 
respondent’s business sector (χ2=44.5, df=8, 
p≤0.0001), although a Cramér’s V of 0.18 indicated 
that there was only a weak level of association 
present. Cash delivery services was the sector most 
likely to indicate that no risks were present and that 
no measures were necessary to address money 
laundering (19.3%). Only 4.7 percent of respondents 
from the alternative remittance sector considered 
there to be no risks and no countermeasures 
required. Comparing mean results for responses 
from gambling sector respondents (13.4%) with 
those from the banking sector (10.2%), it was found 
that there was a statistically significant difference 
between the proportion of respondents who indicated 
that their businesses faced no risks or low risks  
of money laundering (Z=-19.7, p≤0.0001), with 
gambling sector respondents being more likely  
to indicate an absence of risk than those from  
the banking sector.
Counter-terrorism  
financing measures
Respondents were also asked to identify the 
countermeasures that they considered would be 
most effective in minimising financing of terrorism 
risks to their businesses. Table 13 presents these 
results grouped in 12 categories. Respondents most 
commonly indicated that no countermeasures were 
necessary, or they had no suggestions as to the 
measures required (36.4%). The proportions of  
each sector who indicated that no measures were 
Table 10 Perceived terrorism financing risks to business to 30 June 2011
Perceived terrorism financing risk n %
No risk/low risk 2,425 57.9
Money transfer/foreign exchange 70 1.7
Gambling 48 1.2
Increased business/new customers/new products 27 0.6
Unknown customers/investors/services 26 0.6
Identity fraud/other fraud 21 0.5
Cash 8 0.2
Charities 3 0.1
Other 451 10.7
Don’t know/can’t predict 241 5.8
No response 912 21.8
Note: Respondents were able to select more than response; therefore, percentages do not total 100
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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Box 3 Australian terrorism financing cases
Very few defendants have been charged with terrorism financing offences in Australia (see Smith, McCusker & Walters 2010). The case 
of Vinayagamoorthy does not provide any great insight into the potential covert use of the Australian financial system for the purposes 
of providing financing to terrorist organisations or for terrorist actions. The prosecution contended that the defendants generated funds 
by selling stolen car parts and made personal donations to a group pool of funds. The judgements in this case did not explicitly describe 
whether any of these funds entered the financial system, remained as cash, or were simply spent on goods or services.
Aruran Vinayagamoorthy and Anor v DPP [2007] VSC 265
In 2009, three men—Aruran Vinayagamoorthy, Sivarajah Yathavan and Arumugan Rajeevan Tash—pleaded guilty to offences under 
the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) for making money available to an entity, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
proscribed for the purposes of that Act. It was the prosecution case that $1,030,259 was made available to the LTTE. Although the 
judge at sentencing found it was not possible to say precisely how much money was made available, he considered that they were large 
amounts. It was also the prosecution’s case that Mr Vinayagamoorthy made an estimated $97,000 worth of electronic components 
available to the LTTE over a period of about two years. The three defendants collected funds from the Tamil community in Australia 
through the Tamil coordinating committee, the TCCE, and provided them to the LTTE between 2002 and 2005. The court accepted that 
the defendants were motivated, in part, by a desire to assist the Tamil community in Sri Lanka. The three were sentenced to terms of 
imprisonment, but released on good behaviour bonds (R v Vinayagamoorthy & Ors [2010] VSC 148, 31 March 2010).
R v ANB and others [2009] VSC 21
In November 2005, 10 men were arrested in Melbourne and charged with terrorism offences under Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth). A further three men were arrested in March 2006 and charged with similar and related offences. All 13 were alleged to 
have been members of a local unnamed terrorist organisation led by the defendant. It was alleged that the organisation was committed 
to preparing, planning, assisting in, or fostering the commission of terrorist acts in an effort to influence the Australian Government 
to withdraw its troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. Four of the 13 accused were acquitted, with the balance convicted following either 
pleas of guilty or a contested trial. Three of the accused were convicted of attempting to intentionally make funds available to a terrorist 
organisation pursuant to s 102.6(1) of the Criminal Code. The Court found that they intended to do this by selling parts from stolen cars 
and using the proceeds of sale for the purposes of the organisation. The Court accepted evidence that an amount probably in the order 
of $7,000 had been raised through other means. Applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence were lodged by all the 
defendants and were heard by the Victorian Court of Appeal in March 2010. On 25 October 2010 the Court delivered judgement. The 
convictions recorded against each of the defendants with respect to the principal offences were upheld although other convictions for 
possessing a thing connected with preparations for a terrorist act were overturned. The defendants were resentenced. Applications for 
special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia by three of the defendants were refused (CDPP 2011: 71).
Table 11 Perceptions of the level of terrorism financing risks to businesses
Risks to 30 June 2009 Risks from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2011
Current risk level n % Expected change to risks n %
Low 3,522 99.5 Increase 84 2.8
Medium 17 0.5 Remain the same 2,822 95.3
High 2 0.1 Decrease 55 1.9
Total 3,541 Total 2,961
Note: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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necessary or that they had no relevant suggestions 
ranged from more than 40 percent of respondents 
from the securities and derivatives sector to 24.4 
percent from the financial services sector. The extent 
to which respondents stated that there were no 
counter-terrorism financing measures needed or that 
they had no relevant suggestions regarding 
counter-measures, varied significantly according to 
the respondent’s business sector (χ2=41.0, df=8, 
p≤0.0001), with a Cramér’s V of 0.10 indicating a 
weak level of association being present.
The most commonly identified measures that 
respondents considered to be effective in minimising 
terrorism financing related to customer identification 
and due diligence (9.5%) and as noted above, 14.6 
percent of respondents suggested that this was also 
an effective countermeasure for money laundering 
risks. Only 1.7 percent of respondents considered 
that identity checks, use of watch lists, criminal 
background checks and other institutional checks 
would be effective counter-terrorism financing 
measures. Comparing mean results from respondents 
who indicated that no measures were needed and 
those who indicated that customer due diligence 
was the most effective counter-terrorism financing 
measure, it was found that there was a statistically 
significant difference between these two groups of 
respondents (Z=29.3, p≤0.0001).
On the whole, KYC procedures were considered to 
be effective in countering both money laundering 
and financing of terrorism risks, possibly because 
these are widely known and used already by many 
businesses. Many respondents, however, had no 
suggestions concerning effective countermeasures 
owing to the perceived very low levels of risk that 
they faced. Again, reasons surrounding the lack of 
understanding of utility, a lack of understanding of 
the differential purposes of the measures and/or 
indifference to the regime may explain the limited 
positive responses received to the risk mitigation 
measures proposed.
Table 12 Measures most effective in minimising money laundering risks to business
Risk mitigation measure n %
KYC/customer ID/more customer ID/ID card 611 14.6
Staff training/vigilance/awareness 450 10.7
In house/existing procedures/no change needed 401 9.6
Ongoing monitoring/vigilance/observation 311 7.4
Transaction monitoring 269 6.4
Limit transactions (such as by size) 123 2.9
Reporting 120 2.9
Compliance/increase compliance/AUSTRAC or AML/CTF Act measures are fine 101 2.4
Intelligence sharing/ID verifying database/list of high-risk customers 80 1.9
Software 69 1.7
Need information/training/typologies from AUSTRAC 60 1.4
Update/assess procedures/improvement 41 1.0
Other legislation/regulation already covers it 31 0.7
General public awareness 39 1.0
Other 168 4.0
Don’t know 297 7.1
Low risks/no risks/need nothing at all 478 11.4
No response 1,279 30.5
Note: Respondents were able to select more than response; therefore, percentages do not total 100
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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Table 13 Effective measures for minimising terrorism financing
Risk mitigation measure n %
Due diligence/Know your customer 396 9.5
Education and training 286 6.8
Following in-house policies and procedures 268 6.4
Transaction monitoring 214 5.1
Awareness/observation/vigilance 149 3.6
Better communication with government, law enforcement and other agencies 117 2.8
Reporting suspect transactions/individuals/instructions 102 2.4
Existing legislation, policies, procedures 101 2.4
Limiting services (such as no cheques, no cash out) 72 1.7
Identity checks/watch lists/criminal checks/institution checks 71 1.7
Other 1,248 29.7
No measures needed/no suggestions 1,526 36.4
Note: Respondents were able to select more than response; therefore, percentages do not total 100
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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In Australia, as noted above, reporting entities that 
provide designated services are required to comply 
with various AML/CTF obligations including filing 
financial transaction reports such as threshold 
reports to AUSTRAC, performing risk-based 
customer identification procedures and monitoring 
customer transactions, establishing and maintaining 
an AML/CTF program, maintaining customer and 
transaction records, reporting on the level of 
compliance with the regime and nominating a 
compliance officer to AUSTRAC. A risk-based 
system has been developed in Australia where 
entities are required to assess the risks associated 
with specific customers and transactions, and to 
determine how to mitigate that risk by meeting the 
obligations under the Act. Reporting entities are able 
to adjust the level of due diligence associated with 
each customer and transaction according to their 
risk level, as well as to consider the level of risk 
posed by their different operations. Accordingly, 
regulated businesses may have different AML/CTF 
programs in place and act differently from one 
another in fulfilling their obligations under the 
legislation.
Each business must conduct a risk assessment  
of its customers, the services it provides and the 
methods it uses to deliver them, any foreign 
jurisdictions it deals with and any additional risks 
stemming from permanent foreign offices (AUSTRAC 
2008). The customer identification, enhanced due 
diligence and ongoing due diligence, transaction 
monitoring and reporting requirements are tied to  
the business’ evaluation of the risks posed by its 
customers and operations. Compliance beyond 
these measures involves record keeping and staff 
screening obligations. Businesses in Australia are 
also required to submit an annual compliance report 
to the regulator detailing their compliance activities 
(AUSTRAC 2009b).
AUSTRAC (2009c) has noted that authorised 
deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) and investment 
banks are comfortable with AML/CTF compliance 
requirements. Smaller ADIs and non-ADI lenders, 
smaller financial service providers, smaller gambling 
and bullion entities, and money service businesses 
may find the processes of conducting risk 
assessments and implementing risk-based 
programs more problematic.
In the absence of other Australian surveys dealing 
with questions of compliance, it is appropriate to 
review the results of some overseas studies. Survey 
data from the United Kingdom in 2007 have found 
generally high levels of compliance with AML/CTF 
risk assessment requirements and follow-up 
procedures. Almost all of the MLROs surveyed in  
the United Kingdom in 2007 had undertaken a 
formal risk assessment of their business, although 
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14 percent had not developed a strategic  
response to the risks identified in this process.  
A further two percent of this group of MLROs  
were unsure if a response had been developed 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007). The businesses 
within PricewaterhouseCoopers’ sample that had 
experienced problems implementing a risk-based 
approach to the United Kingdom’s AML/CTF regime 
reported concerns about time constraints, 
resourcing demands and difficulties altering existing 
processes. In another survey of Indian financial 
services businesses undertaken by KPMG (India) 
(2009), Indian businesses with AML/CTF 
requirements reported a similar level of compliance 
to those in the United Kingdom for some aspects of 
the regime, with close to 90 percent of respondents 
reporting having used a risk-based approach to 
customer due diligence when opening new accounts 
in 2009 and a further eight percent of businesses 
considered doing so (KPMG (India) 2009).
Previous studies have, however, suggested that 
reporting entities have not fared as well in the 
process of implementing effective procedures for 
transacting with PEPs, a class of customers 
identified by FATF as having high levels of risk in 
terms of ML/TF (Choo 2010 and references cited 
therein; see also the AICs review of international 
developments in Walters et al. 2012). Previous 
surveys of regulated businesses have found that 
identifying PEPs and their associates, and 
ameliorating the risks posed by PEPs, remain 
problematic. More than 70 percent of the MLROs 
surveyed in 2001 (Gill & Taylor 2004) considered the 
United Kingdom’s regulations insufficient to identify 
the links between PEPs and their family members 
and associates. By 2007, just under half of surveyed 
MLROs in the United Kingdom did not have a list  
of PEPs for use through all areas of their business 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007). By 2009, more 
than half of KPMG’s sample of Indian financial 
services businesses had implemented procedures 
for identifying PEPs. Of those with PEP identification 
procedures, 56 percent used a purchased list as 
well as internal lists to identify the relevant, while  
a further 36 percent used a purchased list alone 
(KPMG (India) 2009). A majority of Tier One banks 
reported performing enhanced due diligence for 
PEPs opening accounts and 70 percent of this 
sample reported conducting ongoing transaction 
monitoring for PEPs. The authors of this report note 
that, in the absence of a universally accepted 
definition, the measures applied by these banks are 
unlikely to be uniform (KPMG International 2007).
Anti-money laundering/
counter-terrorism financing 
procedures used
In the present survey, respondents were asked  
to indicate the extent to which they complied with 
the basic requirements of the AML/CTF regime in 
Australia. The participants were asked which of three 
core AML/CTF measures their businesses undertook 
(pre-employment screening of staff, ongoing 
customer due diligence for current customers and 
KYC procedures for new customers). They were  
also asked to indicate what additional AML/CTF 
measures their businesses employed. The data 
shown in Tables 14, 15 and 16 show that the 
proportion of businesses that conducted pre-
employment screening, KYC processes for new 
customers and ongoing customer due diligence for 
existing customers varied according to the business 
sector they occupied. Rates of non-compliance with 
the three nominated AML/CTF requirements across 
the entire sample also differed for each of the three 
AML/CTF requirements examined. Approximately 
one-quarter (23.5%) of all respondents did not 
conduct pre-employment staff screening at all  
(see Table 14), while 15.4 percent did not carry  
out ongoing due diligence for existing customers 
(see Table 15), and 19.8 percent did not conduct 
KYC procedures for new customers (see Table 16).
The majority of participants from all business sectors 
(more than 75%) reported screening prospective 
staff, although the data in Table 14 show variable 
compliance rates according to business sector. 
Businesses in the managed funds and 
superannuation sector reported the highest 
pre-employment screening compliance rates 
(90.8%). Alternative remittance sector businesses 
and businesses in the ‘other’ sector category 
reported the lowest rates of compliance with 
pre-employment screening (65.5% and 63.6% 
respectively). These results were significantly 
different according to the business sector 
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respondents occupied (χ2=125.6, df=8, p≤0.0001). 
A Cramér’s V of 0.18 indicated that there was a 
weak level of association between use of pre-
employment screening and the business sector they 
occupied.
A statistically significant relationship was also found 
between levels of compliance with the requirement 
to conduct ongoing due diligence for existing 
customers and the business sector respondents 
occupied (χ2=49.863, df=8, p=0.000; Cramér’s 
V=0.113) (χ2=49.9, df=8, p≤0.0001). A Cramér’s V  
of 0.11 indicated that there was a weak level of 
association between these variables. Financial 
services sector respondents were most likely to 
report conducting ongoing due diligence for existing 
customers (92.7%), while those in the category of 
‘other businesses’ were least likely to conduct due 
diligence (77.2%; see Table 15). Comparing mean 
results for these two groups, it was found that there 
was a statistically significant difference between 
respondents from the financial services sector  
and those in the ‘other businesses’ category who 
reported complying with ongoing due diligence 
requirements (Z=-7.4, p≤0.0001). Generally, 
however, all respondents reported very high levels  
of compliance with ongoing due diligence obligations 
under the legislation.
In relation to compliance with KYC requirements,  
it was found that over 80 percent of respondents 
reported using such procedures for new customers 
(see Table 16). Compliance with these requirements 
differed significantly across business sectors 
(χ2=122.1, df=8, p≤0.0001), although a Cramér’s V 
of 0.18 indicated only a weak level of association 
between KYC compliance and sector. The highest 
levels of KYC compliance for new customers existed 
in the managed funds/superannuation sector 
(92.8%) and the financial services sector (92.7%). 
Lowest levels of compliance with KYC procedures 
for new customers were reported in the gambling 
(75.7%) and foreign exchange sectors (79.3%). 
Comparing mean results for the managed funds/
superannuation sector and respondents in the 
category of ‘other businesses’, it was found that 
there was a statistically significant difference 
between the proportion of respondents who 
reported complying with statutory KYC requirements 
in these two sector groups (Z=1.4, p≤0.0001).
Comparing mean results for responses from 
respondents concerning non-compliance with staff 
screening and KYC processes, it was found that 
there was a statistically significant difference 
between these two groups (t=-3.1; df=8358.6; 
p≤0.002). There was also a statistically significant 
difference between use of staff screening and 
ongoing due diligence procedures for new customers 
(t=-8.6; df=8209.5, p≤0.0001), and also for the use 
of KYC processes and ongoing customer due 
diligence (t=5.5; df=8297.4; p≤0.0001). Overall, 
reporting entities were most likely to have complied 
with ongoing customer due diligence requirements 
and were more likely to have complied with KYC 
requirements than pre-employment staff screening.
Additional anti-money laundering procedures 
identified by respondents that were not part of the 
measures listed included:
•	 record keeping, monitoring and reporting (n=47; 
1.2% of respondents);
•	 general compliance with the AML/CTF regime 
(n=67; 1.6%);
•	 training and professional development (n=38; 
0.9%);
•	 limiting risks by placing restrictions on transactions 
(n=18; 0.4%); and
•	 stating that the customers and staff are personally 
known to the business, making KYC unnecessary 
(n=12; 0.3%).
Overall, it appears that high proportions of 
businesses complied with the risk-management 
procedures specified in the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) 
and other processes designed to minimise money 
laundering risks.
Anti-money laundering/
counter-terrorism  
financing software
Prior international research
As background to the results of the present Australian 
survey, it is useful to consider the results of previous 
overseas studies that have reported the varying 
degrees to which AML/CTF-specific software has 
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Table 14 Pre-employment screening, by business sector
Conducts screening Does not conduct screening
Business sector n % n %
Managed funds/superannuation (n=346) 314 90.8 32 9.3
Banking (n=304) 251 82.6 53 17.4
Financial services (n=164) 141 86.0 23 14.0
Securities and derivatives (n=114) 103 90.4 11 9.7
Gambling (n=2,184) 1,669 76.4 515 23.6
Foreign exchange (n=203) 148 72.9 55 27.1
Cash delivery (n=57) 51 89.5 6 10.5
ARS (n=192) 122 65.5 70 35.0
Other businesses (n=360) 229 63.6 131 39.3
Total (n=4,189) 3,028 76.5 896 23.5
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
Table 15 Ongoing due diligence for existing customers, by business sector
Conducts due diligence Does not conduct due diligence
Business sector n % n %
Managed funds/superannuation (n=346) 314 90.8 32 9.3
Banking (n=304) 274 90.1 30 9.9
Financial services (n=164) 152 92.7 12 7.3
Securities and derivatives (n=114) 104 91.2 10 8.8
Gambling (n=2,184) 1,810 82.9 374 17.1
Foreign exchange (n=203) 171 84.2 32 15.8
Cash delivery (n=57) 50 87.7 7 12.3
ARS (n=192) 165 85.9 27 14.1
Other businesses (n=360) 278 77.2 82 22.8
Total (n=3,924) 3,318 84.6 606 15.4
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
Table 16 Know-your-customer requirements for new customers, by business sector
Conducts KYC Does not conduct KYC
Business sector n % n %
Managed funds/superannuation (n=346) 3,321 92.8 25 7.2
Banking (n=304) 272 89.5 32 10.5
Financial services (n=164) 152 92.7 12 7.3
Securities and derivatives (n=114) 103 90.4 11 9.7
Gambling (n=2,184) 1,653 75.7 531 24.3
Foreign exchange (n=203) 161 79.3 42 20.7
Cash delivery (n=57) 51 89.5 6 10.5
ARS (n=192) 169 88.0 23 12.0
Other businesses (n=360) 266 73.9 94 26.1
Total (n=3,924) 3,148 80.2 776 19.8
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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been used by businesses in connection with their 
discharge of AML/CTF legislative obligations. For 
example, 34 percent of the Tier One banks surveyed 
by PricewaterhouseCoopers in its 2007 survey in the 
United Kingdom, monitored transactions electronically 
and of these, 29 percent purchased the software 
from a third-party provider (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2007). Within this group, fewer smaller companies 
used automated monitoring than did larger firms. A 
quarter of companies that employed fewer than 100 
staff had automated transaction monitoring systems 
in place, while almost double this proportion (42%) 
of companies with more than 100 employees did so.
Another study found that half of the US-based life 
insurance companies surveyed by Ernst & Young 
(2007) had AML/CTF systems dependant, to some 
extent, on automated services. The companies  
that had automated their AML/CTF programs 
predominantly used systems developed in-house, 
with approximately 35 percent purchasing software 
instead of developing it. This group of companies 
nominated human resources expenditure as the 
most costly area of their AML/CTF electronic 
systems. Approximately 30 percent of respondents 
spent between US$250,000 and US$1m on human 
resources management and all of the companies 
surveyed spent less than US$250,000 on software 
and hardware combined.
In the United Kingdom, one-third of MLRO’s 
surveyed in 2007 (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007) 
stated that their companies needed to improve their 
AML/CTF systems. They specifically identified the 
need to enhance or automate their transaction 
monitoring procedures and to improve staff training. 
They also indicated that an electronic identification, 
or an electronic means of certifying identity, would 
improve their systems. In a survey of financial 
services businesses in India undertaken by KPMG  
in 2009, the majority of those surveyed monitored 
sanctions lists as part of their transaction monitoring 
programs, with more than 40 percent of these 
businesses using software specifically designed  
for this purpose (KPMG India 2009).
A case study involving a Luxembourg private bank’s 
AML/CTF software selection process showed the 
predominant considerations of the bank for system 
flexibility, accuracy, service and follow-up procedures 
for flagged transactions when selecting appropriate 
systems. The central concern of the bank prior to 
making software decisions was that any automated 
transaction monitoring system should be fit-for-
purpose in terms of the bank’s regulatory obligations, 
business operations, potential expansion plans and 
resources (Veyder 2003).
Survey results
The present AML/CTF Australian business survey 
sought to document the proportion of survey 
participants who used software of differing kinds  
to assist with Australian AML/CTF requirements 
compliance. The responses refer to software and 
other systems specifics that were available or used 
by respondent businesses at the time of the survey 
in 2009 and hence do not reflect improvements to 
either that may have occurred subsequent to the 
survey period.
In 2009, approximately 24 percent (n=1,044) of 
respondents indicated that they used some software 
for AML/CTF compliance purposes. The tools that 
respondents identified included commercial software 
packages that are designed to address AML/CTF 
and other compliance or financial crime risks (eg 
World-Check, Norkom (0.3%) and Complinet/
Complispace) or more general software (eg Mantas, 
SAS, Ultradata and Ultracs, Veda, Quicken, MYOB, 
RIA and Microsoft Excel). Overall, use of individual 
software packages of either category was very low 
(less than 1% for most packages identified).
World-Check was the commercial software product 
most commonly used by respondents (2.7%).  
The data in Table 17 show that 10.3 percent of the 
managed funds/superannuation and 12.9 percent 
securities and derivatives reporting entities used 
World-Check software, while the proportions of 
gambling and ‘other’ sector businesses that used 
this product were below one percent.
A higher proportion of businesses reported using 
products developed in-house, or products 
developed by an industry body than licensed 
software from a commercial provider. These included 
in-house developed software (10.2%) and internal 
Australia Post software (2.8%). Some businesses 
reported using internet searching or other search 
functions such as Factiva (0.7%), the AUSTRAC 
website (0.5%), general internet usage (0.2%); and  
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a further 0.2 percent used other unspecified electronic 
procedures. Banking (23.7%) and financial services 
businesses (19.5%) were the sectors with the 
highest proportions of respondents developing  
and using in-house AML/CTF software.
More than 60 percent (n=2,564) of respondents 
reported not using any AML/CTF software tools in 
the 12 month period to 30 June 2009 (see Figure 1). 
These results showed significant differences 
according to the business sector respondents 
occupied (χ2=408.1, df=8, p≤0.0001). A Cramér’s V 
of 0.32 indicated that there was, however, only a 
weak level of association between not using AML/CTF 
software and the business sector respondents 
occupied. The business sector least likely to report 
using AML/CTF software was the gambling sector, 
with almost three-quarters of respondents indicating 
that they did not use this software (73.7%). This  
is most likely due to the high proportion of small 
business clubs and pubs in the sector. By contrast, 
those in the foreign exchange sector were most 
likely to use AML/CTF software—only 29.6 percent 
indicating that they did not use software in the  
12 month period to 30 June 2009.
Interviews
Two interview participants from the banking sector 
reported using software to augment their customer 
identification and transaction monitoring processes. 
One banking respondent noted that he used 
World-Check on a pay-per-use basis, rather than 
paying an annual licence fee of $10,000 per year. 
Transactions were also monitored manually using 
spreadsheets. The interviewee indicated that his 
bank was examining the feasibility of implementing  
a larger system to monitor transactions in the future.
One mutual financial services association interviewee 
reported using Orion, a commercial financial and 
accounting software product, to monitor Visa 
transactions and used an Orion add-on to conduct 
AML/CTF transaction monitoring. Orion software is 
able to identify suspicious transactions based on the 
parameters that the user has defined in advance. 
These parameters are set by the compliance officer 
and were determined by the nature of the customers 
and the relevant AUSTRAC AML/CTF risk indicators. 
The system identified and flagged unusual transactions 
that should be examined further by the compliance 
officer (Financial services association representative, 
personal communication, November 2009).
Know-your-customer 
processes
KYC requirements—such as customer identification 
and enhanced due diligence measures, including the 
identification of beneficial owners of customers—
pose various challenges for regulated businesses 
seeking to implement AML/CTF measures. In Europe, 
Table 17 World-Check software users, by business sector
Business sector
Users of World-Check 
from this sector (n)
Users of World-Check 
from this sector (%)
% of World-Check users 
from the sector
Managed funds and superannuation 36 10.3 33.3
Banking 24 7.9 22.2
Financial services 6 3.7 5.5
Securities and derivatives 15 12.9 13.9
Gambling 17 0.8 15.7
Foreign exchange 4 2.0 3.7
Cash delivery services 2 3.5 1.9
Alternative remittance services 3 1.6 2.8
Other 1 0.3 0.9
All sectors 108 2.8 100.0
Note: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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the majority of the sample of Eastern European 
financial institutions that responded to Ernst & 
Young’s survey on the implementation of the 
European Union’s Third Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive, anticipated challenges meeting the 
Directive’s KYC requirements (Ernst & Young 2007). 
Identifying the economic activities of customers  
and identifying PEPs were the areas that posed the 
greatest challenges. In another survey conducted in 
2001, more than 60 percent of the MLROs surveyed 
anticipated difficulties in identifying the beneficial 
owners of assets (Gill & Taylor 2004).
Know-your-customer confidence
Survey respondents were asked to indicate how 
confident they were in identifying each of the 
following categories of customers:
•	 domestic companies;
•	 registered foreign companies;
•	 trustees;
•	 partnerships;
•	 incorporated and unincorporated associations;
•	 registered cooperatives;
•	 domestic government bodies;
•	 foreign government bodies;
•	 charities or not-for-profit organisations;
•	 PEPs; and
•	 individuals, including sole traders.
Figure 2 presents results combining the percentage 
of businesses that were very confident and confident, 
compared with those that were neutral and those 
that were not confident or not at all confident,  
for each customer type. The highest levels of 
confidence were reported for being able to identify 
individuals (86.1%) and domestic companies 
(84.5%). Very few respondents reported not being 
confident (2.4%) when identifying individuals. The 
highest levels of lack of confidence in identifying 
customers concerned the identification of foreign 
government bodies (24.2%), PEPs (22.4%) and 
foreign-registered companies (21.4%). The obvious 
impediments to undertaking appropriate scrutiny  
of overseas-based organisations and individuals  
are the likely reasons for the low levels of confidence 
expressed by respondents when responding to this 
question.
Figure 1 Regulated businesses that did not use AML/CTF software in 12 month period to 30 June 2009, 
by business sector (%)
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Figure 3 shows more detailed information on  
the confidence different business sectors have in 
identifying foreign registered companies. Businesses 
in the foreign exchange (37%) and gambling (26.7%) 
sectors reported generally little or no confidence in 
their identification of foreign registered businesses, 
while those in the securities and managed funds/
superannuation sectors had much higher levels of 
confidence.
Figure 4 shows levels of confidence reported by 
businesses from various sectors in identifying PEPs. 
Respondents from the alternative remittance 
(15.6%), foreign exchange (15.2%) and ‘other’ 
business categories (16.4%) reported having little or 
no confidence in their ability to identify PEPs. Those 
from the securities sector showed the highest levels 
of confidence in identifying PEPs—47.9 percent 
having some confidence and 22.5 percent being 
extremely confident in so doing.
Know-your-customer processes
The survey also asked respondents to identify the 
extent to which their businesses used manual as 
opposed to software-based processes to conduct 
customer due diligence, or some blend of the two. 
Figure 5 shows that 49 percent of the respondents 
reported using only manual processes and just over 
one-fifth (22%) used a mix of manual and software-
based processes.
These results differed significantly according to the 
business sector respondents occupied (χ2=721.6, 
df=40, p≤0.0001). A Cramér’s V of 0.19 indicated 
that there was a weak level of association between 
respondents’ use of differing due diligence processes 
and the business sector they occupied. Those in the 
gambling sector were most likely to use only manual 
due diligence processes (61%), while manual 
processes were least often used by banks (22.9%).
A statistically significant relationship was also present 
between the type of due diligence processes used 
and use of AML/CTF software (χ2=924.9, df=5, 
p≤0.0001, Cramér’s V=0.47). A number of businesses 
that reported using AML/CTF software also reported 
using only manual processes in relation to customer 
due diligence (n=209, 10.3%), perhaps because 
software was used principally for transaction 
reporting rather than due diligence activities.
A proportion of respondents from each of the 
sectors reported having no customer due diligence 
procedures in place. Just over 10 percent (10.2%)  
of gambling sector businesses reported having no 
customer due diligence procedures in place, while 
11.6 percent of ‘other’ businesses had no such 
procedures. Nine percent of cash delivery 
businesses also had no procedures in place.
Views of interviewees on customer 
due diligence
Interview participants confirmed that the way 
businesses approached customer identification and 
due diligence was very industry specific. Interviewees 
from the gambling sector predominantly worked in 
small businesses that derived most of their income 
from work as hoteliers, while operating some gaming 
machines. Interviewees explained that hotels are not 
obliged to conduct formal identification processes 
for their customer base who simply purchase drinks 
or meals over the bar or who unsuccessfully play 
gaming machines, reflecting the results of the survey 
that showed that this sector used few formal due 
diligence processes. One club’s representative 
indicated that the club collected basic information 
about customers who were not members of the  
club, although this information was not recorded 
anywhere other than on the entry form that was 
completed at the door. Similarly, there were no 
restrictions on who may become a member or who 
may be signed in as a guest. That club documented 
the customer’s basic demographic information upon 
paying out a win of more than $200 and for wins  
of more than $1,000, the club required patrons to 
supply two types of government-issued identification 
before issuing a cheque.
One interviewee from a pub provided an example  
of the difficulties present in seeking information from 
customers (see Box 4)
By contrast, an interviewee from a private equity 
company’s current investment fund had a total of  
12 investor companies, each of which were already 
regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority or the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC). The company also undertook  
its own extensive customer due diligence processes 
that included examination of the investors’ reputation 
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Figure 2 Reporting entities’ customer identification confidence, by customer type (%)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100 Confident/extremely confident Neutral  Not at all/not confident
Ind
ivid
ua
ls 
Do
me
sti
c c
om
pa
nie
s
Ch
ari
tie
s/N
FP
Do
me
sti
c g
ove
rnm
en
t
Pa
rtn
ers
hip
s
As
so
cia
tio
ns
 
Tru
ste
es
 
Co
op
era
tive
s 
Fo
rei
gn
 co
mp
an
ies
PE
Ps
 
Fo
rei
gn
 go
ver
nm
en
ts
Note: NFP= not for profit
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
Figure 3 Confidence in identifying foreign registered companies, by sector (%)
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and capacity to meet its financial commitments 
throughout the forthcoming decade.
Similarly, an interviewee from a commercial bank 
indicated that the bank employed a risk matrix that 
identified a clear hierarchy of management available 
to staff for advice or assistance. All new corporate 
clients were subject to a rudimentary check on the 
ASIC website to verify the identification of the 
directors and any relevant licences. All potential 
clients were checked against the Attorney-General’s 
Department and Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade watch lists, and checked against World-
Check’s database of PEPs.
One interviewee from a cash delivery business 
indicated that he had always taken a very 
conservative risk-management approach to 
accepting new clients. The company did not deal 
with unknown businesses and conducted stringent 
assessment of any potential new clients, which 
encompassed a comprehensive overview of their 
business practices, the company’s reputation, 
potential lost revenue and questions of personal 
safety for employees. Any potential clients that failed 
to take on the risk management recommendations 
identified in the assessment process were declined. 
All new clients, and existing clients at the time  
AML/CTF preventative measures were introduced, 
were checked against ASIC databases. The business 
had a lot of face-to-face contact with its clients and 
required its clients to notify them when a new staff 
member starts.
Another interviewee who worked with a private 
mortgage company indicated that he found it difficult 
to find good borrowers, which made it difficult to 
invest the funds coming into the business (see Box 5).
In another instance recounted by a finance company 
interviewee, a borrower’s application for finance for a 
kebab shop exemplified the enhanced due diligence 
measures of the lender. The lender had reservations 
about the loan because of the nature of business 
and some issues with the proposed guarantors  
for the loan. The lender investigated the proposal 
further, had the applicants detail the history of  
similar businesses they owned and made separate 
enquiries about the applicants to the broker and 
lawyer involved in the transaction. The lender 
obtained a certificate of a witness from the solicitor 
for the mortgage documents, had the guarantors 
verify the identity of the borrowers and ensured that 
the guarantors had received independent advice. All 
Figure 4 Confidence in identifying politically exposed persons, by sector (%)
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clients were subject to a credit ratings agency check 
to uncover patterns such as ‘clear outs’ that might 
indicate where a person has repeatedly run away 
from their debt. The reasons for clear outs varied 
from family case law to something more sinister.
The mortgage company interviewee also noted that 
new investors providing funds for borrowers could 
only invest after being referred to the private 
mortgage company by an existing investor. The 
company regularly received calls from people 
seeking to invest funds with their company. They 
were exceedingly cautious about taking new 
investors as they found it difficult to invest the funds 
they already had. The credit manager would meet 
with a potential new investor to get to know them 
and would conduct a 100 point identity check  
at that stage. The investor would then receive  
a product disclosure statement and the 100 point 
check would be completed. The company considered 
it good practice to trial new investors by investing  
a small amount of money, around $25,000. Most 
investors disclosed where their funds originated.  
The mortgage company considered KYC practices 
important to reduce the risk for their company and 
to ensure the continuation of positive working 
relationships.
Confidence in customer due diligence 
assessments performed by other 
businesses—survey results
Section 38 of the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) allows 
reporting entities to rely on customer identification 
procedures undertaken by another reporting entity 
carried out in accordance with the legislation and 
regulations. The aim of this is to reduce the burden 
on regulated businesses and to streamline the 
identification procedures required in certain specified 
circumstances. The Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter-Terrorism Financing Rules Instrument  
2007 No.1 (Part 7.2) restricts reporting entities’  
use of customer identification conducted by another 
business to licensed financial advisors and members 
of designated business groups where:
•	 the first reporting entity (the entity identifying the 
customer) makes arrangements for the customer 
to receive a designated service by a second 
reporting entity;
•	 the second reporting entity obtains a record of the 
identification record made by the first reporting 
entity or has made arrangements to access the 
records of the first entity; and
Figure 5 Current customer due diligence processes (%)
No customer due diligence 8.5 
Software only 1.4 
Mainly software 2.9
Mix of manual/software 21.8
Mainly manual 16.0
Only manual 49.4 
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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•	 the second reporting entity has determined it 
appropriate to rely on the identification undertaken 
by the first reporting entity, having considered the 
money laundering and terrorism financing risks 
posed by providing a designated service to the 
customer.
Reporting entities that rely on identification procedures 
completed by another reporting entity, or by an agent, 
retain their accountability for accurately identifying 
their customers (AUSTRAC 2010b). Confidence in 
the customer due diligence procedures conducted 
by another business, in this context, is a crucial 
factor in determining whether reporting entities will 
ever share information in this way.
Respondents to the present survey were asked to 
indicate their levels of confidence in the customer 
due diligence assessments conducted by other 
businesses using the same Likert scale as described 
previously (ie not at all confident, not confident, 
neutral, confident, extremely confident). 
Respondents were specifically asked to consider 
customer due diligence conducted by financial 
planners, accountants, lawyers and other financial 
institutions, and were able to nominate other types 
of businesses. The professional sector businesses 
were included despite the fact that they did not  
fall within the legislation. Confidence ratings for the 
customer due diligence undertaken by each of these 
four selected business types were condensed  
into not at all confident/not confident, neutral and 
confident/extremely confident in order to simplify  
the results (see Table 18).
Generally, there was a lower level of confidence  
in customer identification processes undertaken  
by financial planners as opposed to accountants, 
lawyers, or other financial institutions. Comparing 
mean results for responses from respondents 
concerning confidence in identification undertaken 
by financial planners and financial institutions, it  
was found that there was a statistically significant 
difference between these two groups (t=-9.1; 
df=2415.2; p≤0.0001).
Financial institutions were the only business sector 
included in this question that had AML/CTF regulatory 
responsibilities and yet more respondents felt 
confident or extremely confident in customer 
identification completed by accountants (76.7%). 
The confidence rating between accountants and 
financial institutions was statistically significant 
(t=3.2; df=3092.4; p≤0.002), indicating that more 
Box 4 Difficulties in seeking information from customers
The pub had some bikies in a few months ago—they were passing through on their way elsewhere. The group played the pokies and 
drank without any issues. Those playing the pokies made some sizeable bets and received payouts of $100–200 from the TAB. Their 
behaviour was not suspicious in any way; anyone making bets of $500 is going to be paid out larger amounts than someone making 
smaller bets. The hotel staff found it very hard to ask the bikies for identification for the payouts. One of them yelled out his driver’s 
licence number and the staff had to tell him the licence needed to be sighted. It was certainly uncomfortable for the staff member and 
the publican considered the situation to be possibly dangerous. Telling customers that they need identification information for compliance 
might be okay for some businesses but is certainly difficult for pokies. The bikies were very obvious and the owner was aware of them 
constantly. If the bikies had only been in the pub for a short time and gotten large payouts then the owner would have called the police. 
(Publican, personal communication, October 2009).
Box 5 Difficulties in finding good borrowers
Brokers acted as intermediaries for locating borrowers. The brokers the company worked with were well-known to the credit manager but 
not to the employees. The company also considered referrals for borrowers from some banks and mortgage brokers. The most common 
thing clients were seeking was non-confirmative finance. The process for establishing a new borrower was very detailed. Borrowers 
outlined their scenario and supplied supporting documentation and the mortgage company provided application packs including the 
Corporation Act, financial services licence, money laundering brochure and identification requirements. The broker then attends to the 
borrower and returns the information to the mortgage company. The private mortgage company would then send the mortgage document 
out to the borrower. The borrower was required to sign the documents in front of a justice of the peace, who declared that signatures 
were witnessed, verified the identity of the borrower and confirmed that they consented to signing the application. A case of mortgage 
fraud using false identification in the same state compelled the mortgage company to undertake more stringent identity checks. The 
lenders, in this case, may not have been paid out despite an insurance fund for these situations. The private mortgage company, from 
then on, maintained a checklist of documentation for every file and all employees had access to these files for monitoring (Mortgage 
company, personal communication, October 2009).
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confidence existed in the processes undertaken  
by accountants than financial institutions. A higher 
percentage of respondents also expressed 
confidence in the due diligence processes of lawyers 
(73.4%) than other financial institutions (71.1%), 
although this was not statistically significant (t=2.4; 
df=3132.1; p≥0.016). A significant difference was 
found between levels of confidence in due diligence 
undertaken by accountants as opposed to lawyers 
(t=2.421; df=3132.13; p=0.016).
The data in Figure 6 show the marked differences 
that existed across business sectors in respect  
of their level of confidence in relying on customer 
due diligence procedures performed by financial 
planners. Those in the cash delivery services sector 
had the least confidence in relying on due diligence 
assessments made by financial planners (18.8%), 
while respondents from the securities and derivatives 
sector were generally confident or extremely 
confident in customer due diligence assessments 
conducted by financial planners (76.9%).
As is apparent from Figure 7, the banking sector 
showed the highest proportion (11.5%) of businesses 
that reported low levels of confidence in relying on 
the processes conducted by accountants. By contrast, 
more than 86 percent of financial services sector 
respondents were confident or extremely confident 
in the due diligence procedures conducted by 
accountants.
In relation to levels of confidence in due diligence 
undertaken by those in the legal sector, Figure 8 
shows that the financial services sector respondents 
had the highest levels of confidence (83.9%), while 
only 64.5 percent of the banking sector, 60 percent 
of foreign exchange businesses and 51.1 percent  
of alternative remittance dealers were confident or 
extremely confident in replying on due diligence 
undertaken by lawyers.
Transaction monitoring  
and reporting
Both the FTR Act and the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) 
currently require that reporting entities provide a 
number of financial transaction reports to AUSTRAC. 
A substantial change in reporting to AUSTRAC took 
place on 12 December 2008 when the reporting 
requirements of the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) came 
into effect. The reporting requirements oblige entities 
providing one or more ‘designated services’ under 
the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) to submit certain 
reports to AUSTRAC. These include the following 
(AUSTRAC 2010).
Under the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth), reporting entities 
must submit SMRs if, at any time while dealing with 
a customer, the entity forms a reasonable suspicion 
that the matter may be related to an offence (not just 
a ML/TF offence), tax evasion, or the proceeds of 
crime. Entities must submit SMRs to AUSTRAC 
within three days of forming the suspicion (or within 
24 hours for matters related to financing of terrorism 
suspicions). For many reporting entities, SMRs have 
progressively replaced suspicious transaction 
reports, which fall under the FTR Act.
Under the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth), if a reporting 
entity provides a designated service to a customer 
that involves the transfer of physical currency (or 
e-currency) of $10,000 or more (or the foreign 
currency equivalent), that entity must submit a TTR 
to AUSTRAC. For many reporting entities, TTRs 
have replaced significant cash transaction reports, 
which fall under the FTR Act. Entities must submit 
TTRs to AUSTRAC within 10 days of the transaction.
Under the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth), if a reporting 
entity sends or receives an instruction to or from a 
foreign country to transfer money or property, that 
entity must submit an international funds transfer 
instruction (IFTI) report. IFTI reports were also 
required to be submitted under the FTR Act. Entities 
must submit IFTIs to AUSTRAC within 10 days of 
the transfer.
Under the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth), cross-border 
movement of physical currency (CBM-PC) reports 
are submitted when currency (coin or paper money) 
worth $10,000 (or the foreign equivalent) or more is 
carried, mailed or shipped into or out of Australia. 
When a person carries currency of $10,000 or more 
into or out of Australia, a CBM-PC report must be 
completed at the first customs examination area 
upon entry into Australia or before leaving Australia. 
When a person mails or ships currency of $10,000 
or more into or out of Australia, a CBM-PC report 
must be submitted within five business days of the 
currency being received in Australia or at any time 
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before the currency is sent out of Australia. On  
12 December 2006, CBM-PC reports replaced 
international currency transfer reports, which fall 
under the FTR Act.
Under the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth), cross-border 
movement of bearer negotiable instrument reports 
must be completed by persons entering or leaving 
Australia who are carrying bearer negotiable 
instruments (such as travellers cheques, cheques  
or money orders) of any amount, if asked by a 
customs or police officer to complete such a report. 
This aspect of the reporting regime is examined by 
Smith and Walker (2010).
Finally, a reporting entity must give an annual report 
to AUSTRAC regarding its compliance with the AML/
CTF Act 2006 (Cth) (ss 47–48). The first such report 
was due on 31 March 2008. The AML/CTF 
compliance report obligations apply to any person or 
entity that provides designated services. Reporting 
entities were encouraged to enrol via AUSTRAC 
Online, an internet-based information portal for 
reporting entities launched in December 2007. 
AUSTRAC Online streamlined the enrolment process 
for new entities and provided a simple and efficient 
means for entities to submit their compliance 
reports. By the end of the reporting year, more than 
10,000 entities had enrolled via AUSTRAC Online 
Table 18 Respondents’ confidence in know-your-customer procedures undertaken by another business (%)
Confidence rating
Sector performing KYC Not at all/not confident Neutral Confident/extremely confident
Financial planners 10.8 33.3 55.9
Accountants 5.0 18.3 76.7
Lawyers 5.6 21.0 73.4
Other financial institutions 5.5 23.4 71.1
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
Figure 6 Confidence in relying on customer due diligence conducted by financial planners, by sector (%)
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and approximately 7,500 AML/CTF compliance reports 
had been submitted (AUSTRAC 2008). At 30 June 
2011, a total of 18,484 entities were enrolled with 
AUSTRAC Online (AUSTRAC 2011).
In Australia, the pattern of suspicious transaction/
matter reporting to AUSTRAC has been one of 
general increase between 1994–95 and 2010–11, 
although these increases were more pronounced 
from 2003–04 onwards. A substantial increase 
between 2008–09 and 2009–10 was followed by  
a slight reduction in 2010–11 (see Figure 9).
The increased number of reports submitted to 
AUSTRAC is unlikely to be the direct result of an 
increase in the number of suspicious transactions 
performed by designated entities on behalf of their 
customers. Instead, it is likely to be attributed to the 
tightening of the AML/CTF regime (in the wake of the 
11 September 2001 and other terrorist attacks), a 
legislative-driven increase in the number of reporting 
entities, an increase in the size of some regulated 
sectors, increased publicity by AUSTRAC of the 
requirements of the regime and a period of defensive 
reporting influenced by the securing of convictions 
against high profile financial institutions in the United 
States and the United Kingdom for failing to 
adequately maintain AML/CTF compliance systems 
(Smith et al. forthcoming).
Perceptions of the  
effectiveness of transaction 
monitoring—survey results
The AML/CTF regime requires reporting entities to 
monitor transactions of customers in order to identify 
both threshold transactions as well as suspicious 
matters and have regard to complex, unusual large 
transactions and unusual patterns of transactions, 
which have no apparent economic or visible lawful 
purpose (Chapter 15, AML/CTF Rules Instrument 
2007 (No 1)). The survey sought the views of 
participants on the ability of their business to  
monitor transactions, the methods used to  
monitor transactions and the procedures likely  
to be the most effective in monitoring transactions. 
Respondents were specifically asked to indicate 
their views on the extent to which their business was 
effective in identifying each of a variety of types of 
financial transaction. Respondents were also asked 
to indicate their perceptions of the effectiveness of 
Figure 7 Confidence in relying on customer due diligence conducted by accountants, by sector (%)
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transaction monitoring in terms of identifying cash 
transactions equal to or more than $10,000, 
suspicious transactions of less than $10,000, 
suspicious transactions of more than $10,000, 
transactions involving PEPs and suspicious 
transactions to overseas countries. The perceptions 
of respondents on the effectiveness of transaction 
monitoring for each of these transaction types are 
presented in Figure 10.
Almost 95 percent of respondents considered their 
transaction monitoring procedures to be effective,  
or very effective, at identifying cash transactions of 
$10,000 or more. Smaller proportions of respondents 
considered their procedures to be very effective, or 
effective, at identifying transactions involving PEPs 
(51.2%) or at identifying suspicious transactions made 
to overseas countries (77.4%).
Comparing mean results for responses concerning 
the effectiveness of identifying transactions involving 
PEPs and suspicious transactions to other countries, 
it was found that there was a statistically significant 
difference between these two groups (t=-12.3; 
df=3429.5; p≤0.0001); that is, respondents viewed 
their ability to identify transactions involving PEPs as 
being significantly less effective than their ability to 
identify suspicious transactions to other countries. 
The foreign exchange sector was the sector  
that believed it was least effective in identifying 
transactions involving PEPs (19.1% believing 
processes to be either ineffective or very ineffective).
Respondents also differed significantly in terms of 
their perceived effectiveness in identifying suspicious 
transactions of less than $10,000 as opposed to 
those of more than $10,000 (t=-11.2; df=6077.3; 
p≤0.0001). Overall, respondents were less confident 
in their ability to identify suspicious transactions of 
less than $10,000 than suspicious transactions of 
more than $10,000.
Automated transaction monitoring
Respondents were also asked to indicate whether 
their transaction monitoring activities were manual, 
using some automated software-based system,  
a mixture of both, or whether no monitoring was 
undertaken. The data in Figure 11 show that more 
than half (58.2%) of respondents reported using only 
manual, or mainly manual, transaction monitoring 
Figure 8 Confidence in relying on customer due diligence conducted by lawyers, by sector (%)
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processes in their businesses. A small percentage  
of businesses (7.8%) reported using predominantly 
software-based transaction monitoring processes.
Table 19 presents statistics on the transaction 
monitoring processes used by respondents 
according to their business sector. It was found  
that transaction monitoring software was most often 
used in the foreign exchange sector (23.4%) with 
those in the gambling (67.9%) and securities and 
derivatives sectors (68.1%) most often using manual 
processes for transaction monitoring. Almost six 
percent (5.7%) of respondents, mostly from the 
gambling sector, indicated that they used no 
transaction monitoring processes. This accords  
with the results presented in Figure 1 that showed 
that respondents from the gambling sector were  
the least likely to use AML/CTF software generally.
Perceptions of the effectiveness of 
transaction monitoring procedures
An attempt was also made in the survey to gauge 
perceptions about the effectiveness of various types 
of transaction monitoring procedures. Grouping the 
responses into three categories of very effective/
effective, neutral and very ineffective/ineffective, 
Figure 12 presents the assessments for five types  
of transaction monitoring methods—anti-money 
laundering software, external third parties (such  
as consultants), external audit, internal audit and 
internal staff-based methods.
It was found that the majority of respondents 
(92.9%) indicated that using internal staff to identify 
transactions was an effective or very effective 
method of transaction monitoring. Internal auditing 
was also considered to be effective or very effective 
for 85.3 percent of respondents. Somewhat fewer 
respondents (77%) indicated that using external  
third parties, or using external audit (78%), to identify 
transactions were effective or very effective methods 
of transaction monitoring. The effectiveness ratings 
shown in Figure 12 also indicated that just over one 
half of respondents (58.1%) perceived that AML/CTF 
software was an effective or very effective means of 
monitoring transactions.
Respondents from the banking (82.2%), securities 
and derivatives (84%), and alternative remittance 
services (80%) sectors were most likely to view 
transaction monitoring using AML/CTF software  
as effective or very effective. Fewer respondents 
(38.4%) from the gambling sector, by contrast, 
Figure 9 Suspicious transaction/matter reports received by AUSTRAC, 1994–95 to 2010–11 (n)
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viewed AML/CTF software as effective or very 
effective. Those from the gambling sector were also 
most likely to say that they did not use any AML/CTF 
software for any aspect of compliance. There is no 
indication, however, of whether gambling businesses 
did not use AML/CTF software because of its 
perceived ineffectiveness, or simply if the perception 
of ineffectiveness stems from a lack of exposure  
to using software. It could also be the case that 
respondents from the gambling sector considered 
that AML/CTF software was too expensive or not 
well-suited to the compliance needs of the sector.
Responses of interviewees
Interviewees were asked to provide information on 
the procedures they used that were relevant to the 
identification of suspicious transactions undertaken 
by their customers. Many of these procedures were 
used for credit control and fraud reduction reasons, 
rather than specifically for anti-money laundering 
purposes, although they were also of benefit in 
detecting suspicious transactions for AML/CTF 
purposes as well. One interviewee from a pub, for 
example, explained that the pub had TAB facilities  
as well as gaming machines and that the TAB 
monitored the bets placed in the pub. The TAB  
set a betting threshold of $200, beyond which  
the pub owners needed to place the bet with the 
TAB. The TAB would contact the pub to get some 
identification information of the punters on any bets 
they had questions about. One of the pub’s regular 
customers frequently placed large bets at the pub 
and the pub’s owners knew that the man supported 
himself through gambling. This punter placed a  
bet of $1,000 and the TAB called to verify it when  
he placed it and again the day after. The owner 
witnessed one customer winning $10,000 within  
the first three months that the owner had been in the 
pub; another won $1,800 during the same period. 
Each of these winners had their details recorded 
prior to receiving their winnings, although the owners 
knew them quite well and saw them often. The pub 
had procedures for placing large bets so that the 
staff could do so and the system worked well for  
the TAB facilities. The owners had no idea of what 
amounts of cash were going into the pokies by a 
single user though, as each machine gave a figure  
Figure 10 Perceptions of the effectiveness of transaction monitoring for different types of transactions (%)
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at the end of the day but did not log the amounts 
placed by each user or in a single session. Lots of 
big punters played the pokies and tended to favour 
some machines; the pub owners could usually tell 
who had been using a machine upon clearing it out 
at the end of the day.
Another interviewee who worked with a cash 
delivery company indicated that all cash pickups 
came with a receipt indicating the amount of money 
that a machine should be holding. Any pickups that 
approached $10,000, or cumulatively reached 
$10,000, were recorded in a spreadsheet. The 
risk-management system involved a recording 
system for all guards in the field to document 
everything and this information was recorded in  
the office. All of the company’s staff, including the 
Figure 11 Manual and automated transaction monitoring processes across business sectors (%)
No monitoring or reporting 5.7
Software only 2.4
Mainly software 5.4
Mixture 28.4
Mainly manual 12.4
Manual only 45.8 
Note: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
Table 19 Each business sector using manual, software-based, or mixed transaction monitoring 
processes (%)
Business sector Only/mainly manual Only/mainly software Mixture No monitoring
Foreign exchange 32.0 23.4 42.3 2.0
Banking 35.2 11.6 50.5 2.7
Alternative remittance services 49.5 14.4 33.0 3.2
Financial services 52.4 8.5 37.2 1.8
Cash delivery services 54.4 7.0 33.3 5.2
Managed funds/superannuation 54.8 6.1 37.0 2.0
Gambling 67.9 3.5 21.4 7.2
Securities and derivatives 68.1 2.7 25.7 3.5
Other 42.1 21.1 30.2 6.5
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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guards and office staff dealing with the cash once  
it had been collected, were trained in AML/CTF 
reporting requirements. All of the guards were aware 
of the cash transaction reporting requirements  
and the office employees were aware of all of the 
reporting requirements as well. The company 
conducted an AML/CTF component within its 
induction process for new staff and held a monthly 
meeting intended for staff to ask questions and 
identify further training needs.
Identifying suspicious  
transactions—survey results
Respondents were asked to indicate whether their 
business ‘had identified any suspect transactions 
over the 12 month period ending 30 June 2009’ (ie 
the 2008–09 financial year). The question asked 
about ‘suspect transactions’ which was the 
terminology used at the time, rather than the term 
used in the current legislation, ‘suspicious matters’. 
There is a possibility that some respondents might 
not have provided a positive response to these 
questions where they were unable to identify a 
suspect transaction as relating either to money 
laundering or financing of terrorism, where the 
distinction between the two categories was unclear. 
However, because so few transactions concerned 
financing of terrorism, this problem is likely to have 
minimal impact.
A total of 181 respondents indicated that their 
business had identified a suspected money 
laundering transaction. At least five businesses  
from each business sector identified at least one 
transaction suspected of being linked to money 
laundering. More than 80 percent of the businesses 
that reported identifying suspect transactions 
Figure 12 Perceptions of the effectiveness of transaction monitoring procedures (%)
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identified 10 transactions or less. The low numbers 
of suspicious transactions that businesses in the 
AML/CTF Australian businesses survey identified  
are consistent with the reported numbers of suspect 
transactions in other surveys. Ninety percent of 
regulated businesses surveyed in the United Kingdom 
in 2007 reported 100 suspicious transactions or less 
in a year (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007). The largest 
proportion of the group (58%) reported six or less 
transactions per year, compared with one percent of 
the sample that reported 500 transactions or more. 
The Indian financial services businesses surveyed  
by KPMG in 2009 showed a similar pattern, with  
56 percent of respondents filing less than five reports 
and 12 percent reporting more than 20 transactions 
in a year (KPMG (India) 2009).
Figure 13 shows the percentage of suspect 
transactions that were reported by entities in varying 
sectors grouped according to five categories of 
volume—10 or less suspect transactions, 50 or less, 
100 or less, 500 or less, or more than 500 suspect 
transactions. For example, 100 percent of respondents 
that reported over 500 suspect transactions in the 
year to 30 June 2009 came from the banking sector 
(1 bank). However, only 22 percent of entities that 
reported 10 or less suspect transactions came from 
the banking sector. Businesses within the banking 
sector identified 33 percent of all of the transactions 
suspected of involving money laundering reported in 
the survey.
Thirteen survey respondents identified a transaction 
suspected of involving the financing of terrorism in the 
same period. At least one business from each sector 
identified at least one transaction it suspected of 
being linked to the financing of terrorism. The banking 
sector was also the reporting sector that identified the 
largest volume of transactions that were thought to 
involve the financing of terrorism. The number of 
suspected terrorism financing transactions was, 
however, much smaller at only four.
Under- and over-reporting
The present study sought the views of participants 
on under- and over-reporting of suspicious matters 
by seeking their responses to a series of statements 
suggesting situations in which under- or over-
reporting might occur.
Under-reporting—survey results
Survey respondents were asked if they agreed, 
strongly agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed 
that failing to report a suspicious transaction to 
AUSTRAC was justifiable in situations where:
•	 reporting was not required by law;
•	 they perceived reporting to be of no use;
•	 reporting would result in lost business;
•	 reporting would alienate customers; and
•	 there was a fear of reprisals.
Accordingly, if respondents agreed with these 
statements, it was considered likely that they  
would fail to report matters to AUSTRAC that  
could potentially have involved money laundering  
or financing of terrorism.
The results presented in Figure 14 were grouped  
into three categories relating to general agreement 
with the statements, neutrality, or disagreement. It 
was found that almost 80 percent of respondents 
disagreed, or strongly disagreed that failing to report 
was justifiable where reporting might result in a loss 
of business (79.8%) or alienate customers (78.5%). 
A third of respondents agreed or strongly agreed 
that failing to report a suspicious transaction was 
justifiable where reporting was not required by law 
and 13.3 percent of respondents agreed that failure 
to report was justifiable where reporting was 
perceived to be of no use.
The results relating to the statement ‘under-reporting 
is justifiable when it is not required by law’ were 
significantly different according to the business 
sector respondents occupied (χ2=40.4, df=16, 
p≤0.001). A Cramér’s V of 0.07 indicated that  
there was a weak level of association between 
respondents’ views regarding the justifiability of 
non-reporting ‘when not required by law’ and the 
business sector they occupied. Similarly, the results 
relating to the statement ‘under-reporting is 
justifiable when it is of no use’ were significantly 
different according to the business sector 
respondents occupied (χ2=68.1, df=16, p≤0.0001). 
A Cramér’s V of 0.10 indicated that there was a 
weak level of association between respondents’ 
views regarding the justifiability of non-reporting 
‘when it is of no use’ and the business sector they 
occupied.
46 The anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regime in Australia
The data presented in Figure 15 show that the 
banking, cash delivery services and financial services 
sectors were most likely to disagree with the 
statement that failing to report ‘when it is not 
required by law’ was justifiable. Businesses from  
the securities and derivatives sector were most likely 
to agree that failing to report in these circumstances 
was justifiable.
The banking, managed funds/superannuation and 
financial services sectors were also most likely to 
disagree or strongly disagree that failing to report  
a transaction in circumstances in which reporting 
‘would be of no use’ is justifiable, as the data in 
Figure 16 show. Those in the gambling sector were 
most likely to agree that failure to report in these 
circumstances would be justifiable.
The results were also analysed in terms of the  
type of transaction monitoring procedures that 
respondents used—namely, manual, through  
the use of software, a mixture of both, or none. 
Statistically significant relationships were found 
between the transaction monitoring procedures 
businesses used and their views on under-reporting 
suspicious transactions. Figure 17 presents the 
results for the statement that failure to report is 
justifiable when reporting is not required by law.
These results were significantly different according to 
the business sector respondents occupied (χ2=41.5, 
df=10, p≤0.0001). A Cramér’s V of 0.07 indicated 
that there was a weak level of association between 
the views of respondents concerning the justifiability 
of reporting when not required to do so by law and 
the transaction monitoring procedures they used. 
Businesses without any monitoring procedures  
were more likely than other businesses to agree that 
electing not to report suspicious transactions when 
required to do so by law was justifiable.
A statistically significant, but weak relationship was 
also found between the way in which businesses 
monitored transactions and their views on failing to 
report when reporting was perceived to be useless 
(χ2=32.6, df=10, p≤0.001; Cramér’s V=0.07). 
Businesses without any transaction monitoring 
processes were most likely to agree that failing to 
Figure 13 Suspect transactions reported in the year to 30 June 2009, by business sector and volume 
reported (%)
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report if the business considered that doing so 
would be useless was justifiable (53.2%). Businesses 
with a mixture of automated and manual monitoring 
procedures were most likely to disagree or strongly 
disagree with this statement (74.6%). Figure 18 
shows respondents’ views as to the justifiability of 
failing to report where reporting was perceived to be 
of no use, according to the transaction monitoring 
procedures which are used.
A statistically significant, but weak, relationship was 
also found between views concerning the justifiability 
of failing to report where this could alienate customers 
and the type of transaction monitoring procedures 
used (χ2=46.6, df=10, p≤0.001, Cramér’s V=0.08). 
Respondents without any transaction monitoring 
procedures were more likely than other businesses 
to agree or strongly agree that not reporting in these 
circumstances was justifiable.
Over-reporting—survey results
With respect to attitudes towards over-reporting  
of suspicious transactions, respondents were asked 
to indicate whether they believed reporting more 
suspicious transactions to AUSTRAC than strictly 
necessary was justifiable in the following 
circumstances:
•	 when the business was not sure what the 
transaction involved (‘unsure of transaction’);
•	 when there was heightened staff awareness/
understanding of AML issues (‘staff awareness’);
•	 when electronic/automated transaction monitoring 
made reporting easy (‘electronic monitoring’);
•	 to avoid the imposition of penalties for failing  
to comply (‘avoid penalties’); and
•	 to ensure the business’ level of reporting was 
comparable with that of other businesses in  
the same sector (‘report volumes’).
The views of respondents on over-reporting in these 
circumstances are shown in Figure 19, with results 
grouped in three categories of general agreement, 
neutrality and general disagreement.
A majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed 
(70.4%) that over-reporting was justifiable where the 
business was unsure of what a transaction involved. 
A total of 58.3 percent of businesses also agreed or 
strongly agreed that over-reporting in order to avoid 
penalties for non-compliance was justifiable and  
Figure 14 Justifications for failing to report suspicious transactions
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Figure 15 Justifiability of failing to report a suspicious transaction when it is not mandatory, by business 
sector (%)
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Figure 16 Justifiability of failing to report a suspicious transaction when reporting is perceived to be of 
no use, by business sector (%)
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46 percent agreed or strongly agreed that it was 
justifiable to ensure that the business’ level of 
reporting was comparable with that of other 
businesses in the same sector.
The results concerning over-reporting in 
circumstances in which the business was unsure  
of the nature of the transaction were significantly 
associated with the business sector from which 
respondents came (χ2=42.6, df=16, p≤0.0001). A 
Cramér’s V of 0.08 indicated that there was a weak 
level of association between respondents’ views  
as to over-reporting in these circumstances and  
the business sector they occupied. Businesses 
classified as ‘other’ (78.2%), those from the 
managed funds and superannuation sector (74.3%), 
and the foreign exchange sector (73.6%) were most 
likely to agree or strongly agree that over-reporting 
was justifiable in these circumstances. Those from 
the securities and derivatives (62.1%) and cash 
delivery services (59.1%) sectors were least likely  
to agree that this was justifiable.
The business sector of the respondent was also 
significantly associated with their response to 
over-reporting to avoid penalties for non-compliance 
(χ2=57.64 df=32, p≤0.004, Cramér’s V=0.07). 
Businesses from the banking and cash delivery 
sectors were the least likely to consider that 
over-reporting would be justifiable in order to avoid 
fines for non-compliance, while businesses classified 
as ‘other’ were the most likely to agree that 
over-reporting in these circumstances would be 
justifiable.
Banking businesses were also the least likely to 
agree that over-reporting would be justifiable in order 
to ensure that the bank’s level of reporting would  
be comparable with that of other banks. Those from 
the foreign exchange and cash delivery sectors were 
most likely to agree that over-reporting in these 
circumstances would be justifiable. A statistically 
significant relationship was found between the 
business sector respondents occupied and their 
view on over-reporting in order to ensure that their 
level of reporting would be comparable with that  
of comparable businesses in the same sector 
(χ2=102.3, df=16, p≤0.0001). A Cramér’s V of 0.13 
indicated that there was a weak level of association 
between these views and the business sector they 
occupied.
Figure 17 Justifiability of failing to report a suspicious transaction when it is not mandatory, by 
transaction monitoring procedures (%)
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Statistically significant, but weak relationships were 
also found between business sector and views as  
to the justifiability of over-reporting where automated 
transaction monitoring makes reporting easier 
(χ2=149.8 df=16, p≤0.0001, Cramér’s V=0.16) and 
as a consequence of heightened staff awareness 
(χ2=68.8 df=16, p≤0.0001, Cramér’s V=0.10). 
Businesses that provided foreign exchange services 
were the most likely to agree that over-reporting 
would be justifiable where automated transaction 
monitoring made reporting easy, while banking 
sector businesses were the least likely to agree with 
this statement. Alternative remittance businesses 
were the most likely to consider that over-reporting 
was justifiable because of heightened staff 
awareness.
An analysis was also undertaken of the views  
of respondents as to over-reporting and their use  
of AML/CTF software. Statistically significant, but 
weak, relationships were found between the use  
of AML/CTF software and responses:
•	 to over reporting in order to avoid penalties  
for non-compliance (χ2=20.7 df=4, p≤0.0001, 
Cramér’s V=0.08);
•	 to ensure comparable reporting numbers  
(χ2=32.7 df=2, p≤0.001, Cramér’s V=0.10);
•	 when staff have a heightened awareness  
(χ2=8.6 df=2, p≤0.013, Cramér’s V=0.05); and
•	 where software makes reporting easy  
(χ2=38.5 df=2, p≤0.0001, Cramér’s V=0.1).
Businesses that used AML/CTF software were  
less likely than those businesses without AML/CTF 
software to agree or strongly agree that over-
reporting would be justifiable in order to avoid 
penalties, to ensure comparable reporting numbers 
with other businesses in the same sector, or 
because of heightened staff awareness. Businesses 
with AML/CTF software (28.7%) were more likely 
than businesses without software (19.8%) to 
disagree or strongly disagree that over-reporting 
would be justifiable where software made it easy to 
report. It seems, therefore, that there are a number 
of circumstances in which businesses from certain 
sectors would be willing to engage in both under-
reporting and over-reporting of suspicious 
transactions to AUSTRAC, based largely on 
commercial reasons.
Figure 18 Justifiability of failing to report a suspicious transaction when reporting is perceived to be of 
no use, by transaction monitoring procedures (%)
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Views of interviewees 
regarding risk management
Although only a small number of individuals agreed 
to participate in follow-up interviews, a number of 
relevant issues were raised that help understand 
how reporting entities undertake risk management  
in connection with AML/CTF compliance. Some 
interviewees, for example, reported limiting the types 
of products, services, or transactions that they might 
otherwise offer, primarily in order to reduce risks  
of financial loss to their businesses but with the 
subsidiary aim of reducing risks of any involvement 
in any illicit financial transactions. The private 
mortgage lender who participated in an interview 
indicated that risks of loss were minimised by  
limiting loans made to non-Australian residents  
for residential properties. The lender would not lend 
any funds for ‘off the plan’ property purchases to 
any borrowers and would only lend up to 70 percent 
of the value of a property. The business aimed to 
safeguard itself against risks that may be associated 
with non-resident borrowers by conducting enhanced 
due diligence on those clients. The enhanced  
due diligence procedures the mortgage lender 
conducted included investigating whether the client 
had Foreign Investment Review Board approval, 
documenting their reasons for being in Australia, 
using their identification and profile to verify the 
client’s legitimacy and witnessing evidence of the 
funds available to them in Australia. Generally, these 
clients would need to have status as a permanent  
or temporary resident in order to borrow funds.
Other interviewees described risk management 
activities that were supplementary to customer 
identification and transaction monitoring. The 
interviewee from the mutual banking business 
indicated that its risk management procedures  
had been revised following the introduction of the  
AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth). The risk management 
system at the time of interview included the 
development of a risk management framework, the 
creation of a staff library for AML/CTF documents, 
random file auditing conducted every two months 
and tracking risks within a database system. The 
program required all supervisors and managers  
to undergo risk checks each month and the top  
10 risks were then reported to the board. A key 
aspect of the risk management system was the 
establishment of an internal fraud unit, consisting  
of the compliance officer, an information technology 
officer and the finance manager, which was 
Figure 19 Justifiability of reporting more transactions than necessary, by circumstances (%)
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deliberately established as a hierarchical system  
for examining reports of suspicious transactions.
The mutual banking business also performed police 
records checks with the Australian Federal Police 
and a bankruptcy check via the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority and ASIC disqualification 
registers, prior to employing new staff members.  
All staff members made an AML/CTF declaration  
as part of their annual performance review and  
were required to declare any convictions recorded 
against them in the previous 12 month period. Staff 
members were also trained annually with AUSTRAC 
materials and any sites with a poor compliance 
performance in the auditing process received 
additional training. The business also sought to 
educate customers on the risks associated with  
their personal accounts.
By contrast, the two money exchange and 
remittance businesses interviewed did not carry  
out substantial changes to the ways in which they 
identified customers and handled business records 
following the commencement of reporting obligations. 
The businesses had an identification database, 
although this predated the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) 
requirements. All customers were identified, usually 
with a passport, and the business did not undertake 
additional identification procedures beyond this 
unless the transaction was in excess of $10,000. In 
these cases, the forms for a large cash transaction 
were also completed within four or five days. The 
owner considered the KYC principles to be sufficient 
for a small business in its current location.
Two interviewees reported considering specific 
risk-management procedures for terrorism financing 
separately to the procedures employed for money 
laundering. The mutual bank used its transaction 
monitoring software to do a monthly search of  
its customer database against names of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 
watch list. The issues associated with this list,  
such as duplicated names or alternate spellings, 
meant that the business did not follow up any partial 
matches and only examined any complete matches 
between their customers and the list. The private 
mortgage lender, by comparison, did not use the 
DFAT or Attorney-General’s proscribed persons lists 
at all. The company secretary was confident that any 
persons on those lists would not apply for a loan in 
their own name and he doubted that he would be 
able to deduce whether a customer was applying  
for a loan on behalf of an individual on those lists.
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The present study sought to assess the financial and 
other costs associated with conducting the AML/
CTF regime in Australia. Unfortunately, difficulties 
were encountered by participants in quantifying 
precisely the costs of implementing AML/CTF 
regulations. Previous surveys of regulated 
businesses overseas have also emphasised the 
difficulties associated with quantifying the costs  
of AML/CTF regimes. For example, in the United 
Kingdom, more than 80 percent of MLROs surveyed 
by PricewaterhouseCoopers were unable to 
determine their company’s expenditure on AML/CTF 
in 2006 (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007). This was 
partly due to the way compliance systems have 
been designed, which often do not permit costs 
specifically associated with AML/CTF compliance to 
be disaggregated from overall business compliance 
costs generally. Few reporting entities in Australia 
have previously provided estimates of the actual 
cost of AML/CTF implementation. Some banking 
businesses have declined to do so, citing 
commercial confidentiality and Sathye (2008) has 
suggested that accounting practices may render  
the calculation of separate costs for AML/CTF 
compliance impossible to ascertain. Hence, the 
present AML/CTF Australian businesses survey  
is unique in providing some of the first quantitative 
estimates of implementation and compliance costs 
that have been published in Australia.
Despite the fact that the business environment and 
regulatory systems differ in some overseas countries 
from those that exist in Australia, it is appropriate to 
look to some international research to understand 
the difficulties that arose in attempting to quantify 
compliance costs and the effectiveness of the 
regime in the current study. Although most of the 
MLROs surveyed by PricewaterhouseCoopers in  
the United Kingdom in 2007 were unable to quantify 
the costs associated with AML/CTF compliance 
precisely, approximately 80 percent of the sample 
considered that the regime had delivered no benefits 
to their businesses when taking into consideration 
the level of cost involved (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2007); and one-third of MLROs surveyed in 2001 
believed that the costs of AML/CTF outweighed any 
benefits of the regime (Gill & Taylor 2004). The views 
of businesses on the expense of AML/CTF in this 
study were tied to the business sector of the 
respondents and were also linked to the size of the 
business in question. Approximately 67 percent of 
banks did not consider AML/CTF too costly for the 
risks involved, whereas more than 70 percent of 
building societies and 68 percent of insurance 
companies stated that the regime was too expensive 
for those risks. Almost half of this sample of MLROs, 
who also performed another role in their company, 
considered the regime too expensive. By comparison, 
only a quarter of full-time MLROs considered the 
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regime to be too expensive. Gill and Taylor (2004) 
suggested that the more favourable view of full-time 
MLROs stems from their employment in the banking 
sector. MLROs with concurrent roles may also be 
more likely to work in a smaller business and this 
may also have influenced their views on the balance 
of costs of AML/CTF for the risks involved.
The results of previous overseas surveys have found 
relatively large increases in AML/CTF compliance 
costs since the regime has been implemented. The 
Tier One banks surveyed by KPMG (International 
2007), for example, reported an average increase  
of more than 50 percent for AML/CTF compliance 
costs between 2004 and 2007. Similarly, more than 
three-quarters of the regulated businesses surveyed 
by KPMG in India in 2009 anticipated an increase in 
their AML/CTF compliance costs in the three years 
to 2012. These businesses identified automated 
transaction monitoring, retrospective transaction 
review and transaction monitoring as the most 
expensive aspects of compliance. More than  
90 percent of the Indian sample forecast that their 
transaction monitoring systems would need more 
resources because of the complex implementation 
process, ongoing costs and reviewing false positives. 
Just over 75 percent of these businesses anticipated 
that their total costs for all AML/CTF compliance 
would increase in the three years to 2012 (KPMG 
(India) 2009). KPMG’s 2007 Tier One (by capitalisation) 
banks also reported human resources and 
transaction monitoring to be the most expensive 
aspects of AML/CTF compliance (KPMG 
International 2007).
Current costs of 
compliance and  
anticipated changes
The survey sought to document both the nature  
and amount of the costs expended by respondent 
businesses in complying with the AML/CTF 
requirements during the preceding 12 month period 
ending 30 June 2009. The survey also canvassed 
the expectations of participants regarding the 
changes to their AML/CTF compliance costs in the 
two years to 30 June 2011. Because regulated 
businesses are well-placed to identify opportunities 
for reducing their compliance costs, the survey also 
asked for views on potential cost saving measures.
Cost estimates are somewhat difficult to calculate as 
initial implementation costs can often be high where 
new systems are created and software purchased, 
while savings can be made in subsequent years as 
systems are refined and inefficiencies eradicated. 
Subsequent years may, however, have ongoing 
maintenance costs and regular staff training 
overheads. Costs can also vary as businesses 
change their operations or move into new markets—
particularly those that entail business transactions 
with potentially high-risk customers located 
overseas. As this survey was completed shortly after 
the full implementation of the AML/CTF Act 2006 
(Cth), the costs data presented below refer to a 
period when entities were actively making system 
changes in response to new compliance obligations. 
It is possible that for some entities these changes 
required substantial expenditure while for others, 
only minimal investment was needed. The findings 
described below refer to expenditure as estimated 
for this timeframe, which may or may not have 
continued into the current period. In addition,  
as noted above, it is sometimes also difficult for 
AML/CTF compliance costs to be disaggregated 
completely from general corporate compliance and 
risk management costs. This is reflected by some 
respondents to the present survey being unable  
to qualify the costs of AML/CTF specifically.
The survey began by asking respondents to estimate 
the approximate cost to their business of complying 
with the AML/CTF regime over the 12 month  
period ending 30 June 2009. Figure 20 shows  
that expenditure estimates for all of the survey 
respondents ranged from $0 to $60m for the period 
in question. One-fifth (21%) of respondents stated 
that their business did not incur any AML/CTF 
compliance costs in the period to 30 June 2009. 
When costs were incurred, the mean expenditure 
per business was $57,580, with a median cost  
of $1,000. Almost two-thirds of the respondents 
(63%) estimated that their business’ expenditure  
on AML/CTF compliance was more than $1 and  
less than $10,000.
In terms of the sector respondents occupied, at 
least some respondents from each sector reported 
having no expenditure on AML/CTF compliance. 
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Almost 40 percent of businesses classified as ‘other’ 
reported no AML/CTF compliance expenditure,  
while only four percent of managed funds and 
superannuation sector respondents reported no 
such expenditure. The results in Table 20 show  
the average and range of reported AML/CTF costs 
within each business sector. Businesses from the 
securities and derivatives sector had the highest 
mean annual compliance costs at close to $300,000 
for the 2008–09 year. The sectors that reported the 
least mean expenditure on anti-money laundering 
compliance were the foreign exchange sector, the 
gambling sector and those classified as ‘other’ 
businesses.
Comparing categories of expenditure on AML/CTF 
compliance (see Figure 20) with categories of  
annual business turnover (see Table 3), a statistically 
significant, but weak relationship was found 
(χ2=327.8, df=25, p≤0.0001; Cramér’s V=0.23). 
Similarly, comparing categories of expenditure on 
AML/CTF compliance (see Figure 20) with categories 
of the number of full-time equivalent employees  
(see Table 2), a statistically significant, but weak 
relationship was found (χ2=802.1, df=30, p≤0.0001; 
Cramér’s V=0.23).
Figure 21 shows the percentage of businesses  
in each sector whose expenditure on AML/CTF 
compliance was grouped into five categories (in 
addition to those who reported zero expenditure).  
As expected, respondents from the managed funds/
superannuation, banking and securities sectors 
spent the highest amounts on AML/CTF compliance, 
while those from the gambling, foreign exchange 
and ‘other’ sectors spent the least. Over 50 percent 
of managed funds businesses spent in excess  
of $10,000, while only 4.3 percent of those in  
the gambling sector spent in excess of $10,000. 
Approximately one-quarter (25.5%) of cash delivery 
businesses spent between $1 and $500. The 
highest expenditure on AML/CTF compliance costs 
were reported by one respondent with 850 full-time 
equivalent employees from the securities and 
derivatives sector who spent $60m in the year 
2008–09. The highest spend in the banking sector 
was one business that spent $36.2m for the year 
(see Table 20).
Respondents were also asked to arrange various 
types of compliance costs in rank order from most 
costly to least costly. The aspects ranked were:
•	 AML/CTF training and professional development;
•	 AML/CTF staff recruitment;
•	 AML/CTF staff salaries;
•	 AML/CTF monitoring software establishment costs;
•	 AML/CTF monitoring software recurrent costs; and
•	 AML/CTF external consultancy costs.
Respondents were also able to provide a rank order 
for additional items of compliance expenditure and 
these were also rated from the most costly item to 
least costly. Table 21 presents summary statistics for 
respondents’ rankings of the most costly aspects of 
AML/CTF compliance. Respondents indicated that 
training and professional development and staff 
salaries were the two most costly aspects of 
compliance from the prompted categories. Record 
keeping and customer relations were the two most 
costly areas of expenditure of the self-nominated 
categories.
Comparing mean results for responses relating  
to the two categories with the highest rankings 
(training/professional development and record 
keeping), it was found that there was no statistically 
significant difference between these two categories 
(t=-1.1, p≥0.28). Similarly there were no significant 
differences between the compliance cost mean 
rankings for record keeping, monitoring, and 
reporting and for the costs of customer relations 
(t=-0.407; p≥0.703); or the cost of record keeping 
and the costs of equipment and administration 
(t=-1.809; p≥0.080), or for each of the unprompted 
compliance cost areas supplied by survey 
respondents.
Respondents were also asked to indicate the extent 
to which they expected their AML/CTF compliance 
costs would change in the two year period ending 
30 June 2011 and if so, what was the area of 
greatest increase or decrease. More than two-thirds 
of respondents (67.7%) expected the AML/CTF 
compliance costs to their businesses to remain the 
same in the two year period to 30 June 2011. Few 
businesses (5.5%) anticipated those costs falling 
while a little over a quarter of respondents (26.8%) 
anticipated that their AML/CTF costs would increase 
(see Tables 29 and 30 regarding anticipated increases 
in compliance areas). Figure 22 shows the responses 
from businesses in the various sectors concerning 
the likelihood of costs of compliance changing in the 
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ensuing two years to 30 June 2011. The largest 
proportions of almost all sectors expected 
compliance costs to remain the same. The 
alternative remittance sector (47.8%), cash delivery 
services (43.2%) and the securities and derivatives 
(42%) sectors were those with the largest proportion 
of businesses anticipating an increase in compliance 
costs. The gambling and foreign exchange sectors 
both had approximately 75 percent of respondents 
expecting the costs of compliance to remain the 
same in the two years to 30 June 2011.
The size of the expected increases and decreases  
in compliance costs to 30 June 2011, for those 
respondents anticipating a change, are presented in 
Table 22. Approximately 70 percent of the proportion 
of respondents expecting a shift in compliance costs 
also expected those costs to rise by up to 50 percent. 
A much smaller proportion (12.9%) anticipated an 
increase in AML/CTF costs of more than 50 percent.
Table 23 shows how these anticipated changes in 
AML/CTF compliance expenditure differed according 
Figure 20 Estimated compliance costs from all respondents for the year to 30 June 2009 (%)
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Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
Table 20 AML/CTF compliance expenditure across sectors
Sector Mean ($) Median Range
Gambling $10,848 $500 $0–$12,000,000
Banking $198,156 $2,100 $0–$36,200,000
Managed funds and superannuation $52,201 $6,000 $0–$3,000,000
Financial services $26,721 $1,000 $0–$3,016,500
Securities and derivatives $291,037 $1,000 $0–$60,000,000
Foreign exchange $7,979 $375 $0–$550,000
Cash delivery $12,801 $500 $0–$550,000
ARS $12,003 $1,000 $0–$550,000
Other $8,349 $250 $0–$550,000
All sectors $57,580 $1,000 $0–$60,000,000
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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to the business sector respondents occupied. Of 
those anticipating an increase in compliance costs, 
the financial services sector comprised the largest 
proportion of businesses that expected costs to 
increase by more than 50 percent. The managed 
funds and superannuation sector comprised the 
largest proportion of businesses anticipating a fall  
in compliance costs of more than 50 percent.
Respondents who reported expecting AML/CTF 
compliance costs to their business to increase or 
decrease in the two years to 30 June 2011 also 
nominated the area of expenditure likely to show  
the greatest change. The largest proportion of 
respondents (39.5%) anticipating either an increase 
or decrease in costs nominated AML/CTF staff 
training and professional development as the area 
likely to show the greatest change. AML/CTF staff 
recruitment was the cost compliance area nominated 
by the smallest proportion of respondents anticipating 
change (1.8%) as being most likely to show the 
greatest impact on costs.
The results presented in Table 24 and Table 25 show 
that respondents who expected an increase in  
AML/CTF costs identified different areas of change 
to businesses who anticipated a decrease in costs. 
Just over 43 percent (43.2%) of respondents who 
expected an increase thought that training and 
professional development would be the area of 
expenditure most likely to change. An additional  
fifth of respondents (20.4%) expected that AML/CTF 
staff salaries would be the area of the greatest cost 
increase to 30 June 2011.
Approximately 30 percent of businesses who 
anticipated a decrease in costs in the period to  
30 June 2011 identified the use of external 
consultants to be the area of greatest change. 
Fewer businesses (22.7%) expected staff training 
and professional development to have the greatest 
impact on costs although this was similar to the 
proportion of businesses that anticipated an 
increase in staff salaries (20%).
Respondents were also asked to indicate how  
the costs to their businesses of complying with the 
AML/CTF regime could be reduced. The prompted 
alternatives were:
•	 avoiding duplicated compliance procedures;
•	 sharing data and information with other 
businesses;
•	 streamlining account opening procedures;
Figure 21 Compliance cost categories for the year to 30 June 2009, by business sector (%)
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•	 developing AML/CTF software in-house;
•	 reducing their reliance on outsourced expertise; and
•	 greater sharing of typology data and software by 
AUSTRAC.
From Table 26 it is apparent that the largest 
proportion of respondents (34.2%) indicated that 
AML/CTF costs could be reduced by not duplicating 
compliance procedures.
Tests of association demonstrated a statistically 
significant, but weak relationship between the 
compliance cost expectations of respondents and 
their views on reducing costs by avoiding duplicated 
compliance procedures (χ2=28.0, df=2, p≤0.0001, 
Table 21 Most costly compliance components
Compliance aspect Mean ranking Median ranking Standard deviation
Prompted responses
Training/professional development 2.19 2 1.5
Staff recruitment 3.62 3 1.5
Staff salaries 2.68 2 1.5
Monitoring software establishment 3.73 4 1.4
Software recurrent 4.52 5 1.4
External consultancy 4.11 5 2.0
Unprompted responses
Record keeping/monitoring/reporting 1.91 1 1.5
Equipment/admin costs 2.81 3 2.0
Customer relations 2.40 1 2.6
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
Figure 22 Estimated movements in compliance costs to 30 June 2011, by business sector (%)
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Cramér’s V=0.10). Those who anticipated an 
increase in their compliance costs were more likely 
to agree that those costs could be reduced by 
avoiding any duplication in procedures.
Respondents who anticipated an increase in costs 
also indicated that greater sharing of typology data 
and software by AUSTRAC would reduce their 
costs, although the survey did not specify what  
that data or software might be. Tests of association 
showed that the relationship between anticipated 
cost movements and greater sharing of typology 
data and software by AUSTRAC was statistically 
significant (χ2=68.7, df=2, p≤0.0001, Cramér’s 
V=0.15). The association between expected 
compliance costs and the belief that data sharing 
with other businesses would reduce costs was  
also statistically significant (χ2=9.9, df=2, p≤0.007, 
Cramér’s V=0.06). Participants who anticipated cost 
increases to 30 June 2011 were also more likely to 
agree that data sharing with other businesses would 
reduce their compliance costs.
Interviewees’ views of  
compliance costs
The views expressed by interviewees on the costs 
and utility of the AML/CTF regime showed a mixture 
of support for the aims of the regime and difficulties 
in its application. One interviewee anticipated that, in 
2006 when the regime was introduced, compliance 
costs would be onerous, but later found that 
compliance was relatively simple and that existing 
compliance programs or other risk management 
processes were able to be adapted to suit the new 
requirements. The positive experiences of one small 
business with respect to compliance and the ability 
of existing risk management practices to be 
integrated into AML/CTF compliance activities, led 
Table 22 Anticipated shifts in AML/CTF compliance costs
Direction of change Extent of change
Index
n %
Anticipated reduction in costs <50% 59 6.5
>50% 96 10.5
Anticipated increase in costs <50% 639 70.1
>50% 118 12.9
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
Table 23 Anticipated movements in AML/CTF costs to 30 June 2011, by business sector (%)a
Anticipating decreased costs Anticipating increased costs
Business sector
Decrease by 
more than 50%
Decrease by less 
than 50%
Increase by 
less than 50%
Increase by more 
than 50% Total
Managed funds/super 18.5 12.6 63.0 5.9 100.0
Banking 14.6 8.1 70.9 6.4 100.0
Foreign exchange 3.7 7.4 77.8 11.1 100.0
Securities/derivatives 7.0 4.7 76.7 11.6 100.0
Cash delivery service 10.0 10.0 65.0 15.0 100.0
Gambling 10.0 3.8 71.1 15.1 100.0
Alternative remittance 5.1 5.1 74.6 15.3 100.0
Other 5.4 1.8 75.0 17.9 100.1b
Financial services 10.0 15.0 47.5 27.5 100.0
a: Percentages are of those respondents who anticipated a change in costs
b: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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the Managing Director to believe that those 
businesses that had difficulties in complying with  
the AML/CTF regime probably had inadequate risk 
management procedures in place prior to 2006 and 
that the introduction of the AML/CTF legislation 
simply exacerbated the problem for them. Another 
interviewee noted that although the AML/CTF 
compliance costs had been very great for her 
business, the additional benefits that it provided  
in terms of enhanced risk management made it 
more than worthwhile. Even if the current legislative 
requirements were abolished, she would still seek  
to maintain the system that had been introduced.
For interviewees employed in compliance roles 
within their organisations, filing the annual compliance 
report was not felt to be challenging. The picture that 
emerged from the interviews was that for those with 
a professional understanding of compliance, or with 
existing exposure to compliance obligations other 
than the AML/CTF regime, compliance was not 
overly difficult. Those without this experience, 
particularly those from the gambling and alternative 
remittance sectors, indicated that they found it 
difficult to understand the entire range of their 
reporting obligations and where they encountered 
problems, found it difficult to obtain clear and simple 
advice. A major concern identified by interviewees 
from small businesses related to the often legalistic 
language used by the regulator in providing 
information and advice. The gambling sector was 
the industry sector that interviewees perceived the 
AML/CTF regime as being too onerous for, in view  
of the risks present in Australia. By comparison, 
however, one interviewee who was a securities 
dealer and an Australian Financial Services Licence 
holder prior to the 2006 AML/CTF reforms, indicated 
that AML/CTF compliance for his business was so 
simple that it was pointless. This interviewee took 
Table 24 Anticipated increase to costs to 30 June 2011, by compliance area (%)
AML/CTF compliance expense area %
AML/CTF training and professional development 43.2
AML/CTF staff recruitment 1.9
AML/CTF staff salaries 20.4
AML/CTF software establishment costs 12.7
AML/CTF software ongoing costs 6.3
External consultants 12.5
Other 2.9
Note: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
Table 25 Anticipated decrease to costs to 30 June 2011, by compliance area (%)
AML/CTF compliance expense %
AML/CTF training and professional development 22.7
AML/CTF staff recruitment 1.3
AML/CTF staff salaries 20.0
AML/CTF software establishment costs 18.0
AML/CTF software ongoing costs 0.0
External consultants 29.3
Other 6.0
n/a 2.7
Total 100.0
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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the view that the other compliance obligations for his 
business, managed by ASIC, were far more arduous. 
He further noted that the information and templates 
that ASIC provided were accessible and helpful.
Some interviewees expressed that they had 
considerable difficulties understanding the regime 
and knowing how to comply with the legislation.  
It should be noted that these interviews were 
conducted in 2009, shortly after full implementation 
of the 2006 legislation. The actual financial cost of 
compliance was seen as being less of a problem for 
some compared with the time and effort required to 
understand the compliance requirements for small 
businesses unfamiliar with money laundering and 
financial crime. Interviewees from the small business 
sector, in particular, indicated that they found it 
difficult to obtain advice on how to implement a 
compliance program that was appropriate for their 
business sector. The annual compliance report was 
difficult for some interviewees, although less of a 
problem for more experienced compliance officers.
Most interviewees found accurate quantification  
of the costs of complying with the AML/CTF regime 
for the year to 30 June 2009 difficult. Particular 
issues arose because AML/CTF compliance costs 
often were embedded within more general corporate 
compliance and risk management costs. The reported 
expenditure was likely to have been affected by the 
size of businesses, although interviewees suggested 
that the estimates provided by businesses with 
multiple types of compliance obligations were 
probably not solely related to AML/CTF compliance. 
The interviewees who were able to indicate a dollar 
amount for their AML/CTF compliance costs for the 
2008–09 financial year drew on the fixed costs of 
software, staff and external consultants to arrive at 
an estimate, although they noted that the time spent 
on compliance was difficult to quantify.
The representative from the mutual banking business 
reported that the business spent approximately 
$60,000 in the year to 30 June 2009 on AML/CTF 
compliance. The software component of this figure 
was $1,500 per month during that period and  
the remaining portion was for the salary of the 
compliance officer. The business intended to 
enhance the software package that it used for  
risk monitoring and tracking but also noted the 
impossibility of determining the amount of staff time 
required to establish the AML/CTF program. The 
representative from the private equity investor firm, 
by contrast, paid $25,000 to engage solicitors  
to prepare an AML/CTF policy but noted that the 
remaining costs of compliance were negligible as 
they were subsumed within general risk management 
and corporate governance activities. The private 
mortgage provider approached several legal firms  
to provide the same service to their business and 
decided, in view of the high price of outsourcing, to 
develop an AML/CTF compliance regime in-house. 
This interviewee found the process challenging 
because of an absence of clarity in the guidelines  
he used.
Staff costs, record keeping and customer relations 
were considered to be the most costly components 
of AML/CTF compliance, with staffing also being 
identified as an area in which costs are likely to 
increase. However, this was not the case for all 
interviewees. One interviewee expected AML/CTF 
costs to be quite high when he first examined  
the requirements but subsequently found that  
his business did not need to hire any new staff  
in order to become compliant. The resulting costs 
for implementing an AML/CTF program for this 
business, as a consequence, were quite low.
Table 26 Mechanisms to reduce AML/CTF compliance costs (%)
Prompted cost reduction mechanisms %
Avoiding duplication of procedures 34.2
Sharing data and information with other businesses 19.8
Streamline account opening 9.2
Develop AML/CTF software inhouse 10.3
Less reliance on outside experts 10.2
Sharing from AUSTRAC 20.5
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
62 The anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regime in Australia
One of the central aims of the present study was  
to canvass the views of respondents concerning  
the necessity for, and effectiveness of, Australia’s 
AML/CTF regime. Views were also sought on the 
necessity of the level of resources required for 
compliance with the legislation in light of the level of 
risk of ML/TF in Australia and accordingly, the extent 
to which the regime was effective in minimising risk. 
Finally, respondents were also invited to offer 
suggestions concerning possible ways the regime 
could be improved.
Effectiveness of the anti-
money laundering/counter-
terrorism regime
The present study sought to document the views of 
those regulated by Australia’s AML/CTF regime by 
seeking their opinions on the regime’s contribution  
to the deterrence of financial crime, minimisation  
of financial crime risks within businesses, ability to 
recover the proceeds of crime and promote good 
governance and integrity of the financial system 
generally. The AML/CTF regime operates within  
a much broader regulatory environment, so it was 
sometimes difficult for respondents to identify the 
precise extent of the contribution of the AML/CTF 
regime as distinct from other aspects of corporate 
governance. Nonetheless, the responses provided 
some indication of how businesses assessed some 
of these key aspects of the AML/CTF regulatory 
environment.
Respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness  
of the AML/CTF regime in achieving each of the 
following nine goals:
•	 deterring offenders from using reporting entities  
to facilitate crime;
•	 enabling regulators to investigate financial crime 
effectively;
•	 facilitating the recovery of the proceeds of crime;
•	 minimising risks of financial crime and identity 
fraud;
•	 minimising risks of money laundering;
•	 minimising risks of terrorism financing;
•	 minimising risks of reputational damage;
•	 maintaining the integrity of the financial system; and
•	 promoting good governance.
The views of survey participants on the ability of  
the AML/CTF regime to meet is goals varied quite 
considerably (see Figure 23). Overall, significantly 
more respondents viewed the regime as being 
effective or very effective at minimising the risk of 
money laundering (65.2%) compared with those 
who believed the regime was effective or very 
effective at minimising terrorism financing risks 
Attitudes towards the  
anti-money laundering/
counter-terrorism  
financing regime
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(58.2%; t=4.7, p≤0.0001). Ten percent of respondents 
took the view that the aim of the AML/CTF regime  
to reduce risks of terrorism financing was either 
ineffective or very ineffective.
Table 27 presents centralised tendency results for the 
ratings that respondents gave the regime in meeting 
its nine objectives. The aim of the regime of ‘enabling 
regulators to investigate financial crime effectively’ 
received the highest mean effectiveness rating (3.7), 
as did the additional benefit of installing ‘good 
governance practices’. The lowest effectiveness 
rating was given for the aim of ‘facilitating the recovery 
of the proceeds of crime’ (3.4). A statistically 
significant difference was found between the mean 
results for the highest and lowest mean rated aims  
of the regime (t=-2.5; df=7069.9; p≤0.01).
Figure 23 Perceptions of the AML/CTF regime’s ability to meet its stated goals
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Table 27 Perceptions of the effectiveness of the AML/CTF regime, by goal
Possible benefit
Mean effectiveness 
rating (1–5)
Median effectiveness 
rating (1–5) Standard deviation
Deter offenders 3.6 4.0 0.9
Help regulators to investigate financial crime 3.7 4.0 0.8
Facilitate proceeds of crime recovery 3.4 3.0 0.8
Minimise financial crime/ID fraud risks 3.6 4.0 0.9
Minimise money laundering risks 3.7 4.0 0.9
Minimise terrorism financing risks 3.6 4.0 0.9
Minimise reputational damage risks 3.5 3.0 0.8
Financial system integrity 3.6 4.0 0.8
Good governance practices 3.7 4.0 0.8
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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Overall, survey respondents considered that the  
AML/CTF regime was generally effective in meeting 
most of its stated aims, such as deterring offenders, 
facilitating investigations of financial crimes and 
promoting good governance, and held neutral 
opinions regarding its effectiveness in reducing 
reputational risks and tracking the proceeds of crime.
Views of interviewees concerning 
effectiveness of the regime
Interviewees indicated that the regime was, to  
them, less effective in minimising risks of terrorism 
financing than money laundering, owing to the 
amounts of money involved being generally much 
smaller than the amounts of money that would be 
involved in money laundering activities.
One interviewee from the remittance sector viewed 
the current system of threshold reports and 
suspicious transaction reports as well as the general 
monitoring of large remittances, to be effective in 
identifying fraudulent transactions. One business,  
for example, used its transaction monitoring systems 
to identify several Nigerian scams that had been 
reported to its parent company. The parent company 
was able to examine the transactions in its database 
and to contact the customer in question to prevent 
the customer from being defrauded. Although the 
business in question was not obligated to prevent  
its customers from sending funds in these 
circumstances, it tried to discourage them from 
doing so.
Interviewees indicated that the regime had focused 
their attention on the possible impact that criminal 
activities could have on their operations, on their 
profitability, or on their corporate reputations, even  
if the regime could not materially change behaviour 
in all cases. The perceived effectiveness of the  
AML/CTF regime was influenced, for some, by the 
paper trail that law enforcement and other agencies 
could follow, even if it remained very difficult for 
banks to stop financial crimes from actually taking 
place. These views are reflected in the results 
presented in Table 32, which show that the aim  
of helping regulators to investigate financial crime 
effectively was the most highly rated aim in terms  
of effectiveness of the regime.
Other interviewees, from both the financial services 
and gambling sectors, considered that the regime 
was an appropriate crime risk-reduction mechanism 
but considered, on balance, that the inclusion of 
their business within the regime was inappropriate 
because of their perceived very low levels of risk.
Justifications for the regime
The participants in the study were also asked to 
provide their views on whether they considered that 
the costs and difficulties of the AML/CTF regime 
were justified, given the risks of money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism that were present in 
Australia. Specifically, participants were asked to 
indicate on a five-point scale the extent to which 
they agreed or disagreed with the statement ‘In 
Australia, the AML/CTF regime is too onerous, given 
the risks’ and then to provide reasons for their views.
On the scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree), all respondents recorded a mean score  
of 3.8, a median score of 3.0 and a standard 
deviation of 1.0. The largest proportion (45.5%) of 
respondents neither agreed nor disagreed that the 
system was too onerous for the money laundering 
risks. The proportion of respondents who agreed 
with the statement (30%) was slightly higher than  
the proportion that did not (25.7%). These findings 
indicate there is no strong feeling either way about 
the extent to which the regime is onerous.
The results were significantly different according  
to the business sector respondents occupied 
(χ2=108.5, df=16, p≤0.0001). A Cramér’s V of 0.12 
indicated that there was a weak level of association 
between the views of respondents for the 
justifications for the regime and the business sector 
they occupied. Those from the securities and 
derivatives, alternative remittance service and 
financial services sectors were most likely to take  
the view that the regime was too onerous for the 
perceived level of risks present (see Figure 24). 
Those in the banking sector were most likely to 
disagree that the regime was too onerous for the 
risks perceived to be present (42.1%).
Each respondent was also asked to provide their 
reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with the view 
that the AML/CTF regime in Australia was too 
onerous given the risks. From Table 28, it is apparent 
that the most common reason offered by businesses 
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Figure 24 Perceptions of the demands of compliance for the risks involved, by business sector (%)
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Table 28 How respondents view the AML/CTF regime (%)
Reason All businesses ‘Disagreeing’ businesses
Not too onerous
Not too onerous/adequate/sufficient 3.1 7.7
Necessary/essential/important/beneficial 7.7 20.8
Safety/security/counter-terrorism 4.3 14.0
Money laundering/crime 4.6 15.0
In line with international standards 0.5 2.0
Many procedures already in place 1.4 3.5
Low risk, low burden 1.4 2.6
Too onerous
Process is onerous/unnecessary 3.3 8.0
Business is small/reporting threshold too low 8.4 19.1
Business/area/industry is low risk 8.6 19.7
Regime time intensive/costly/work intensive 6.3 15.1
Regime complicated/hard to understand/need guidance 3.0 5.1
My business should be exempt/doesn’t apply to us 1.0 3.0
Regime prescriptive/compliance too general/not specific enough 3.7 8.9
Over regulated/issues already regulated by other bodies/duplication 3.2 8.56
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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that did not view the AML/CTF requirements as 
being too onerous was that the regime was essential 
or beneficial (20.8%). A further 14 percent of 
businesses who disagreed that the system was  
too onerous shared this view for safety reasons or 
because of the regime’s counter-terrorism aims. A 
small proportion of businesses that disagreed that 
the regime was too onerous (2.6%) suggested that 
the perceived low risks to their businesses meant  
a low burden in terms of AML/CTF compliance.
The two most common reasons that participants 
cited for considering the AML/CTF regime to be too 
onerous were the small size of their businesses or 
that the threshold for reporting was too low (19.1%), 
or that they perceived their business or industry 
experienced a low AML/CTF risk (19.7%).
Level of business 
responsibility
Participants were also asked to comment on the 
level of responsibility for ensuring the legitimacy of 
their customers required by the regime. Specifically, 
respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point 
scale the extent to which they agreed or disagreed 
with the statement ‘Not enough responsibility is 
placed on reporting entities to ensure probity when 
dealing with customers’ and then to provide reasons 
for their views.
Just under half of respondents (46.7%) disagreed  
or strongly disagreed that reporting entities did not 
have enough responsibility to ensure probity when 
dealing with customers (see Figure 25). A smaller 
proportion (6.9%) agreed or strongly agreed that 
reporting entities’ current responsibilities were 
insufficient. The largest single proportion of 
respondents (46.3%) provided a neutral response to 
the statement. Responses to this question differed 
significantly according to the business sector 
respondents occupied (χ2=138.2, df=16, p≤0.0001). 
A Cramér’s V of 0.14 indicated that there was a 
weak level of association between the views of 
respondents concerning their responsibility for 
ensuring probity of customers and the business 
sector they occupied.
Banking sector respondents were the most likely  
to disagree or strongly disagree that they did not 
currently have enough responsibility for ensuring 
Figure 25 Perceptions of the responsibilities of business owners, by business sectors (%)
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probity (65.4%), while respondents from the gambling 
sector were the least likely to disagree or strongly 
disagree with the statement, although still more than 
40 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed with  
the statement. Respondents from the alternative 
remittance sector were most likely to agree or 
strongly agree that they did not have enough 
responsibility to ensure probity when dealing with 
customers (12.3%).
Respondents provided unprompted reasons for 
agreeing or disagreeing with the statement that 
reporting entities currently have enough responsibility 
for ensuring probity when dealing with customers 
and these are presented in Table 29. Almost 16 
percent of respondents (15.7%) who disagreed with 
the statement gave their reason as being general 
support for the current regime or because they 
thought that they already had sufficient responsibility. 
Another 16 percent indicated that they were 
currently compliant or that the penalties for non-
compliance were sufficiently high to ensure that 
adequate probity checks were made. Fewer 
businesses that disagreed that they did not  
have enough responsibility suggested that their 
obligations were costly and time consuming (4.5%), 
they were over-regulated or had too much 
responsibility (5.7%), or their responsibilities were too 
high in view of the low level of risk that was present 
(4.2%)
A far smaller proportion of respondents agreed  
or strongly agreed that they currently did not have 
enough responsibility to ensure probity. The largest 
group of these respondents formed this view 
because of a perception that more responsibility is 
needed generally, or that greater vigilance is required 
from some businesses (8.9%). Some respondents 
also expressed the view that combining the DFAT 
and Attorney-General’s Department watch lists,  
and employing simpler language, would make 
compliance easier.
Interviewees reported experienced a number of 
challenges in assessing probity of their customers 
under the AML/CTF regime. Discrepancies between 
the AML/CTF regulatory requirements in different 
countries created problems for businesses with 
international operations and different standards  
for customer due diligence. Reporting had to be 
managed in each of the locations they conducted 
business. On a practical level, undertaking customer 
identification could also be difficult where customer 
bases included many foreign nationals whose names 
are not based on Roman characters. An example 
Table 29 How respondents view levels of responsibility for ensuring probity (%)
Reason All businesses ‘Disagreeing’ businesses
Disagreed that responsibility was insufficient
Enough responsibility/regime is OK/generic positive 9.4 15.7
Over regulated/ too much responsibility/generic negative 3.1 5.7
Current system onerous/time consuming/costly 2.5 4.5
Obliged to comply/penalties high/currently compliant 9.2 16.2
Too much for low risk 3.5 4.2
We would do the requirements anyway 2.7 5.0
Current requirements already cover anti-money laundering 1.7 3.4
Agreed that responsibility was insufficient
Need assistance/support/difficult to implement 1.6 4.3
System is ineffective 0.9 4.6
Needs more vigilance from some/more responsibility 1.3 8.9
Anti-money laundering is important/essential 0.8 2.5
Neutral response
Irrelevant 0.7 1.1
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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given by one interviewee concerned the application 
of SWIFT transaction identification procedures that 
required a code to be used for Chinese character 
names. The resulting output was a very long code 
that made reporting difficult using standard forms. 
Most banks use SWIFT to transfer funds securely 
between banks.
Suggested improvements 
to the anti-money 
laundering/counter-
terrorism financing regime
Survey respondents were also asked to consider 
how the AML/CTF regime could be improved. 
Survey respondents were provided with some 
closed questions, as well as the opportunity to 
provide their own suggestions for improvement  
(see Table 30). These findings should be read in  
the context that they were provided during the early 
stages of implementing the AML/CTF Act.
The category of improvements with which the 
largest proportion of respondents agreed was for 
AUSTRAC to provide more training courses and 
seminars on the regime (43.9%). These views were 
based on actual experience of AUSTRAC’s services 
prior to 2009. Another third nominated the provision 
of more relevant typologies and case studies. The 
most commonly cited unprompted suggestion for 
improving the AML/CTF regime, nominated by 6.5 
percent of respondents, was to consider business 
size, the extent of risks to businesses, or to consider 
industry-specific measures in reforming the regime.
Figure 26 shows the proportions in each business 
sector that responded to the three prompted 
responses to how regime could be improved— 
by AUSTRAC providing more typologies and case 
studies, by AUSTRAC offering more training courses 
and by more training and seminars being provided 
by industry peak bodies. Generally, there was a 
preference for AUSTRAC to provide more training 
courses, although those in the gambling and foreign 
exchange sectors least favoured this option. 
Alternative remittance providers were particularly 
keen on further training being provided by AUSTRAC 
Table 30 Suggested improvements to the current AML/CTF regime (%)
Suggested improvements %
Prompted responses
More typologies/case studies from AUSTRAC 33.5
More training courses by AUSTRAC 43.9
More training/seminars by industry peak bodies 29.0
Unprompted responses
More feedback on compliance/reporting 0.4
More case studies/typologies/examples of effectiveness 1.0
Abolish AML/CTF regime 0.6
Simplify the process/more user friendly 2.9
Consider business size/risk levels/industry specific regime 6.5
More data sharing/central data base 1.0
Stop duplication of reporting/of legislation/of requirements 0.5
More AML/CTF training/industry specific assistance 4.3
Provide software 0.3
Costs too high/provide reimbursement or concessions 0.5
Increase awareness/public information 0.3
Other 17.3
Don’t know 2.4
Refused 0.2
No response 9.4
Source: AIC AML/CTF Australian businesses survey [computer file]
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(a need reiterated during AIC consultations with 
alternative remittance providers; see Rees 2010). 
Those in the managed funds, financial services and 
cash delivery sectors also favoured the use of 
industry-based training because this is the form of 
training that is employed for other compliance 
regimes that they are subject to.
The results relating to each of the prompted 
alternative responses were significantly different 
according to the business sector respondents 
occupied in terms of the provision of more training 
course provided by AUSTRAC (χ2=63.8, df=8, 
p≤0.0001, Cramér’s V=0.10); in terms of the 
provision of more typologies and case studies from 
AUSTRAC (χ2=188.1, df=8, p≤0.0001, Cramér’s 
V=0.21); and in terms of the provision of training  
by industry peak bodies (χ2=41.8, df=8, p≤0.0001, 
Cramér’s V=0.10). Each of these statistics showed  
a weak level of association between the views  
of respondents as to the specified methods of 
improvement and the business sector they 
occupied.
More than half of the respondents from the managed 
funds and superannuation, banking and securities 
and derivatives sectors agreed that the current 
regime could be improved with more typologies and 
more training courses from AUSTRAC. Smaller 
proportions of respondents from the cash delivery 
(31%) and gambling sectors (26.4%) agreed that 
typologies and case studies provided by AUSTRAC 
would improve the regime. These findings illustrate 
to some extent the difficulties AUSTRAC faces in 
educating the regulated sectors, as it appears that a 
proportion of respondents were unaware of the 
typology reports and other sources of information 
that were available, even in mid 2009.
Figure 26 Suggested improvements to the AML/CTF regime, by business sector (%)
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The AML/CTF Australian business study surveyed 
businesses from all sectors in Australia during 2009 
with AML/CTF regulatory requirements, including  
the gambling, banking, managed funds and 
superannuation, securities and derivatives, foreign 
exchange, alternative remittance, financial services 
and cash delivery sectors, and other businesses 
providing regulated services, such as bullion dealers. 
The study was the first in Australia to consider the 
views of reporting entities on the risks of money 
laundering and terrorism financing facing their 
businesses, their approaches to compliance, the 
costs of compliance the perceived effectiveness  
of the regime and ways in which the regime could  
be improved. The findings presented in this report 
summarise the views of regulated businesses in the 
phase immediately following the full implementation 
of the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) in 2009. Further 
qualitative information on the perceptions of regulated 
businesses came from interviews undertaken with  
a small number of individuals who had completed 
the questionnaire and who were willing to undertake 
face-to-face interviews. Their views, although  
not necessarily representative of all the survey 
respondents, nonetheless provided some useful 
insights into how they understood Australia’s  
AML/CTF regime in 2009.
Perceptions of risk
Perception of risks  
of money laundering
More than half of the respondents to the AML/CTF 
Australian businesses survey perceived the risk  
of their business becoming implicated in money 
laundering to be non-existent, or very low. The other 
half highlighted a diverse range of potential money 
laundering risks that they believed their businesses 
might face in the two year period to 30 June 2011. 
Many of these risks were tied directly to the core 
business of each industry sector and not to any 
external threat, type of customer, or type of predicate 
crime. The largest proportion of respondents (albeit 
only 5.9%) nominated gambling as the highest risk  
for money laundering, with the majority of these 
businesses being from the gambling sector 
themselves.
In relation to perceptions of the level of risk of money 
laundering to which the businesses of respondents 
were exposed, almost all of the survey participants 
(97.8%) stated that they considered their businesses 
were exposed to low risks of money laundering in 
the year to 30 June 2009. Ninety-five percent of the 
survey respondents anticipated that the level of risks 
would decrease or remain the same in the two year 
period to 30 June 2011. Nine businesses, from the 
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3,870 respondents who answered the question 
perceived the risks of money laundering to their 
businesses to be high. Most interviewees shared the 
view that their business faced few risks in mid 2009 
and their expectation was that this situation would 
not change in the two year period to 30 June 2011.
Each of the business sectors surveyed in this study 
demonstrated different profiles in respect of who 
they considered to be high-risk customers, although 
each sector highlighted Australian and foreign 
individuals, PEPs and foreign companies as the  
four riskiest types of customers. As might be 
expected in a risk-based system, individual 
businesses assigned risk based on their own 
experiences. For example, respondents providing 
gambling services were less likely to identify PEPs  
as high-risk customers compared with respondents 
from the banking sector—although as noted above, 
casinos might have viewed PEPs as a higher risk 
than clubs and pubs—which was not able to be 
assessed in this survey where the results of all 
gambling service providers were grouped together. 
The perception of high risk did not include customer 
types that might be linked to complex business 
arrangements, which might be used to conceal 
beneficial ownership such as trusts, associations,  
or domestic companies.
More than one-third of survey respondents 
nominated individuals as high-risk customers— 
a larger proportion than those that identified either 
PEPs or foreign companies as being high risk. 
Businesses from the financial services sectors—
such as banks and securities and derivatives 
businesses—were more likely to consider PEPs as 
high-risk customers than money service businesses 
or the non-financial businesses regulated in Australia. 
Financial services businesses were also more likely 
than money service businesses or non-financial 
businesses to consider foreign residents and foreign 
governments as posing higher risks as customers.
Perception of terrorism  
financing risks
Almost all of the study’s participants (99.5%) 
considered the risks of terrorism financing to their 
businesses to be low in 2008–09 and more than  
95 percent of respondents also anticipated that such 
risks would remain stable in the two year period to  
30 June 2011. When respondents were asked to 
nominate the types of terrorism financing risks that 
their businesses might face in the two year period to 
30 June 2011, just under 60 percent still indicated 
that their business faced little or no risks of terrorism 
financing. There was a relationship between business 
sector and perceptions of terrorism financing risk, 
with the proportions of respondents from different 
business sectors that identified no or low risks of 
terrorism financing ranging between 40 percent  
of foreign exchange businesses to 66 percent of 
financial services businesses. Only two participants 
from the entire sample reported believed high risks 
of terrorism financing might be affecting their 
businesses.
The perceptions of participants of higher risk 
customers also varied according to the business 
sector they occupied. Businesses from the financial 
services sector were more likely than money service 
businesses or non-financial businesses to select 
‘individuals’ as higher risk customers in relation to 
terrorism financing.
Explaining these perceptions
The overwhelming view of survey participants was 
that their business faced few money laundering  
and terrorism financing risks. This opinion may  
have been based on the surveyed entities genuinely 
having faced few risks of either crime taking place. 
Alternatively, those surveyed may not have been  
in possession of adequate information to enable 
them to evaluate the level of risk that faced their 
business at the time. It may also be the case that  
the participants may have underestimated the true 
level of risk involved.
The current study offers some insight into the 
reasons why almost all of the participants in the 
study considered their business to be exposed to 
low risks of money laundering or terrorism financing. 
One view that emerged from the survey data was 
that the perception of there being very few money 
laundering and terrorism financing risks was directly 
linked to the size and core activities of the businesses 
involved. Smaller sized businesses felt they were 
insulated from ML/TF risks because owners and 
managers of small enterprises personally knew  
their customers and any new customer entering  
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the business would be immediately obvious to, and 
‘vetted’ by, staff. Providing some support for this 
view is that almost all of the few money laundering 
cases that have been prosecuted in Australia that 
have involved small businesses have not involved 
unwitting involvement of personnel. Rather, these 
cases all involved complicit agreement by the 
business to participate in laundering the proceeds  
of crime. The Australian case examples that involved 
unwitting use of designated service providers had 
used large banks with multiple branches in order to 
structure deposits discreetly (see Box 1 and ACC 
2011, AUSTRAC 2011b, AUSTRAC 2011c).
The feedback provided by interview participants 
from the gambling sector stressed that the small 
turnover that their businesses experienced from 
regulated services and the industry in which they 
operate were the two primary reasons for levels  
of money laundering risk being so low. These 
participants took the view that gaming machines 
offered little genuine opportunity to launder money  
or to launder large sums of money undetected. The 
limited opportunities afforded to any customer with 
the intention of laundering money would be further 
reduced in licensed premises that might only have 
one or two gaming machines. Any attempt to 
launder funds in such an environment would be 
immediately apparent.
Some of the interview participants considered that 
the nature of their customer base would make 
money laundering unlikely to occur and if it did, it 
would be identified. Smaller businesses, in particular, 
emphasised that owners and managers personally 
knew their customers and that any new customer 
entering the business would be immediately obvious 
to all staff and other clientele.
Another factor that may explain perceptions of  
low ML/TF risks was the self-described risk-averse 
culture of their businesses. In each case, the 
motivation for a highly risk-averse culture stemmed 
from inherent risks associated with the core activities 
of the business rather than from money laundering 
concerns. The cautious approach that these 
businesses adopted when dealing with new  
clients, combined with monitoring and modifying 
procedures, acted to diminish the opportunities for 
any clients to use their businesses to conduct illegal 
transactions.
It is apparent from the present research that 
perceptions of risk and confirmed cases of actual 
exploitation may not always coincide. AUSTRAC’s 
(2010c) examination of 174 case studies and 
typologies published for the period 2007–10 found 
that money laundering offences, along with fraud 
offences, constituted the most prevalent form of 
criminal activity (26% each), while terrorism made up 
just one percent. The regulated industry sector most 
commonly used to launder money or transfer funds 
for the financing of terrorism—based on the sample 
of cases chosen in AUSTRACs typologies and case 
studies series—was the banking industry (45%; 
AUSTRAC 2010c), followed by alternative remittance 
services (18%) and gambling services (9%).  
Based on this evidence, it might be expected that 
representatives from these business sectors would 
perceive or experience a higher level of risk than 
other sectors in general (although it should be noted 
the survey in 2009 occurred in the early stages of 
AUSTRAC’s typologies and case studies series).
However, in the current survey, the majority of survey 
respondents from the banking, remittance services 
and gambling sectors were no more likely than 
representatives of other surveyed industry sectors  
to report a higher perception money laundering or 
terrorism financing risk. They were also no more 
likely to predict an increased risk between 1 July 
2009 and 30 June 2011, with the exception of 
providers of alternative remittance services.
In another AIC survey, respondents from law 
enforcement agencies considered that the risk  
of ML/TF to currently regulated sectors had not 
changed considerably since the implementation  
of the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth), although it had 
probably reduced for the banking sector and 
increased for alternative remittance service providers 
(Smith et al. forthcoming).
Exploring why business sectors that are implicated 
in confirmed cases of misuse do not have a higher 
risk perception might identify ways to close this gap 
and improve the effect of government guidance. 
Whether those sectors and industries regulated 
under AML/CTF actively use AUSTRAC and other 
government information to inform their risk programs 
could also be evaluated.
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Compliance
Some relationship existed between the perceptions 
of reporting entities of risks and compliance 
activities, although there was no clear reduction  
in compliance from businesses that had low 
perceptions of risk. More than 85 percent of 
businesses conducted ongoing customer due 
diligence procedures. The compliance rate fell to  
75 percent for pre-employment screening and  
80 percent for KYC procedures. Relationships were 
found between the business sectors of participants 
and their likelihood of conducting each of these 
three compliance measures assessed in this survey. 
Businesses from the financial services sectors  
were more likely to conduct ongoing due diligence 
and KYC procedures than either money service 
businesses or non-financial businesses. Financial 
services businesses, such as banks, and cash 
delivery service providers were more likely than other 
participants to conduct pre-employment screening 
before hiring new staff.
The data revealed no statistically significant 
relationship between compliance with KYC 
requirements and the views of participants on 
money laundering risks to 2011. Those who 
perceived no money laundering risks were no less 
likely to comply than those who nominated some 
level of risk. There were relationships between 
respondents who nominated ‘no risks’ and those 
who conducted pre-employment screening and 
ongoing due diligence. Businesses that nominated 
‘no risks’ were significantly less likely to conduct 
pre-employment screening and less likely to conduct 
ongoing due diligence.
More than 90 percent of the businesses that 
responded to the AML/CTF Australian businesses 
survey were small or micro businesses and many  
did not have AML/CTF regulatory obligations under 
the FTR Act (ie they were newly exposed to such 
obligations with the enactment of the AML/CTF Act 
2006 (Cth)). It is arguable that within this context, 
some of the reporting entities surveyed experienced 
difficulties applying the risk-assessment procedures 
that formed the current basis of AML/CTF compliance 
in Australia. Comments from the small number of 
interviewees from small businesses in previously 
unregulated industries indicated a degree of difficulty 
in understanding the requirements of the regime, 
applying the logic of risk assessment as the basis  
of risk-based compliance and addressing those  
risks through customer due diligence and ongoing 
monitoring. Interviewees from industries that had 
previous exposure to AML/CTF regulation, other 
financial regulatory obligations, or extensive 
regulation for other areas of their business were 
better able to apply the concepts of a risk-based 
system and to identify the specific AML/CTF and 
other risks that their businesses might face. The 
relationship between the views of respondents on 
whether the Australian AML/CTF regime was too 
onerous and their business sectors might also 
suggest difficulties from within some industry  
sectors in complying with the regime.
Identifying and reporting  
suspicious transactions
The business sector of the participants also 
appeared to have an impact on the likelihood of 
each business identifying a suspicious matter. 
Banks, despite holding more restrictive views on 
over-reporting than other businesses, were those 
most likely to have identified a transaction suspected 
of being linked to money laundering in the year to  
30 June 2009.
Most participants (70–80% depending on the scenario 
presented) disagreed or strongly disagreed that 
under-reporting of suspicious transactions to 
AUSTRAC was justifiable, even in situations where 
reporting might be thought to result in a loss of 
business, or where the business feared reprisals 
from such action. Over-reporting was also considered 
justifiable by the majority of respondents (50–70% 
depending on the scenario presented), although  
in each instance, the banking sector was the least 
likely to consider over-reporting justifiable. The 
results suggested that even as participants outside 
the banking sector were more inclined than not to 
report a suspicious matter, those in the banking 
sector were the most likely to encounter and to 
identify a suspicious matter.
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Costs
Information on costs provided by survey respondents 
was also tied to, or affected by, the business sector 
respondents occupied. The reported compliance 
expenses across the entire sample ranged from  
no cost to $60m. The median expenditure across 
the entire sample was $1,000, with 57 percent of 
businesses reporting expenditure of $1,000 or less 
on AML/CTF compliance. Managed funds and 
superannuation businesses reported the highest 
median AML/CTF compliance costs at $6,000. 
Businesses from the foreign exchange sector and 
those classified as ‘other’ reported median costs 
below $500.
Approximately two-thirds of the sample expected 
their compliance costs to remain the same in the 
two year period to 30 June 2011. Seventy percent 
of participants who anticipated shifts in their 
compliance costs expected their expenses to 
increase by less than 50 percent. Participants 
ranked staff training and professional development, 
staff salaries and record keeping, monitoring and 
reporting as the most expensive areas of their 
compliance costs. The timing of the AML/CTF 
Australian businesses survey coincided with the 
period immediately after the full implementation of 
the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) and hence some of the 
compliance cost estimates provided by respondents 
may refer to initial financial outlays that were not 
sustained into subsequent years. It is also possible 
that some of the systems changes required to 
address AML/CTF compliance were done in 
conjunction with other, general upgrades which  
may have temporarily inflated costs. The reported 
expenditure of participants for AML/CTF compliance 
in 2008–09 was associated with their views on 
whether the regime was too onerous. The likelihood 
of participants viewing the regime as being too 
onerous, however, did not directly increase with  
their costs. The participants who reported spending 
$1,000 or less were more likely to give neutral 
responses to the question of whether the regime 
was too onerous for the risks involved. Across the 
entire sample, around 28 percent of participants 
considered the regime to be too onerous, while 
approximately 25 percent disagreed that this  
was the case. Only one percent of respondents 
disagreed that the regime was too onerous as  
the low level of risk to their businesses meant 
compliance activities were kept to a minimum.
Attitudes towards the anti-
money laundering/counter-
terrorism financing regime
Participants held fairly positive views of the AML/CTF 
regime, despite the overwhelming perception that 
there were minimal risks of money laundering or 
terrorism financing to their businesses at the time. 
The survey’s respondents considered the regime  
to be effective in deterring offenders, minimising  
the risks of financial crimes, minimising the risks of 
money laundering, minimising the risks of terrorism 
financing, maintaining the integrity of the financial 
system and promoting good governance practises. 
Respondents rated the regime as neither effective 
nor ineffective at facilitating proceeds of crime 
recoveries or minimising the risks of reputational 
damage. Those who considered the regime to be 
too onerous for the risks of ML/TF were also more 
likely to consider the regime to be less effective at 
minimising these risks.
Almost half of respondents agreed that the AML/CTF 
system would be improved if AUSTRAC were able  
to provide more AML/CTF training courses. 
Approximately one-third agreed that the system 
would be improved if AUSTRAC could provide more 
case studies and typologies. The businesses that 
participated in this study had a range of experiences 
with AUSTRAC and AUSTRAC’s materials. Some 
businesses, predominantly those from industries 
with previous contact with financial and other forms 
of regulation, found AUSTRACs training documents 
integral to their employee training programs. 
Businesses from the financial services industries 
were more likely than money service businesses,  
or non-financial businesses, to suggest that the 
AML/CTF regime could be improved with more 
typologies and case studies being provided by 
AUSTRAC.
Conclusion
The AML/CTF Australian businesses survey was the 
first study to canvass the views of Australian regulated 
businesses on various aspects of complying with  
the AML/CTF regime. It attracted a large number  
of respondents drawn from all regulated sectors in 
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2009 and achieved an unusually high response rate 
for business surveys of this kind (50%). The findings 
provide a benchmark of how businesses in Australia 
understood their obligations in mid 2009, their views 
on the regime at the time and projections for the 
ensuing two years to 30 June 2011. Some of the 
principal findings are as follows.
Variations between business sectors in terms of 
compliance, costs and perceptions of risk were 
present throughout the results of the survey. The 
experience of businesses from the banking, securities 
and derivatives, managed funds and superannuation, 
and financial services sectors were quite different from 
those in the gambling sector, ARS providers, foreign 
exchange businesses, cash delivery sector and other 
businesses with regulatory obligations in key areas.
Generally, businesses without previous exposure to 
AML/CTF compliance were less likely to have used 
standard compliance measures and to report feeling 
confident in identifying suspicious transactions. 
Absence of prior exposure to AML/CTF compliance 
also led to these respondents to consider that the 
regime was too onerous relative to the risks present. 
While most respondents surveyed perceived  
the overall risk of money laundering or terrorism 
financing to their business to be low, some sectors 
from the newly regulated component of businesses 
were more likely to nominate a lower risk. The 
perception of the AML/CTF regime as being too 
onerous was less likely, however, to be associated 
with the costs involved. Most businesses reported 
spending $1,000 or less on AML/CTF compliance 
and the businesses from some of the newly 
integrated sectors spent even less.
An issue for the integrity of the system as a whole  
is that some of the business sectors (or some 
members of affected sectors) included in the 
regime—in order to create a more hostile environment 
to illicit transactions—reported experiencing difficulties 
in conducting risk assessments, implementing 
risk-appropriate measures and complying fully with 
the regulatory obligations in 2009. Gurung, Wijaya 
and Rao (2010) argued that all businesses may find 
interpreting and applying their AML/CTF regulatory 
obligations challenging, although financial institutions 
that had AML/CTF regulatory obligations prior to the 
2006 Act were far better placed to become compliant 
with the current obligations because of their previous 
exposure to regulation in this field.
The Australian AML/CTF regime is risk based in the 
sense that regulated sectors are able to self-assess 
the ML/TF risk their business is exposed to and 
develop an appropriate compliance program to 
mitigate and manage this risks; reporting requirements 
are the same, irrespective of risk. While it was  
not entirely clear from the survey findings which 
components of the regime respondents found 
particularly onerous—the development and 
adherence to the business-specific risk mitigation 
program or compliance with mandatory reporting 
requirements—it is assumed from the responses 
that much of the difficulty was associated with  
the latter.
One of the core tenets of the risk-based system  
is to apply it appropriately to different business 
environments. One response to the findings may be 
the need to place greater emphasis on developing 
sector-specific education that will enable businesses 
to assess levels of risk more effectively and to create 
programs accordingly. An immediate response to 
assisting businesses without previous exposure to, 
or continuing difficulty with, AML/CTF regulatory 
requirements is through the provision of educational 
materials and training tailored to affected sectors. At 
the time the survey was undertaken, which coincided 
with the initial implementation of the AML/CTF Act 
2006 (Cth), respondents suggested that sector-
specific educative and training initiatives would  
assist them in better understanding and assessing 
the risk environment in which they operated, a 
central component of the risk-based AML/CTF 
system. The delivery of sector-specific education has 
been recommended in other AIC research on money 
laundering and terrorism financing risks; for example, 
providers of alternative remittance services (Rees 
2010), non-financial sector businesses and 
professions suggested for inclusion under the 
second tranche of reforms and non-profit 
organisations (Bricknell et al. 2011).
In the period since the survey, AUSTRAC has made 
available a more extensive range of education, 
training and guidance materials for regulated entities 
that has included:
•	 generic and industry-specific guidelines regarding 
AML/CTF obligations;
•	 information brochure series on program 
procedures;
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•	 risk-management tools to aid small and medium 
sized businesses in identifying, assessing and 
treating risk; and
•	 industry-specific engagement and supervisory 
strategies, comprising targeted education and 
awareness campaigns and guidance materials 
with a focus on sectors that have experienced 
difficulty in applying a risk-based approach to 
implementing AML/CTF programs;
These initiatives, along with the annual publication  
of typology reports, should have filled at least some 
of the educative gap survey respondents felt existed 
in 2009.
Limitations
The present survey was not without its limitations. 
Slightly over half of the survey’s respondents came 
from the gambling sector and these tended to be 
smaller businesses within that sector. Businesses 
from the financial services sectors, such as banks, 
were under-represented. This may have influenced 
the results in situations where analysis was 
conducted across the entire sample rather than 
comparing the outcomes between business sectors. 
Small and micro-businesses comprised the majority 
of the sample, which may also have influenced the 
results obtained in the study. There was no publicly 
available information at the time of writing on the 
distribution of business size within the regulated 
sector, to determine whether the number of smaller 
businesses that responded were representative of 
the entire regulated sector.
The data analysis uncovered some inconsistencies 
in how businesses from the same industry identified 
their primary sources of revenue in the self-reported 
demographic information. This was particularly 
problematic for businesses providing a range of 
services, such as a general store operating as a  
post office while also providing remittance services.
In addition, and despite intensive pre-testing of the 
survey instrument and consultation with regulators 
(see Challice & Eliseo 2012), the language used in 
the questionnaire to describe some aspects of the 
AML/CTF regime in Australia proved inaccessible to 
some survey respondents. The language adopted in 
the questionnaire predominantly reflected the 
language used by AUSTRAC and in Australian 
legislation concerning AML/CTF-specific terms. 
Some survey respondents also highlighted problems 
understanding some of the terms in the 
questionnaire in their answers to open-ended 
questions.
Depending on the extent of participants’ difficulty in 
understanding some of the key terms in the survey, 
the results may not have captured the views of 
businesses recently included in the regime to an 
appropriate extent. Analysis of the responses of  
the 50 percent of participants that elected not to 
complete the survey suggested that non-corporate 
businesses, such as pubs and clubs, post offices 
and retailers, were over-represented in this group. 
More than 70 percent of those that elected to not 
complete the survey agreed that the regime was  
too onerous (Challice & Eliseo 2012).
Finally, the survey findings reported here must be 
taken in the context that they were collected at  
the early stages of implementation of the AML/CTF 
regime. Initial trepidation about the costs of 
complying with the regime, among other concerns, 
may or may not have been borne out in the interim 
period. AUSTRAC’s (2010d) Supervision Strategy for 
2010–11 noted the agency’s intention of conducting 
surveys across five industry sectors to gauge how 
well each sector has understood and implemented 
its AML/CTF obligations. If these subsequent findings 
are made available, they could be compared with 
responses collected in 2009 to determine if any 
changes or improvements have occurred in the 
regulated population’s response to or capacity  
to comply with Australia’s AML/CTF regime.
Directions for future research
Future studies of the opinions held by regulated 
businesses in this area and the methods and costs 
of compliance might seek to:
•	 replicate the survey and interviews to document 
changes in the ways businesses have viewed and 
applied the regime since 2009;
•	 replicate the survey to include all regulated 
businesses if the AML/CTF regime is expanded  
to include designated non-financial businesses 
and professions, such as legal practitioners, 
accountants and real estate agents;
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•	 replicate the study in comparable countries  
to highlight differences and similarities in the 
self-reported risk profiles of different industries  
in different geographic locations; and
•	 conduct further and more detailed interviews  
with those in the regulated sectors and also with 
representatives of law enforcement, regulators 
and AUSTRAC’s partner agencies that make use 
of the reported data.
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The AML/CTF legislation contains a number of 
definitions that are important to understand for 
present purposes. These include the following.
Remittance services (alternative remittance 
services)
Services involved in transmitting money or property, 
including informal systems or networks outside of 
the formal banking sector. A remittance arrangement 
is between persons who are not ADIs, banks, 
building societies, or credit unions.
Reporting entities
All financial institutions, money service businesses 
and designated non-financial businesses and 
professions, providing the designated services 
outlined in s 6 of the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth). 
Reporting entities may be collectively referred to  
as the regulated sector.
Financial institution
A person or entity conducting, as a business, one  
or more of the following activities or operations on 
behalf of a customer:
•	 accepting deposits and other repayable funds 
from the public;
•	 lending and financing commercial transactions;
•	 financial leasing;
•	 transferring money or value;
•	 issuing and managing means of payment such  
as stored value cards;
•	 providing financial guarantees and commitments;
•	 trading in money market instruments, foreign 
exchange, exchange, interest rate, and index 
instruments, transferable securities or 
commodities;
•	 participating in securities issues;
•	 portfolio management;
•	 otherwise investing, administering, or managing 
funds on behalf of another person;
•	 underwriting and placing life insurance and other 
investment-related insurance products; and
•	 money and currency exchanging.
Financial institutions may be ADIs, banks, building 
societies, credit unions, or other persons specified  
in the AML/CTF Rules.
Designated non-financial businesses and 
professions
Businesses, outside of the financial and money 
service business sectors, offering a service outlined 
in s 6 of the AML/CTF Act. The DNFBPs identified 
by FATF are:
•	 casinos;
•	 real estate agents;
•	 dealers in precious metals;
•	 dealers in precious stones;
•	 legal practitioners, notaries, other legal 
professionals and accountants providing services 
to external clients; and
•	 trust and company service providers.
Bullion dealers are currently the only DNFBPs 
providing a designated service in Australia.
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Financial Intelligence Unit
A central agency responsible for receiving (and as 
permitted, requesting), analysing and disseminating 
disclosures of financial information:
•	 concerning suspected proceeds of crime  
and potential financing of terrorism; or
•	 required by national legislation or regulation in 
order to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing.
Tipping off provisions
Requirements for entities filing reports of suspicious 
financial activity to avoid disclosing information 
about the details of the report, or the existence  
of a report, to the subject of the report or another 
prohibited party.
Criminal penalties
Penalties imposed following a criminal conviction for 
an offence.
Civil penalties
Penalties imposed following civil proceedings rather 
than proving an offence to a criminal standard or 
with criminal court procedures.
Predicate offences
Financially motivated offences generating funds  
to be laundered.
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